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to teach Apologetics. I therefore presuppose the Reformed system of 
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—Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 1955
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that Cornelius Van Til’s (1895–
1987) presupposition of Reformed dogmatics is largely a presupposition of 
Herman Bavinck’s (1854–1921) Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. The argument proceeds 
in three steps. First, by situating Van Til’s life and work in the neo-Calvinist 
intellectual milieu within which he operated throughout his career, the prevailing 
Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s thought is challenged on the grounds of 
historical abstraction. Second, his formal, material, and polemical appropriations 
of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek are analyzed in order to show not only that Van Til 
appropriates Bavinck’s thought pervasively, but also that his apologetics cannot 
be properly understood apart from Bavinck’s dogmatics. Third, Van Til’s 
criticisms of the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought are analyzed in terms 
of their originality and their validity. Regarding the former, it is argued that Van 
Til tacitly appropriates Herman Dooyeweerd’s (1894–1977) earlier criticisms of 
neo-Calvinist scholasticism. Regarding the latter, it is argued that Van Til’s 
criticisms are methodologically unsound and historically untenable insofar as 
they proceed upon subjective premises and lead to a subjective conclusion. In 
sum, given both his pervasive appropriation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek and his 
entrenchment in neo-Calvinist theology and philosophy, Van Til is more 
accurately interpreted as a neo-Calvinist rather than a Copernican revolutionary.
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PREFACE
Kees Van Til als Nederlandse-Amerikaanse, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan 
apologeticus—such an obtuse title surely calls for an explanation!
Taken together, these words sound two important bass notes that carry along 
the melody of my thesis, and since these notes ring out clearly in the relevant 
biographical literature,1 I will simply summarize them briefly up front.
In the first place, Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) is Dutch through and 
through. He frankly admits that he was groomed on the Dutch neo-Calvinist 
theology of Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920) and Herman Bavinck (1854–1921). 
Further, throughout his entire teaching career Van Til interacted extensively with 
modern Dutch theologians and philosophers. Nevertheless, his neo-Calvinist 
heritage has been significantly underdeveloped in the predominantly American-
Presbyterian-based Van Til scholarship. Hence the Dutch title is my attempt to 
foreground this important, yet neglected, contextual factor.
In the second place, Van Til is complex through and through. Due to his 
1. For the most recent and most thorough biography of Van Til, see John R. Muether, 
Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, American Reformed Biographies 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008). The biography by William White Jr., Van Til, Defender of the Faith: 
An Authorized Biography (Nashville and New York: Thomas Nelson, 1979), although largely 
uncritical, provides useful insights into Van Til’s life nevertheless. Also note the brief biographical 
sections within the following works: John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 19-47; Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic: Readings and Analysis 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 7-20; Kenneth D. Boa and Robert M. Bowman Jr., Faith Has Its  
Reasons: An Integrative Approach to Defending Christianity, 2nd ed. (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 
2005), 240-43.
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multifarious immigrations (i.e., geographically—from The Netherlands to 
America at age 10; institutionally—from Calvin Seminary to Princeton Seminary 
to Westminster Seminary; and ecclesiastically—from the Christian Reformed 
Church in North America to the Orthodox Presbyterian Church), nearly every 
aspect of Van Til’s life defies simple classification. Hence, a broad historical-
theological perspective is necessary for understanding any of the individual 
aspects of his colorful thought, including the one that is analyzed in this thesis—
Van Til’s presupposition of Reformed dogmatics.
Considered individually, each of the title words represent a particular 
component not only of Van Til’s thought and life, but also of my thesis’ raison 
d'être. 
First, apologeticus. In 1976 my friend and former seminary professor, Dr. John 
M. Frame, wrote the following introduction to an essay on Van Til’s theology:
In 1961, Cornelius Van Til reviewed a book by R. H. Bremmer called 
Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus (Herman Bavinck the Theologian). Having 
run across this review in a recent perusal of the Van Til corpus, I asked 
myself whether someday there might be a book called Cornelius Van Til  
als Dogmaticus.2
In part, apologeticus is my humble response to Professor Frame’s rhetorical 
question. Based upon (1) Van Til’s expressly stated job description that he is an 
apologist and not a dogmatician, (2) his frequent and persistent claims to the 
effect that he is building upon the theology of his Reformed predecessors rather 
than starting de novo, (3) his extensive interaction with neo-Calvinist Dutch 
2. John M. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” in Foundations of Christian 
Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North (Vallecito, CA: Ross House Books, 
1976), 295; also published as Van Til: The Theologian (Phillipsburg, NJ: Pilgrim Pub. Co., 1976). Cf. 
Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological Journal 24, 
no. 1 (1961): 48-64.
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theology and philosophy, and (4) as Frame himself suggests3—and as I intend to 
demonstrate below—Van Til’s pervasive appropriations of Bavinck’s dogmatic 
formulations, were such a book to be written it would have to be entitled 
Cornelius Van Til als apologeticus (or perhaps even als Nederlandse-Amerikaanse,  
Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan apologeticus!) rather than als dogmaticus.
Second, Nederlandse-Amerikaanse. Much has happened in the field of Bavinck 
scholarship since Frame’s essay in 1976. Most notably, Bavinck’s Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek has “immigrated” from Nederland to Amerika via a four-volume, 
unabridged English translation. Although it could be said that Bavinck’s 
dogmatic theology appeared in America much earlier by second-hand means 
(i.e., via B. B. Warfield’s, Geerhardus Vos’, Louis Berkhof’s, and even Van Til’s 
support for and appropriation of Bavinck’s thought) and by abridged 
translations, his Dogmatiek has been neither fully nor directly available to 
American readers until its recent “immigration.”
Additionally, as more scholars are reading Bavinck in English, international 
conferences on his theology have begun to appear on both sides of the Atlantic, 
such as, the 28–30 October 2004 “Ontmoeting met Herman Bavinck” conference at 
both the Theologische Universiteit te Kampen (Oudestraat) and De Vrije Universiteit te  
Amsterdam;4 the 18–20 September 2008 “Pearl and Leaven” Bavinck Conference at 
Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, MI, USA;5 the 16–18 April 2009 
3. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 295: “Even when Van Til’s theology sounds 
most strange to American ears (for example, his strong emphasis upon the ethical/metaphysical 
distinction), he is very often paraphrasing ideas from the Dutch tradition. (In the case of the 
ethical/metaphysical distinction, the source is Bavinck.)”
4. Papers from this conference were published in George Harinck and Gerrit Neven, eds., 
Ontmoetingen met Herman Bavinck, Ad Chartas-reeks 9 (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006).
5. Papers from this conference were published in Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (April 
2010) and The Bavinck Review, no. 1 (2010), http://bavinck.calvinseminary.edu/review/tbr-1-
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conference sponsored by The Abraham Kuyper Center for Public Theology at 
Princeton Theological Seminary in Princeton, NJ, USA, in celebration of the 
centenary of Bavinck’s Stone Lectures; the 1–2 September 2010 Edinburgh 
Bavinck Conference at The New College School of Divinity, University of 
Edinburgh, in Edinburgh, Scotland;6 and the upcoming 12–14 October 2011 
Bavinck Conference at Calvin Seminary. Additionally, the first English-language 
biography of Herman Bavinck has been published just this past year.7 Van Til 
scholars, accordingly, have received the opportunity to analyze Van Til’s 
Amerikaanse theology in light of the growing body of English-language 
scholarship regarding Bavinck’s Nederlandse theology only recently.
Third, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan. A deep irony pervades Van Til 
scholarship, one that is unavoidable due to the nature of his aforementioned 
immigrations, namely, whereas Van Til was reared in the Dutch Reformed 
tradition, he spent nearly his entire teaching career at a predominantly 
Presbyterian institution. Likewise, he spent nearly his entire ecclesiastical career 
2010.
6. Papers from the plenary sessions of this conference will be published in The Scottish 
Bulletin of Evangelical Theology (Summer 2011), and student papers will be published in The 
Bavinck Review, no. 2 (April 2011), http://bavinck.calvinseminary.edu/review.
7. Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian (Phillipsburg, 
NJ: P&R, 2010). Also note the several introductory articles on Bavinck’s theology by Cornelis P. 
Venema: “Bavinck the Dogmatician (I),” The Outlook 58, no. 4 (April 2008): 6-9; idem, “Bavinck the 
Dogmatician (II),” The Outlook 58, no. 5 (May 2008): 8-11; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (3),” 
The Outlook 58, no. 8 (September 2008): 8-11; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (4),” The Outlook 58, 
no. 11 (December 2008): 8-11; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (4),” The Outlook 59, no. 1 (2009): 29-
31; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician (5),” The Outlook 59, no. 2 (February 2009): 27-28; idem, 
“Bavinck the Dogmatician (6),” The Outlook 59, no. 3 (March 2009): 22-25; idem, “Bavinck the 
Dogmatician (7),” The Outlook 59, no. 5 (May 2009): 26-31; idem, “Bavinck the Dogmatician: The 
Names and Attributes of the Triune God,” The Outlook 59, no. 7 (July 2009): 24-28; idem, “Bavinck 
the Dogmatician: The Doctrine of the Trinity,” The Outlook 59, no. 8 (September 2009): 28-31; idem, 
“Bavinck the Dogmatician (10),” The Outlook 60, no. 2 (March 2010): 28-31; idem, “Herman 
Bavinck: His Life and Theology,” New Horizons, October 2008, http://www.opc.org/nh.html?
article_id=576.
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in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. Yet, as his corpus clearly reveals, Van Til 
continued to engage the Dutch Reformed tradition (i.e., both the actual Dutch 
tradition in The Netherlands and its American counterparts) from his new 
Presbyterian posts. Despite his indefatigably Dutch roots and writings, however, 
his foremost interpreters and biographers have been American Presbyterians. 
Therefore, the words, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan, signify both this irony and 
the corresponding need for a thick reading of Van Til’s complex historical 
context.
Fourth, Kees Van Til. I was five years old when Van Til died, thus I never had 
the opportunity to meet him in person. But I have read in biographies of his life 
and have been told by those who knew him personally that his friends addressed 
him by his Dutch nickname—Kees. Although I will not be able to be his personal 
friend until heaven, I can do now what good friends always seek to do, namely, 
to listen to what the other is saying within the context in which he or she is 
speaking. In this sense I aim to be a good friend of Kees even now in the 
presentation of the following thesis.
By way of acknowledgements, first and foremost, I wish to thank the triune 
Lord who not only has drawn me out of sin’s darkness and shone his Son’s 
saving light into my heart, but also has redirected the course of my life in ways I 
never would have expected, including lavishing upon me the gift of 
postgraduate theological study. Who am I to deserve such an opportunity? 
Second, thank you to my beautiful, gracious, and selfless wife without whose 
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enduring patience and loving support I could have neither made it through the 
Th.M. program nor finished this thesis.
Third, thank you to my parents and to my in-laws, whose financial support, 
ceaseless prayers, and patience with their son’s frenetic and domineering school 
schedule and whose visits to Grand Rapids have put fresh wind in my slacking 
sails more than a few times.
Fourth, thank you to Professor John Bolt, whose generosity in providing 
materials for me to read, whose insightful suggestions and criticisms in countless 
office conversations, whose Th.M. courses on Bavinck’s theology, whose Ph.D. 
seminar on twentieth-century Dutch theology, and, above all, whose friendship 
and encouragement have been a great boon to my studies and to this project in 
particular.
Fifth, thank you to Calvin Theological Seminary not only for awarding me 
the Louis Berkhof Graduate Scholarship and hence enabling me to move my 
family to Grand Rapids in order to complete the Th.M. program, but also for 
providing—along with the Herman Bavinck Institute—funding to attend the 
2010 Edinburgh Bavinck Conference. The paper I delivered at the conference was 
an immense help toward the completion of this thesis.
Sixth, thank you to Mark Hofman, a fellow Th.M. student who generously 
donated to me a large collection of Van Til books that he had received from the 
personal library of Van Til’s brother-in-law, Dr. Fled Klooster. Having my own 
copies of these hard-to-find primary sources proved to be very useful throughout 
this project.
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Last but not least, thank you to Kerry John Hollingsworth, Director of 
Paideia Press, who not only generously provided access to pre-published 
translations of two works by Herman Dooyeweerd, but also graciously shared 
warm personal recollections regarding his friendship with Kees and keen insights 
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CHAPTER I. 
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN ABSTRACTO:
CORNELIUS AS COPERNICUS
The purpose of this essay is to analyze Cornelius Van Til’s preeminent 
presupposition—a presupposition upon which the entire structure of his thought 
depends, yet a presupposition which has received surprisingly little attention in 
the related scholarship—his presupposition of Reformed dogmatics. He states 
this presupposition clearly and modestly in the introduction to the first chapter 
of The Defense of the Faith, a book that many consider to be his magnum opus: “I 
have never been called upon to work out any form of systematic theology,” 
writes Van Til. “My business is to teach Apologetics. I therefore presuppose the 
Reformed system of doctrine.”1
Several critical questions arise from Van Til’s frank presupposition of 
Reformed dogmatics, such as: What is the nature of this presupposition in Van 
Til’s thought? Does he treat “the Reformed system of doctrine” as an eternal, 
static idea? Or does he view it as an historically-mediated and hence culturally-
conditioned and dynamic presupposition? Further, what is the extent of “the 
Reformed system” in Van Til’s view? Does it include Reformed confessional 
theology? If so, then which confessional traditions does it include? Does it 
include Reformed dogmatic theology? If so, then which dogmaticians does he 
1. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
P&R, 2008), 27.
2include, and from which countries and which eras does he make his selections? 
Does it include Reformed catechetical theology, Reformed biblical interpretation, 
and Reformed preaching? If so, then again, which catechists, commentators, and 
preachers does Van Til view as comprising “the Reformed system”? Moreover, 
what is the function of this presupposition in Van Til’s thought? Does he use this 
presupposition as the terminus a quo from whence all of his polemics proceed? 
For example, since in Van Til’s view Reformed apologetics presupposes 
Reformed dogmatics, then does it follow necessarily that the Reformed apologist 
is always the student of the Reformed dogmatician? If so, then from whom did 
Van Til learn his dogmatics before he formulated his apologetics?
Despite the fact that answers to these questions regarding Van Til’s 
presupposition of “the Reformed system of doctrine” are vital not only for an 
accurate interpretation of his thought, but also for a valid assessment of his 
contribution to Reformed theology, this aspect of his thought has received scant 
analysis. One of the primary reasons for this want is that, within the current body 
of Van Til scholarship, the historical Cornelius has been transformed into an 
ahistorical Copernican revolutionary; hence, his presupposition of “the Reformed 
system” has been abstracted into an ahistorical Copernican world wherein Van 
Til is seen as not only a revolutionary apologist but also a revolutionary 
theologian the likes of which have not been seen since Aquinas or Calvin. 
Therefore, if we are going to make any progress toward an historically sound 
analysis of Van Til’s presupposition, then first we must evaluate the Copernican 
line of scholarship with its attempt to present Van Til’s presupposition in 
3abstracto.
A. The Problem: Cornelius as Copernicus
Cornelius Van Til is frequently hailed by his followers as the Copernicus of 
modern Christian apologetics.2 He is attributed with the following Copernican 
résumé accordingly: (1) “He has done for apologetics,” insists Greg Bahnsen, 
what Calvin did for theology. By aiming to bring every thought into 
captivity to the obedience of Christ, Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic 
has triggered the reformation of Christian apologetics.3 
(2) “So, then,” Bahnsen alleges further,
the distinctive presuppositional method and outlook that Van Til 
promoted through his published writings have generated an intellectual 
revolution.4 
(3) “Any historical survey of Christian apologetics,” K. Scott Oliphint brashly 
asserts, “would show that, since Aquinas, the church has done little to develop 
the discipline of apologetics until Van Til.”5 (4) John Frame lauds Van Til as “the 
2. K. Scott Oliphint, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian 
Apologetics,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint 
and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 280; originally published as “Cornelius Van Til 
and the Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” in Die idee van reformasie: Gister en vandag, ed. B. J. 
van der Walt (Potchefstroomse: Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys, 
1991); also cf. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 295; Edmund P. Clowney, 
“Preaching the Word of the Lord: Cornelius Van Til, VDM,” Westminster Theological Journal 46, no. 
2 (1984): 242; Gary North, Westminster's Confession: The Abandonment of Van Til's Legacy (Tyler, TX: 
Institute for Christian Economics, 1991), 20-22. Though he is  not a follower of Van Til but rather a 
stiff critic, John W. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth (Jefferson, MD: The Trinity 
Foundation, 1986), 1-2, notes that Van Til’s followers have transformed Cornelius into a 
mythological Copernican figure.
3. Greg L. Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ: The Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” in 
Foundations of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North (Vallecito, CA: 
Ross House Books, 1976), 239; also cf. ibid., 233-34; idem, “The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception 
in Presuppositional Apologetics,” Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 1n2; idem, Van 
Til's Apologetic, 7.
4. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 16.
5. Oliphint, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” 
280. Incidentally, one standard history of apologetics textbook, Avery Cardinal Dulles, A History 
of Apologetics, 1st ed., Theological Resources (New York: Corpus Instrumentorum, 1971), contains 
no references to Van Til; furthermore, the revised edition includes only three passing references to 
4most important Christian thinker since John Calvin”6 and lavishes him with the 
following praise: 
“[W]hen one considers the uniqueness of his apologetic position and 
then further considers the implications of that apologetic for theology, 
one searches for superlatives to describe the significance of Van Til’s 
overall approach.”7 
(5) Frame further extols Van Til’s Copernican revolution in apologetics as equal 
to that of Kant’s in philosophy:
If (as may well be said) Van Til has done for Christian thought what Kant 
accomplished for non-Christian thought, giving it a revolutionary 
awareness of the uniqueness and comprehensiveness of its distinctive 
principles, then as with Kant the “Copernican” radicalism of his 
contribution must be appreciated in all areas of human thought and life.8
(6) Van Til’s “revolutionary” apologetic, exclaims Charles Dennison, was 
“virtually turning the study of apologetics head over heels.”9 (7) “Van Tilian 
him (idem, A History of Apologetics, 2nd ed., Modern Apologetics Library (San Francisco, CA: 
Ignatius Press, 2002), 266, 322, 357). Oliphint’s brash overstatement is based upon his own 
Copernican-like “Van Tilian” revolution as recounted in K. Scott Oliphint, “Desert Bloom in 
Amarillo,” New Horizons (July 2010), http://opc.org/nh.html?article_id=666; and idem, 
“Forward,” in The Defense of the Faith, xi-xiii, rather than upon objective historical analysis. Also, 
note idem, “Van Til the Evangelist,” Ordained Servant 17 (2008): 54: “My initial introduction to him 
[i.e., Van Til] came through his many writings. I immersed myself in those writings, seeing, for 
the first time in my Christian life, a man whose method (based, as it, was on Reformed theology) 
was able to decimate all pretensions and permutations of unbelief, including those residing in my 
own heart.” Additionally, see idem, Reasons for Faith: Philosophy in the Service of Theology 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2006), x, wherein Oliphint claims that he has imbibed Van Til’s teachings 
to such an extent that they are “between every line of the pages that follow” and that he “could 
not have written anything here had his [i.e., Van Til’s] influence not been profoundly present. . . .”
6. John M. Frame, “Backgrounds to My Thought,” in Speaking the Truth in Love: The Theology 
of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 14; also cf. idem, Salvation 
Belongs to the Lord: An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 
2006), 352; idem, The Doctrine of God, A Theology of Lordship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2002), 762.
7. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 295. Idem, Cornelius Van Til, 3, writes the 
following in a similar context: “I have been criticized for using such superlatives to describe Van 
Til, but I intend to use them again, and to defend that use, in the present volume.” At the same 
time, however, Frame admits that there is a need for a “sympathetic, comprehensive, critical 
analysis” of Van Til (p. 3).
8. Frame, “The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 297.
9. Charles G. Dennison, History for a Pilgrim People: The Historical Writings of Charles G.  
Dennison, ed. Danny E. Olinger and David K. Thompson (Willow Grove, PA: The Committee for 
the Historian of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 2002), 120.
5presuppositionalism” has provided, according to the Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church’s recommended curriculum for the training of ministers, “the most 
biblically faithful expression of Reformed apologetics,” and hence it is to be 
taught first and foremost before the presentation of a mere “survey of positions 
held by other Reformed apologists.”10 
These gushing scholarly and ecclesiastical interpretations of Van Til’s 
significance give the impression that the entire history of Christian thought 
begins and ends with Van Til.11 However, such ahistorical interpretations of Van 
Til’s work that transform Cornelius into a Copernican revolutionary appear 
oddly hyperbolic when contrasted against Van Til’s conspicuous modesty, his 
sonorous aversion to theological novelty, and his explicit appropriation of 
Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision.
1. Van Til’s Modest Self-Assessments
Van Til described his own work as intentionally unoriginal in the classic 
10. The full statement in Stated Clerk of the General Assembly, The Book of Church Order of the  
Orthodox Presbyterian Church, rev. ed. (Willow Grove, PA: The Committee on Christian Education 
of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 2011), 216, regarding the guideline for what should be 
taught with respect to apologetics is as follows: “Introduction to Apologetic Methodology and 
Practice including (1) the school of Van Tilian presuppositionalism as the most biblically faithful 
expression of Reformed apologetics, and (2) a survey of positions held by other Reformed 
apologists.” The language in the 2005 edition of the Book of Church Order is exactly the same. This 
statement is odd due to its idiosyncrasy: None of the other topics of study (e.g., systematic 
theology, church history, etc.) contain prescriptions for one person’s thought as the “most 
biblically faithful” expressions of that topic.
11. Regarding Van Til’s followers, Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 16, writes, “Some of them have 
made extravagant claims about Van Til and his legacy that would have embarrassed him. 
Disciples have lauded him as the most creative mind since Immanuel Kant and the greatest 
Christian thinker since John Calvin. The allegedly innovative features of his apologetic approach 
have been applauded for their proto-postmodernism and either credited or blamed for distancing 
both Westminster Theological Seminary and the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from their 
American Presbyterian past.” William Edgar, “Introduction,” in Christian Apologetics, ed. William 
Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 14, likewise asserts: “Cornelius Van Til is not the last 
word on apologetics, nor would he ever have claimed to be.”
6Protestant sense of the term—historical, orthodox, non-revolutionary.12 Like the 
seventeenth-century Reformed polemicist, Francis Turretin (1623–1687), who 
ardently eschewed “novelty” as a descriptor of his Institutio Theologiae  
Elencticae,13 and like Charles Hodge (1797–1878), the nineteenth-century 
Reformed theologian who famously asserted that during his tenure at Princeton 
no new doctrines had appeared either at Princeton Seminary or in the Biblical  
Repertory and Princeton Review,14 Van Til intentionally describes himself as 
standing squarely on the shoulders of his Reformed predecessors.15 Regarding 
12. For a classic statement of Protestant “unoriginality,” see John Calvin, “Prefatory Address 
to King Francis I of France,” in Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, 2 vols., 
Library of Christian Classics (Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 9-31. E.g., in response to the 
allegation of theological novelty leveled against the French Protestants, Calvin replies as follows: 
“First, by calling it ‘new’ they do great wrong to God, whose Sacred word does not deserve to be 
accused of novelty. Indeed, I do not at all doubt that it is new to them, since to them both Christ 
himself and his gospel are new. But he who knows that this preaching of Paul is ancient, that 
‘Jesus Christ died for our sins and rose again for our justification’ [Rom. 4:25 p.], will find nothing 
new among us” (pp. 15-16). Cf. William S. Barker, “The Historical Context of the Institutes as a 
Work in Theology,” in A Theological Guide to Calvin's Institutes: Essays and Analysis, ed. David W. 
Hall and Peter A., Lillback (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 4-7.
13. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George 
Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992), I:xlii, writes: “Let other books, then, be 
commended by their novelty. I do not want this statement to justify mine. I avoided it most 
diligently lest it should contain anything new, a stranger from the word of God and from the 
public forms received in our churches, and nothing is built up there that is not confirmed by the 
vote of our most proven theologians of highest reputation.”
14. D. G. Hart, “Systematic Theology at Old Princeton Seminary: Unoriginal Calvinism,” in 
The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of  
Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 3-4.
15. E.g., referring to his book on Christian epistemology, Cornelius Van Til, A Christian 
Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 23, writes: “The greater 
part of what is presented here is due to the fact that the writer stands on the shoulders of the 
great Reformed thinkers mentioned above. He is merely gathering together the thoughts found 
over a widely diversified body of their writings in order to present briefly that which basically 
they have taught.” The theologians “mentioned above” include “the great Reformed 
dogmaticians of modern times, such as Charles Hodge, Thornwell, Dabney, Shedd, Kuyper and 
especially Herman Bavinck. Back of all of them stands that master theologian and exegete of 
Scripture, John Calvin, whose writings have been constantly consulted” (see “Introduction,” 
n.p.). “It is to this basic approach,” Van Til similarly remarks, “of Kuyper and Bavinck, of Charles 
Hodge and B. B. Warfield and Geerhardus Vos (ignoring or setting aside the remnants of the 
traditional method that is found in their works) that appeal is made in this work” (ibid., 20). 
Additionally, cf. idem, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 
2003), 57n4, 101, 107n33, 115; idem, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the  
Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 
2007), 5-7, 13, 29n8, 70, 89, 89n1, 112n15, 320n4; idem, The Defense of the Faith, 2, 23, 27, 27n1, 103, 
7his own contributions to Reformed apologetics, for example, Van Til insists that 
he did not start de novo:
Seeing, therefore, the failure of even Reformed theologians and 
apologists in their efforts to defend consistently the self-attesting Christ 
of Scripture, it became clear to me that new ground work needed to be 
done. I did not, however, undertake this task de novo. I learned much 
from other men, just as I did in theology from Kuyper and Bavinck.16
In another work Van Til carefully emphasizes his continuity with “historic 
Calvinism” and downplays his differences with Warfield and Kuyper on 
apologetics:
In all this I think I am only presenting generic or historic Calvinism. If I 
have proposed variations, they are certainly not of basic import. Even the 
apologetic methodology I have proposed rests upon Calvin and upon the 
classical Reformed theologians. To the extent that these differ among one 
another I have been compelled to choose between them. Even so these 
differences have not been of such a basic nature that I could not appeal to 
a common view held by both parties. I have tried to use elements both of 
Kuyper’s and of Warfield’s thinking. If the construction that has resulted 
differs somewhat from both and is in that sense “original,” its soundness 
may be judged on its merits.17
In yet another place Van Til nuances his own apologetic formulations 
circumspectly. Referring to himself, he writes:
It is only in a subordinate way that he differs from the great theologians 
of the preceding generation. The greater part of what is presented here is 
due to the fact that the writer stands on the shoulders of the great 
Reformed thinkers mentioned above [i.e., Kuyper, Bavinck, Charles 
Hodge, B. B. Warfield, and Geerhardus Vos, p. 20]. He is merely 
gathering together the thoughts found over a widely diversified body of 
their writings in order to present briefly that which basically they have 
113, 143n43, 237, 264, 276, 284, 382, 395; Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ,” 234; White, Van Til,  
Defender of the Faith, 34-36; Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56.
16. Cornelius Van Til, “My Credo,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology 
and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 11.
17. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 23-24. In contradistinction to his “Copernican” 
assessment of Van Til noted above, Oliphint comments on this passage as follows: “This 
confession of Van Till’s should not be passed over lightly. He confesses here that the thrust of his 
approach to apologetics is the application of Reformed systematic theology to the Christian 
defense of the faith. He did not see himself as developing anything new in that sense” (23n101).
8taught.18
Likewise, Van Til introduces his own contribution to the Reformed debate over 
the doctrine of common grace as follows:
We now make bold to submit a few remarks by way of suggesting the 
direction in which we may possibly hope for profitable discussion on the 
common grace question in the future. It is with hesitation and diffidence 
that we do so. And it is with the greatest of appreciation for the labors of 
such men as Kuyper, Bavinck, Hepp, Schilder, Hoeksema, Zwier, and 
others, that we say what we say.19
Van Til elsewhere admits his indebtedness to his Reformed predecessors as 
follows:
With grateful acknowledgment of indebtedness to both Kuyper and 
Warfield, to Herman Bavinck and other associates and followers of 
Kuyper, to the various associates and followers of Warfield, to J. 
Gresham Machen in particular, we would take their common basic 
contribution to the idea of the full Christian faith and the self-attesting 
Scripture and build as best as we can upon it.20
In terms of his self-assessments, therefore, Van Til consistently viewed himself 
simply as “Cornelius,” a self-conscious inheritor of the classic Reformed 
tradition, not as “Copernicus,” a revolutionary seeking to begin his work de novo.
2. Van Til’s Polemics against Novelty
In addition to cautiously resisting the perception of novelty in his self-
18. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 23.
19. Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Pub. Co., 1972), 33-34. “Of course,” writes Van Til in a similar passage, “it was with 
great diffidence and hesitation that I sought a solution for the apologetic problem and for the 
problem of common grace by the means of thus sorting out, rejecting the weaknesses in both 
positions, and building upon the solid foundation in both, derived from Calvin and ultimately 
from St. Paul” (p. 186); Also cf. Van Til’s analysis of the differences between Old Princeton and 
Old Amsterdam on the nature of Reformed apologetics (pp. 183-87). “It is, in short,” Van Til 
writes further, “because I hold the appeal to reason as autonomous to be both illegitimate and 
destructive from the point of view of Reformed faith that I am bound to reject Hepp’s position as 
well as that of Old Princeton apologetics. But happily I can do so in view of the theology that I 
have learned from Old Princeton and Amsterdam” (p. 194).
20. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 254.
9assessments, Van Til also polemicizes vehemently against the heterodox 
“newness” that was appearing all around him. His self-named theological 
opponents include, for example: the “new theology” of the 1967 revision to the 
Presbyterian confessional standards;21 the “new modernism” at his Alma Mater, 
Princeton, and in the thought of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner;22 the “new 
hermeneutic” of Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling;23 the “new evangelicalism” 
and “new Protestantism” both of which rejected the infallibility of the Bible and 
asserted a “new Christ”;24 and the “new synthesis theology” overtaking the 
Gereformeerde Kerken van Nederland.25 It is clearly evident, then, that rather than 
21. Cornelius Van Til, The Confession of 1967: Its Theological Background and Ecumenical  
Significance (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1967), 1, declares the 
following: “Should the Confession of 1967 be adopted by that church [i.e., the United 
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America], an entirely new phase in its life will be 
ushered in. This is true because this proposed Confession gives expression to and is based upon a 
new theology. Our concern in this booklet, therefore, is with the nature of this new theology 
which will be given creedal status if this proposed Confession is adopted by the United 
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.” Additionally, cf. idem, An Introduction to 
Systematic Theology, 11-12.
22. In a characteristic statement regarding the rise of heterodoxy at his Alma Mater, 
Cornelius Van Til, “More New Modernism at Old Princeton,” Presbyterian Guardian 18, no. 9 
(September 1949): 166, exclaims: “Charles Hodge was one of the greatest systematic theologians 
of modern times. The man about to occupy the chair named after him does not believe in 
systematic theology at all.” Idem, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 181, moreover, describes Karl 
Barth’s theology as “the ‘new’ Protestantism rather than historic Protestantism.” See also idem, 
The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner, 3rd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972); idem, Christianity and Barthianism (Philadelphia, PA: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962); idem, “Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?,” Westminster  
Theological Journal 16, no. 2 (1954): 135-181.
23. Cornelius Van Til, The New Hermeneutic (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Pub. Co., 1974).
24. Cornelius Van Til, “The New Evangelicalism: Address of Welcome to Students Entering 
Westminster Seminary,” Presbyterian Guardian 26, no. 9 (October 1957): 131-132; idem, Karl Barth  
and Evangelicalism (Nutley, NJ and Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1964); See the 
following addresses within the book entitled “The Pamphlets, Tracts, and Offprints of Cornelius 
Van Til” in Cornelius Van Til, The Works of Cornelius Van Til (40 Vols.) (Logos Bible Software, n.d.), 
http://www.logos.com/products/details/3993: “The New Protestantism—1962” and “The New 
Christ—1958.” NB: Hereafter, this electronic collection of Van Til’s works will be referenced as 
follows: The Works of Cornelius Van Til (Software).
25. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 10, describes this book as follows: “The thesis of this 
essay is that the change of direction in Holland is one which is marked by a turning away from 
the traditional Reformed Faith, and toward the reinterpretation (Umdeutung) of it in terms of the 
post-Kantian freedom-nature scheme of thought, and, in particular, of neo-orthodox theology. We 
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promoting theological revolutions, Van Til frequently employs the adjective 
“new” in a pejorative sense in order to characterize his opponents’ views as 
heterodox. 
In light of Van Til’s careful avoidance of novelty in his self-assessments and 
his voluminous polemics against “new” theologies, it is therefore doubly ironic 
that some of Van Til’s interpreters have been quick to extol their “Copernicus” in 
terms of the very critique he leveled against his theological opponents—novelty.
3. Van Til’s Neo-Calvinist Vision
Abraham Kuyper’s 1898 Stone Lectures at Princeton Seminary26 had a 
profound influence upon Van Til. He not only writes about Kuyper27 and his 
Stone Lectures fondly,28 but also views himself as carrying on the neo-Calvinist 
vision that Kuyper propounded. For example, speaking with autobiographical 
undertones, Van Til concludes a 1969 speech with a clarion call for others to take 
up Kuyper’s vision:
The wisdom of this world has been made foolishness with God. It is thus 
that Kuyper’s vision expanded and clarified by Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd may help us in our task in undertaking the cultural 
mandate for ourselves today. Would that more of those who have seen 
shall be concerned chiefly with the new direction so far as it affects theology and, in particular, 
hermeneutics. But the new direction in theology and hermeneutics involves and presupposes the 
post-Kantian methodology of science and philosophy as well. Finally, the new direction in 
theology is, apparently, effecting a new direction in the ecclesiastical situation of the Gereformeerde 
Kerken.”
26. These lectures were published in Abraham Kuyper, Calvinism: Six Lectures Delivered in the 
Theological Seminary at Princeton (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1899).
27. Cornelius Van Til, “Reflections on Dr. A. Kuyper,” The Banner 72, no. 21 (December 16, 
1937): 1187; idem, “Kuyper en Amerika,” De Reformatie 18, no. 14 (December 31, 1937): 150; also cf. 
the extensive analysis of Kuyper's thought throughout idem, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed 
Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974).
28. E.g., see Van Til’s address entitled, “Pro Rege”—a title based upon the three-volume 
work by Kuyper with the same name—which address Van Til delivered once in 1933 and twice in 
1965; cf. Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til 1895–1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree 
Communications, 1995), s.vv., 1933.K, 1965.B.
11
something of Kuyper’s vision as he set it forth in the chapel at Princeton 
Seminary, might be willing to follow through with Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd. If they did, they would say, without hesitation, that it is 
only on the presupposition of the truth of what is taught in Scripture 
about man and his world, that it is possible for science to understand 
itself, for philosophy to attain a totality vision that is not mirage, and for 
theology to challenge the new Protestant synthesis between Christianity 
and existentialism and the still newer synthesis of the Aristotle-Christ-
Kant axis now functioning in the International Council of Churches of 
Christ in the World.29
Furthermore, since he names two Dutch neo-Calvinist philosophers, Herman 
Dooyeweerd (1894–1977) and Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven (1892–1978), 
as co-laborers, it is clear that Van Til did not consider himself to be a lone ranger 
in the fight to uphold Kuyper’s banner in the twentieth century. Rather, he places 
himself side-by-side in the same trench with these fellow crusaders.
Additionally, as a self-styled champion of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision, Van 
Til took upon himself the role of guardian of Kuyper’s antithesis in America. 
Thus, from his post in Philadelphia, he frequently looked across the Atlantic in 
order to survey the various permutations of “synthesis” thinking (i.e., the 
opposite of Kuyper’s “antithesis” thinking30) that were corrupting not only the 
theological landscape of his home country, but also the wider European 
theological landscape. Then, in order to stave off an infiltration of such heterodox 
synthesis thinking into American Reformed theology, Van Til vehemently 
polemicized against the work of the modern European theologian who was, 
according to Van Til, the paragon of synthesis thinking—Karl Barth (1886–1968).31 
29. “Appendix 2” in White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 233; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1968.I, 
1979.B2.
30. As will be demonstrated in chapter 6 below, Van Til appropriated the concept of 
“synthesis thinking” from Herman Dooyeweerd.
31. Van Til's polemics against Barth’s theology are as voluminous as they are vehement. His 
major polemic is Christianity and Barthianism. For a representative sample of his shorter polemics, 
see: idem, Karl Barth and Evangelicalism; idem, “Has Karl Barth Become Orthodox?” For a complete 
12
Van Til was especially frustrated by the fact that Barth’s synthesis theology took 
hold at his Alma Mater, Princeton Seminary. Likewise, he leveled polemics 
against the alleged synthesis thinking of several modern Dutch Reformed 
theologians, such as, Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965),32 Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer 
(1903–1996),33 Hendrikus Berkhof (1914–1995),34 and Harry Kuitert (1924–
present).35
Therefore, based upon the fact that Van Til (1) frankly appropriates Kuyper’s 
neo-Calvinist vision as his own—especially the “antithesis” of Kuyper’s Stone 
catalog of Van Til’s writings contra Barth, cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1931.A, 1932.D, 1934.D2, 1935.C, 
1935.J, 1936.G, H, 1937.B1-B4, 1937.I, 1938.B, D-F, K, P, 1940.A, 1946.B, G, 1947.A, 1948.B1, D, 
1950.A, 1954.A, B, L, 1955.B, 1958.A, D, 1959.A, D, E, F, J, 1960.B, 1961.I, 1962.D, G, H, N, 1964.A, 
B1, C, 1966.C, E, 1969.B, E, 1972.G, 1974.D, 1978.A.
32. Cornelius Van Til, “Review of Communication of the Christian Faith by Hendrik 
Kraemer (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956),” Westminster Theological Journal 19, no. 2 
(May 1957): 208-212.
33. Van Til critically appreciated Berkouwer’s earlier writings, but he vehemently 
polemicized against Berkouwer’s later writings. His voluminous analyses include: Cornelius Van 
Til, “Review of Karl Barth en de Kinderdoop (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1947) and E. Smilde, Een Eeuw van 
Strijd over Verbond en Doop (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1946), by G. C. Berkouwer,” Westminster  
Theological Journal 11, no. 1 (1948): 77-80; idem, “Review of Geloof en Rechtvaardiging, Dogmatische  
Studien (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1949) and Geloof en Heiliging, Dogmatische Studien (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 
1949), by G. C. Berkouwer,” Westminster Theological Journal 12, no. 1 (1949): 74-76; idem, “Review 
of De Triomf der Genade in de Theologie van Karl Barth (Kampen: J. H. Kok, N.V, 1954), by G. C. 
Berkouwer,” Westminster Theological Journal 18, no. 1 (1955): 58-59; idem, The Triumph of Grace: The 
Heidelberg Catechism, Vol. 1, Introduction, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Theological 
Seminary, 1958), esp. chs. 4, 6, 7, and 9; idem, “Westminster Professor Replies to Criticism of His 
Theological Views,” The Banner 96, no. 2 (January 13, 1961): 18; idem, Christianity and Barthianism, 
117-71; idem, “Review of The Second Vatican Council and the New Catholicism, trans. Lewis B. 
Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1965), by G. C. Berkouwer,” Interpretation 20, no. 4 
(October 1966): 493-94; “Appendix II” in idem, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, In Defense of 
Biblical Christianity 1 (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967); idem, The Sovereignty 
of Grace: An Appraisal of G. C. Berkouwer’s View of Dordt (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Pub. Co., 1969); “Appendix 5” in idem,The New Modernism; idem, “The Umkehr at Amsterdam,” in 
The Law and the Prophets: Old Testament Studies Prepared in Honor of Oswald Thompson Allis, ed. John 
H. Skilton (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1974); idem, The New Synthesis, 44-76; also see 
Van Til's response to Berkouwer in E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on 
the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 
197-204; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1948.B1, 1949.A1 and A2, 1955.B, 1958.D, 1959.J, 1961.K, 1961.O, 
1962.H, 1964.C, 1966.K, 1967.B, 1969.E, 1971.O, 1972.G, 1974.B1, 1974.G, 1975.B, 1975.E.
34. Van Til, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, 140-41; idem, The Sovereignty of Grace, 64-76.
35. Van Til, The New Hermeneutic, 109-80; idem, “The Umkehr at Amsterdam”; idem, The New 
Synthesis, 10-12, 17-19, 77-99; also cf. the few passing references to Kuitert throughout idem, 
Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.
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Lectures—and (2) levels “synthesis thinking” polemics against modern Dutch 
and European theologians accordingly, there is abundant warrant for classifying 
him as a neo-Calvinist theologian who was deeply engaged in modern Dutch 
Reformed thought.
B. The Question: “Van Tilian” or Neo-Calvinist?
Given the dissonance between Van Til’s modest self-identification as a 
“generic Calvinist,” his polemics against theological novelty, and his 
identification with Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision on the one hand, and the 
Copernican identity purported by several of his interpreters on the other hand, 
the following question arises: Did Van Til view himself as a “Van Tilian” (i.e., a 
Copernicus)?36 Or, is it possible that some of his interpreters have abstracted Van 
Til from his self-styled historic, Reformed context—“Christianity as interpreted 
in the Reformed creeds, as championed by Kuyper, Bavinck, Hodge, Warfield 
and Machen”37—and have created an adjective that Van Til himself never 
intended to exist?38
36. Michael S. Horton, “Consistently Reformed: The Inheritance and Legacy of Van Til's 
Apologetic,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and 
Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 134, raises a similar question, though in a more 
narrow context regarding the principia of traditional Reformed scholastic theology: “Cartesian 
epistemologies have produced ‘rational apologetics,’ while Lockean versions have generated ‘ 
evidential apologetics.’ Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositionalism was consequently regarded in its 
time as a novum in the history of apologetics, a conclusion that Van Til himself perhaps 
insufficiently challenged. But was it really new?”
37. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 276. Similar self-descriptions by which Van Til aligns 
himself behind the classic modern Reformed theologians abound in his writings. E.g., idem, The 
Defense of the Faith, 103, asserts the following: “It is on the basis of the work of such men as 
Charles Hodge, Herman Bavinck, and B. B. Warfield, to mention no others, that we have 
formulated the broad outline of the Reformed life-and-world view. It is only by the help of such 
men that we have been enabled to attain to anything like a consistent Protestantism.”
38. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 17, highlights the fact that Van Til “referred to his system 
unpretentiously as ‘Reformed apologetics’,” and he notes that Van Til used the term “Van Tilian 
apologetics” only in private correspondence with confidants (cf. pp. 113-14; quote at p. 114). 
Nevertheless, Muether employs the adjective “Van Tilian” in a few places, e.g., pp. 15, 18, 268, 
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This essay seeks to answer one aspect of this question by analyzing Van Til’s 
appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s Dutch neo-Calvinist theology. I write begin 
circumspectly; for, as Van Til himself admits, a panoply of philosophical and 
theological tributaries flow into his thought,39 and many of these streams remain 
uncharted waters in the scholarly literature.40 Yet, notwithstanding this caveat, 
there are four reasons why it is worthwhile to focus on the Bavinck tributary 
within the larger neo-Calvinist stream clearly evident in Van Til’s thought.
First, Van Til explicitly identifies two prominent neo-Calvinist theologians—
Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck—as main theological influences. 
Reflecting upon his long academic career in a letter, for example, Van Til begins 
as follows: “In my days at Calvin College and Seminary I read Kuyper and 
Bavinck assiduously and followed them through thick and thin.”41 Further, in 
“My Credo,” Van Til’s own non-technical summary of his thought, he writes:
277. NB: This neologism appears in the secondary literature in two forms, i.e., “Van Tilian” and 
“Van Tillian.” For simplicity’s sake, the former will be used throughout this thesis.
39. E.g., in the “Introduction” to his A Christian Theory of Knowledge, n.p., Van Til presents the 
following long list of theological and philosophical influences: Charles Hodge, James Henly 
Thornwell, Robert L. Dabney, William G. T. Shedd, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, D. H. Th. 
Vollenhoven, Herman Dooyeweerd, and G. H. Stoker. Later on Van Til adds B. B. Warfield and 
Geerhardus Vos to the list (p. 20). On Van Til’s appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s 
interpretation of the history of philosophy, see pp. 50-51. Also cf. idem, An Introduction to  
Systematic Theology, 13.
40. William Edgar, e.g, in Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 57n4, makes the following editorial 
comment: “The full story of Van Til’s relationship to the Amsterdam philosophy, and especially to 
Herman Dooyeweerd, has not yet been told.” (On Van Til’s complicated relationship with 
Dooyeweerd, see Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 18-19, 48-52; John M. Frame, The Amsterdam 
Philosophy: A Preliminary Critique (Pilgrim Press, 1972), 37-39). Likewise, Charles G. Dennison 
notes that Van Til’s relationship to Kuyper needs more study (History for a Pilgrim People, 136n54). 
Furthermore, as will become evident in the survey of scholarship below, few studies attempt to 
analyze Van Til’s appropriation of his self-named Reformed predecessors at any length. Owen 
Anderson, however, devotes a chapter to Van Til’s critiques of B. B. Warfield (see ch. 4 in Benjamin 
B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 2005)), and Brian G. Mattson evaluates Van Til’s critiques of 
Bavinck (“Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” Westminster Theological Journal 70, no. 1 (2008): 
111-127).
41. Cornelius Van Til, “The Development of My Thinking,” an unpublished letter to John 
Vander Stelt, 1968; Reproduced in Bristley, Guide, 14-17; quote at p. 14.
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Wanting to follow the Reformers, it was natural that I read and 
appreciated the works of those who before me likewise attempted to do 
so. I first used the works of Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck. How 
basic and how broad was their view! The idea of Scripture, they said, 
must never be separated from its message. . . .
. . . As Bavinck truly said, the nature of the message of salvation and 
the nature of Scripture are always involved in one another.42
Additionally, referring to his book, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Van Til admits 
that “what has been advocated in this work has in large measure been suggested 
by Kuyper’s thinking.”43 Similarly, thinking of his own apologetic method, Van 
Til asks:
And have I, following such a method, departed radically from the 
tradition of Kuyper and Bavinck? On the contrary I have learned all this 
primarily from them. It is Kuyper’s Encyclopedie that has, more than any 
other work in modern times, brought out the fact of the difference 
between the approach of the believer and of the unbeliever. It is 
Bavinck’s monumental work which set a “natural theology” frankly 
oriented to Scripture squarely over against that of Romanism which is 
based on neutral reason. It is Bavinck who taught me that the proofs for 
God as usually formulated on the traditional method prove a finite god. I 
have indeed had the temerity to maintain that these great Reformed 
theologians have in some points not been quite true to their own 
principles. But when I have done so I have tried to point out that when 
they did so they had departed from Calvin.44
At the beginning of An Introduction to Systematic Theology, moreover, Van Til 
comments: “My indebtedness to such former Reformed theologians as Louis 
Berkhof and, back of him, Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper, is apparent 
throughout.”45 Contra the theological subjectivism infiltrating Holland, 
furthermore, Van Til lauds Kuyper and Bavinck for instigating a “revival of 
42. Van Til, “My Credo,” 8-9; also cf. ibid., 11; White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 34-36.
43. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 233-34.
44. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 301; cf. idem, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155-56; 
idem, “Westminster Professor Replies to Criticism of His Theological Views.”
45. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 13.
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genuine Reformed theology.”46 In terms of dogmatic influences, therefore, the Dutch 
neo-Calvinist stream is the most prominent tributary flowing into Van Til’s 
thought.47
Second, within this neo-Calvinist dogmatic stream Van Til considers Bavinck 
to be the greatest modern Reformed theologian. He lauds Bavinck’s Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek accordingly as “the greatest and most comprehensive statement of 
Reformed systematic theology in modern times.”48 Moreover, in the introduction 
to A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Van Til admits that he is “greatly indebted to 
46. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 20. Throughout the book Van Til uses “Kuyper and Bavinck” 
as the representatives of orthodox Reformed orthodoxy contra the allegedly heterodox “new 
synthesis” Reformed theologians (e.g., pp. 29-30, 32-33, 35, 55, 59, 64, 69, 71, 87); See also the 
section entitled, “Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck: Orthodox Reaction to the Christ-Kant 
Synthesis of Nineteenth Century Theology” (pp. 28-43). Cf. Van Til’s use of Bavinck contra Barth 
in Common Grace and the Gospel, 135.
47. K. Scott Oliphint, “Forward,” in The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), ix-x, asserts the following: “To understand Van Til’s contribution to 
Reformed apologetics, one needs to see not simply his criticisms of Kuyper, Bavinck, and 
Warfield, but, more importantly, the ways in which he was able to take the best of these Reformed 
theological giants and incorporate their theological insights into his own apologetic 
methodology.” Idem, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the Reformation of Christian 
Apologetics,” 295n45, similarly asserts: “The Dutch influence of Van Til could arguably be the 
most significant influence that has contributed to his Reformed apologetic.” William Edgar, 
moreover, in editorial comments throughout Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 
observes the following: Kuyper was Van Til’s “mentor” (320n4; cf. 17n7); Van Til pervasively 
appropriated Bavinck’s doctrine of God (5, 29n8, 89n1, 319n1, 323n8, 335n33, 341n53, 353nn12, 14, 
354n20, 369n1).
48. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89; cf. ibid., 29; idem, Common Grace and the  
Gospel, 44; idem, The New Synthesis, 37; idem, Appendix 2 in White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 
225; idem, The Sovereignty of Grace, 27; idem, The Theology of James Daane (Philadelphia, PA: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1959), 92; idem, The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, 29; idem, “As I 
Think of Bavinck,” International Reformed Bulletin 9, no. 27 (1966): 19-26; idem, “Bavinck the 
Theologian,” 48-49. Commenting on Van Til’s statement, William Edgar notes, “Herman Bavinck 
(1854–1921) was a major influence on Van Til. He was perhaps the most significant force in 
evangelical Reformed theology in the twentieth century” (An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 
89n1). For more on Van Til’s assessment of Bavinck, see Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck”; Muether, 
Cornelius Van Til, 56, 115-16. Benjamin B. Warfield, who Van Til counts among his predecessors, 
provides a similar commendation: “He [i.e., Bavinck] has given us the most valuable treatise on 
Dogmatics written during the last quarter of a century—a thoroughly wrought out treatise which 
we never consult without the keenest satisfaction and abundant profit” (Benjamin B. Warfield, 
“Review of De Zekerheid des Geloofs (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1901), by Herman Bavinck,” The Princeton 
Theological Review 1, no. 1 (January 1903): 148). James Hutton Mackay, Religious Thought in Holland 
during the Nineteenth Century, The Hastie Lectures 1909-1911 (London, New York, Toronto: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1911), x-xi, similarly describes Bavinck as “the ablest living writer on 
Dogmatics in Holland.”
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the great Reformed dogmaticians of modern times, such as Charles Hodge, 
Thornwell, Dabney, Shedd, Kuyper and especially Herman Bavinck.”49 Finally, 
toward the end of his career Van Til  contrasts Bavinck with Kuyper and insists 
that the former, not the latter, provides the paragon of modern Reformed 
dogmatics:
He [i.e., Bavinck] will give us great help in our construction of a truly 
Reformed theology along the lines of the Reformation principle and 
specifically along the lines of Calvin and of Dordt.50
Van Til thus accords Bavinck the place of preeminence among his modern 
Reformed predecessors.51
Third, Van Til knows Bavinck’s works well, and he frequently references 
them. His introduction to the Dutch dogmatician came early on in his academic 
training, likely from two of Van Til’s most influential seminary professors—Louis 
Berkhof and Geerhardus Vos—both of whom, as will be noted below, had 
important theological and personal ties to Bavinck.52 Furthermore, his scholarly 
49. See "Introduction" in Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, n.p.; emphasis added.
50. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
51. “Back of them all,” continues Van Til in reference to his preeminent pre-modern 
theological influence, “stands that master theologian and exegete of Scripture, John Calvin, 
whose writings have been constantly consulted” ("Introduction" in A Christian Theory of  
Knowledge, n.p.). Thus, for Van Til, Calvin provides the classical paragon of Reformed theology. 
See also idem, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:17.
52. On the mutual scholarly affinities between Berkhof and Van Til, including an offer by 
Calvin Seminary for Van Til to succeed Berkhof as professor of dogmatics, see Muether, Cornelius 
Van Til, 44, 51, 99, 124, 153, 160; idem, “The Whole Counsel of God: Westminster and the OPC,” in 
The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of  
Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 227; White, Van Til,  
Defender of the Faith, 38. On the similar scholarly affinities and strong personal relationship 
between Van Til and his favorite professor—Geerhardus Vos—see Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 51, 
72; Clowney, “Preaching the Word of the Lord,” 235, 246; idem, “Professor John Murray at 
Westminster Theological Seminary,” in The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the  
Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, 
NJ: P&R, 2004), 38-39; William D. Dennison, “Analytic Philosophy and Van Til's Epistemology,” 
Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 51-56; William Edgar, “Introduction,” in Christian 
Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 12; John M. Frame, 
“Systematic Theology and Apologetics at the Westminster Seminaries,” in The Pattern of Sound 
Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B. Strimple, ed. 
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interaction with Bavinck’s thought began early on in Van Til’s academic career 
and continued throughout;53 accordingly, references to Bavinck’s name pervade 
Van Til’s publications.54
Fourth, Bavinck’s major dogmatic work has been recently translated into 
English. With the language barrier thus removed Van Til scholars have begun to 
re-read Van Til in light of his most profound dogmatic influence, and hence the 
most recent scholarship evinces an incipient reassessment of Van Til’s thought 
vis-á-vis Bavinck.
David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 96; Richard B. Gaffin Jr., “Some Epistemological 
Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6-16,” Westminster Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 103; White, Van Til,  
Defender of the Faith, 35-36, 45, 48; David VanDrunen, “A System of Theology? The Centrality of 
Covenant for Westminster Systematics,” in The Pattern of Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the  
Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B. Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, 
NJ: P&R, 2004), 204; William D. Dennison, Paul's Two-Age Construction and Apologetics (Lanham, 
MD, London: University Press of America, Inc., 1985), 92-94; cf. idem, “The Eschatological 
Implications of Genesis 2:15 for Apologetics,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed 
Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 203; Frame, 
“The Problem of Theological Paradox,” 319-20; idem, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Handbook of  
Evangelical Theologians, ed. Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1993), 157; Dennison, History 
for a Pilgrim People, 73-77, 121n25, 217-18; Richard B. Gaffin Jr., “Geerhardus Vos and the 
Interpretation of Paul,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics  
of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 228.
53. Van Til’s second academic publication is the following: “Review of Paedagogische 
Beginselen and De Nieuwe Opvoeding, by Herman Bavinck,” Princeton Theological Review 27 (Jan 
1929): 135–36; cf. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 10; White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 77-78.
54. In terms of raw tabulation (i.e., no differentiation between text and footnotes, etc.) Van Til 
refers to Bavinck ~1,193 times throughout his collected works, third only to Calvin (~3,413 
references) and Kuyper (~1,685 references). His most frequent references to Bavinck occur in the 
following books: Common Grace and the Gospel, 109 references; idem, An Introduction to Systematic  
Theology, 105 references; idem, The New Synthesis, 103 references. In light of our thesis (see §D 
below) it is worth noting that Van Til references neo-Calvinist theologians (i.e., Kuyper and 
Bavinck) much more frequently than he does Presbyterian theologians, such as B. B. Warfield, 
~652 references; J. Gresham Machen, ~354 references; the “Princeton Hodges” (i.e., C. W. Hodge, 
A. A. Hodge, and Charles Hodge), ~312 references; John Murray, ~42 references; and William G. 
T. Shedd, ~40 references. (NB: All tabulations are based on searches performed within the 
electronic collection of Van Til’s works (Van Til, The Works of Cornelius Van Til (Software)). Attempt 
was made to avoid duplicate entries by omitting references in the abridged edition of The Defense 
of the Faith when there were corresponding references in the unabridged edition. Likewise, all 
references in Eric Bristley’s A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til were omitted.)
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C. The State of the Question: Van Til vis-à-vis Bavinck
Herman Bavinck’s monumental Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was not available in 
an unabridged English translation until 2008.55 Thus the full extent of Bavinck’s 
neo-Calvinist influence upon subsequent European and American Reformed 
theology is  just beginning to be properly assessed in English-speaking 
scholarship.56 For example, although Louis Berkhof’s (1873–1957) pervasive 
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought was noted a quarter-century ago,57 Karl 
Barth’s appropriations of Bavinck’s thought,58 the mutually influencing 
relationship between Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949),59 and Bavinck’s 
55. The unabridged English translation of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was completed 
between 2003 and 2008. For a brief history of abridged and unabridged English translations, see 
John Bolt, “Herman Bavinck Speaks English: A Bibliographic Essay,” Mid-America Journal of  
Theology 19 (2008): 117n1.
56. That Bavinck’s profound influence has been appreciated in European Reformed 
scholarship long before the English translation of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics is evident, e.g., in 
G. C. Berkouwer’s extensive references to Bavinck in A Half Century of Theology: Movements and 
Motives, ed. Lewis B. Smedes, trans. Lewis B. Smedes (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 
originally published as Een halve eeuw theologie: motieven en stromingen van 1920 tot heden (Kampen: 
J. H. Kok, 1974).“Bavinck died in 1920,” notes Berkouwer, “but the theological issues he raised 
kept stirring the minds of others” (p. 11). (NB: Berkouwer’s year is a typo; Bavinck died in 1921.) 
Regarding Bavinck’s transatlantic influence, moreover, John Bolt remarks that “the history of 
twentieth century Dutch Reformed theology in The Netherlands and in North America is in 
significant measure a story of conflicting appeals to Bavinck” (“Grand Rapids Between Kampen 
and Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck's Reception and Influence in North America,” Calvin 
Theological Journal 38 (2003): 270).
57. Henry Zwaanstra, “Louis Berkhof,” in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its  
Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1997), 135-156; 
originally published as part of a previous book with the same title (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1985); cf. Richard A. Muller, “Preface to the New Edition of Louis Berkhof's Systematic Theology,” 
in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), v-viii; Bolt, 
“Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 277; Oliphint, “Forward,” 29n10; Malcolm B. 
Yarnell, III, The Formation of Christian Doctrine (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2007), 49.
58. On Barth’s critical appropriation of Bavinck’s theology, see John Vissers, “Karl Barth's 
Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 
(2010): 79-86; Cornelis Van der Kooi, “Herman Bavinck and Karl Barth on Christian Faith and 
Culture,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 75-76.
59. On the striking similarities between the lives and thought of Vos and Bavinck, see George 
Harinck, “Herman Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (April 2010): 
18-31; cf. Bolt, “Grand Rapids Between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 273n50; Edgar, “Introduction,” 
3, 12; Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
P&R, 2010), 2-3, 148-49, 173.
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influence upon the treatment of various theological topics, such as, the negative 
reception of geological evidence for an old earth view in the Dutch-Reformed 
tradition,60 have been studied only recently. For scholars operating on the 
Western shore of the Atlantic, therefore, the translation of Bavinck’s magnum opus 
has provided a new vista for analyzing the Dutch dogmatician’s transatlantic 
influence upon modern Reformed theology.
Van Til is one such American Reformed theologian whose work is being re-
read in light of the Bavinck’s newly-translated Dogmatiek. A chronological survey 
of Van Til scholarship before and after the translation reveals that, whereas prior 
to the translation many scholars made passing observations regarding Bavinck’s 
influence upon Van Til’s thought, only studies performed subsequent to the 
translation attempt to analyze Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought in 
any meaningful way.
1. Scholarship before the Reformed Dogmatics Translation (1950–2002)
Bernard Ramm’s 1953 introduction to apologetics, Types of Apologetic Systems, 
devotes a chapter to Van Til’s system.61 Regarding Van Til’s theological 
predecessors, Ramm remarks:
Van Til has made a sustained effort to have an apologetic system that 
60. D. A. Young, “The reception of geology in the Dutch Reformed tradition: the case of 
Herman Bavinck (1854–1921),” in Geology and Religion: A History of Harmony and Hostility, ed. 
Martina Kölbl-Ebert, Geological Society Special Publication 310 (London: The Geological Society, 
2009), 290, lists the English translation of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics as one of the motivating 
factors for his study.
61. See ch. 9 in Bernard Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems: An Introductory Study to the  
Christian Philosophy of Religion (Wheaton, Ill: Van Kampen Press, 1953), 184-209. In the preface 
Ramm points out that Van Til himself critiqued the chapter (p. x). In the revised edition Ramm 
replaced the chapter on Van Til with one on Kuyper, arguing that the latter is more of a classic 
example than the former. See ch. 10 in idem, Varieties of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1961), 179-195; Ramm's note regarding Van Til's replacement by Kuyper is 
found in the preface at p. 7.
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grows naturally out of the Reformed system of theology. The god-father 
of his system is certainly John Calvin, although he admits that Augustine 
was the first Christian theologian to try to work out a Christian 
metaphysics and epistemology. His more immediate apologetic relatives 
are the great Dutch thinkers as Kuyper and Bavinck and such 
outstanding American Calvinists as Hodge and Warfield. He has great 
sympathy with the Calvinistic philosophy as recently developed at the 
Free University of Amsterdam by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.62
Ramm provides one example where “Van Til agrees heartily with Bavinck and 
Kuyper”  against Warfield, namely, the priority of theology to apologetics.63 
Additionally, Ramm  makes a few passing comments regarding Van Til’s 
appropriation of (1) Calvin’s thought on the proofs for God’s existence, (2) 
Vollenhoven’s thought on probability, and (3) Kuyper’s thought on miracle and 
prophecy.64 Ramm’s analysis, therefore, clearly emphasizes Van Til’s neo-
Calvinist heritage, yet without elaboration.
The first book-length treatment of Van Til’s thought is James Daane’s 1954 
analysis of Van Til’s formulation of common grace in which Daane claims that 
Van Til’s view contradicts the traditional Reformed views found in “Calvin, 
Kuyper, Bavinck, Hepp, Warfield, Machen and Berkhof.”65 Insofar as his work is 
a polemic, Daane does not attempt to show any similarities between Van Til and 
these classical Reformed theologians. Neither does Daane seek to show Van Til’s 
background in the Christian Reformed Church aside from a passing reference to 
his one-year teaching term at Calvin Seminary.66 Thus Daane paints Van Til as an 
62. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 184-85.
63. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 185.
64. Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, 202, 207, and 208, respectively.
65. James Daane, A Theology of Grace: An Inquiry Into and Evaluation of Dr. C. Van Til's Doctrine 
of Common Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1954), 16 cf. 53-58, 
91, 100.
66. Daane, A Theology of Grace, 16n1. In the same note Daane recalls that Van Til was actually 
offered a lifetime teaching appointment at the Seminary, which Van Til declined.
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idiosyncratic outsider in relation to the Dutch Reformed tradition.
In 1959 and 1960 Rousas Rushdoony published the first book-length analyses 
of Van Til’s apologetics.67 Rushdoony describes Van Til as a formulator of 
“epistemologically self-conscious Calvinism,”68 but he does not give much 
attention to Van Til’s Calvinist theological precedents other than an occasional 
reference to Van Til’s affinities with Dooyeweerd, the Westminster Standards, 
Augustine, and Calvin.69 Rushdoony does make one significant comment, 
however, regarding the sources of Van Til’s Calvinist apologetics. Speaking of the 
Princeton apologetic tradition, he writes:
Abraham Kuyper, however, challenged this traditional approach as 
faulty Calvinism in that it assumes that the natural man has the ability to 
reason his way to salvation, and that the presuppositions of the natural 
man can lead to God. Van Til’s development of this Amsterdam tradition 
is regarded by many as his greatest contribution to the Reformed faith.70
Rushdoony elaborates upon Van Til’s critical appropriation of the so-called 
Amsterdam apologetic in an appendix,71 even briefly mentioning Bavinck in this 
regard.72 Rushdoony makes a second passing reference to Bavinck in the context 
of disputing Barth’s alleged rejection of God’s aseity. “With regard to the being of 
God,” he writes, “we can speak, as Van Til, following Bavinck and Berkhof, 
points out, of the independence or aseity of God. . . .”73 This brief reference is 
67. Rousas John Rushdoony, By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy of Cornelius Van  
Til (Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1959); Van Til, International Library of 
Philosophy and Theology: Modern Thinkers Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1960). 
These works are better seen as general introductions or popularizations rather than critical 
analyses.
68. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 6.
69. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 13, 15, 32-33, and 40-44, respectively.
70. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 100.
71. See appendix 2, “Van Til and Amsterdam,” in Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 180-83. 
72. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 181.
73. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 157-58. Compare Rushdoony’s similar passing reference 
to Bavinck as “Kuyper’s successor” in Van Til, 14. Note Rushdoony’s comments that “not all 
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significant for our purposes since it occurs in a passage relating to Van Til’s Neo-
Calvinist roots. Yet, although Rushdoony is aware of Bavinck’s influence upon 
Van Til, he links Van Til’s “epistemologically self-conscious Calvinism” mostly to 
Kuyper.
In another appendix Rushdoony further describes Van Til’s relation to 
Kuyper. “Van Til’s great love and abiding interest in Kuyper and his works,” 
writes Rushdoony, “are a notable aspect of the man and date back to his youth; 
he delights in reading him and warms to the mention of his name.”74 In his 
shorter work, moreover, Rushdoony describes Van Til as a “prominent and 
leading member of the Kuyperian school,”75 a modern “son of Abraham”—
Abraham Kuyper, that is.76 Rushdoony, therefore, clearly interprets Van Til’s 
“greatest contribution” as developing the Neo-Calvinist tradition à la Kuyper 
into a more “epistemologically self-conscious Calvinism” vis-á-vis both Princeton 
and Amsterdam. 
Gordon Lewis’ 1976 introduction to various views of Christian epistemology 
includes a chapter on Van Til.77 Regarding Van Til’s theological context, Lewis 
briefly recalls Van Til’s educational history in Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian 
schools and his resolute agreement with B. B. Warfield on the evaluation of 
Calvinism as “Christianity come into its own.”78 “And he [i.e., Van Til] belittles,” 
Kuyperian thinkers . . . are known to Americans” and that only the following three works by 
Bavinck are available in English translation (as of 1960): The Philosophy of Revelation, The Doctrine  
of God, and Our Reasonable Faith (Van Til, 14).
74. Rushdoony, By What Standard?, 206.
75. Rushdoony, Van Til, 15.
76. Rushdoony, Van Til, 12.
77. See ch. 5 in Gordon R. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims: Approaches to Christian  
Apologetics (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), 125-150.
78. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, 125.
24
Lewis writes later, 
the Reformed brethren who adopt a less consistent Calvinism. Indeed, 
the primary purpose of his apologetic is to set forth a method of 
defending Christianity which is consistent with his theology.79 
Lewis provides only passing references, however, to Van Til’s appropriations of 
various Reformed theologians, such as, Kuyper’s thought on the antithesis 
between believers and non-believers, Charles Hodge’s view on cognition vs. true 
knowledge, and Warfield’s defense of Scripture’s inspiration.80
“It has been my experience,” writes Jim Halsey in his 1978 introduction to 
Van Til’s apologetics, “that some people who read Van Til seem to forget (or 
never realize) that his apologetic is a Reformed apologetic. It is based upon 
Reformed doctrine.”81 Halsey notes, furthermore, that “apologetics and 
systematic theology are directly interrelated” and that, “systematics and 
apologetics cannot be divorced.”82 Halsey asserts that “Van Til’s apologetic is first 
and last a Reformed defense of the Christian faith.”83 Clearly, then, Halsey 
grounds Van Til’s Reformed apologetics in Reformed dogmatics.
Halsey, however, provides little explanation of Van Til’s dogmatic sources. 
The most direct, albeit brief, statement relating to Van Til’s appropriation of 
Reformed theology appears at the end of the book. “Van Til’s apologetic,” writes 
Halsey, “calls the Christian back to Kuyper’s stand—a stand involving an all-out 
battle between two absolutely incompatible world systems.”84 Halsey’s sole 
79. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, 146.
80. Lewis, Testing Christianity's Truth Claims, 127, 138, and 140, respectively.
81. Jim S. Halsey, For a Time Such As This: An Introduction to the Reformed Apologetic of  
Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978), xiv.
82. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 7.
83. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 13.
84. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 146.
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mention of Bavinck appears in the epilogue,85 but this brief reference relates only 
to Van Til’s general lament over the decline of Reformed theology. 
Other sources Van Til’s Calvinism may be inferred from Halsey’s research. 
For example, in his survey of Van Til’s Calvinism86 Halsey references Louis 
Berkhof four times87 and B. B. Warfield once.88 However, for the most part Halsey 
limits the scope of his survey to general statements, and throughout the 
remainder of the book he nowhere explicates Van Til’s specific Neo-Calvinist 
heritage. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is noteworthy that Halsey mentions 
both Kuyper and Bavinck as Van Til’s theological predecessors.
David Diehl makes a strong assertion regarding Van Til’s appropriation of 
Bavinck’s doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God: “The theologian who has 
probably influenced Van Til the most, next to John Calvin,” he writes in his 1978 
dissertation comparing Charles Hartshorne and Van Til, “is the prominent Dutch 
Reformed theologian of the turn of the century, Herman Bavinck.”89 Diehl further 
remarks that Van Til follows Calvin and Bavinck on the doctrines of revelation 
and analogical reasoning.90 Diehl briefly mentions, moreover, Van Til’s 
appropriation of Kuyper’s archetype-ectype distinction.91 Therefore, even though 
Diehl does not elaborate on Van Til’s appropriations from Calvin, Bavinck, or 
85. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 156.
86. See ch. 1, “the theological basis of Van Til's apologetic,” in Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 
13-39.
87. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 16n3, 17n8, 25n15, 34n25.
88. Halsey, For a Time Such As This, 35n28.
89. David Waring Diehl, “Divine Omniscience in the Thought of Charles Hartshorne and 
Cornelius Van Til: A Systemic Comparative Study” (Ph.D. diss., Yorktown Heights, N. Y.: The 
Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1978), 48. Regarding Van Til’s background, Diehl names Calvin 
as Van Til’s theological “mentor” (p. 69) and asserts that Van Til follows standard Protestant 
theological methodology (p. 63).
90. Diehl, “Divine Omniscience,” 50.
91. Diehl, “Divine Omniscience,” 52.
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Kuyper, it is noteworthy for our purposes that he lists Bavinck among Van Til’s 
preeminent theological influences.
“It was while he was a student at the Grand Rapids school [i.e., Calvin 
College], recalls White in his 1979 “authorized biography” of Van Til, “that Kees 
began to read extensively the writings of the great Abraham Kuyper. Cornelius 
Van Til freely admits,” continues White, “that when it comes to the background 
for some of his formulations he stands on the shoulders of Abraham Kuyper.”92 
White briefly mentions several of Van Til’s professors as influences: Louis 
Berkhof, Samuel Volbeda, William Heyns, Professor Ten Hoor, W. H. Jellema. Yet 
Van Til’s most influential professor by far, according to White, is Geerhardus Vos. 
The two became such close friends at Princeton that Van Til was asked to officiate 
at Vos’ funeral.93 White makes a couple of passing references to Bavinck,94 but, 
overall, White views Kuyper and Vos as the predominant influences in Van Til’s 
thought.95
John Robbins’ scathing critique of Van Til, published in 1986, does not 
mention any of Van Til’s theological predecessors.96 Robbins intentionally paints 
Van Til as a wholly “distinctive” (i.e., heterodox) and concludes that Van Til’s 
formulations “must be totally rejected by Christians,” else Christianity’s future 
will be in jeopardy.97 Robbins is thus intentionally inattentive to Van Til’s 
92. White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 34, 35, respectively.
93. White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 38-48.
94. White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 77-78, 190.
95. For more references to Kuyper’s influence, see White, Van Til, Defender of the Faith, 60-62, 
74.   Additionally, as noted in §A, 3, above, the 1969 lecture by Van Til that is reproduced in 
“Appendix 2” of White’s biography further reveals the permeating influence of Kuyper upon Van 
Til’s thought (see especially pp. 213-225). Also cf. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 276.
96. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth.
97. Robbins, Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth, 38.
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theological context.
Bradley Swygard’s 1991 thesis on Van Til’s debate with Gordon Clark briefly 
notes (1) Van Til’s agreement with Bavinck on the relation between mystery and 
dogma and (2) Van Til’s disagreement with Kuyper over the uselessness of 
reasoning with non-Christians;98 yet, Swygard does not analyze Van Til’s relation 
to these two neo-Calvinists.
In 1994 James Emery White published a chapter-length analysis of Van Til’s 
apologetics. Although his assertion that Van Til was “the main exponent of Dutch 
Reformed theology in America” is an overstatement, White appropriately 
categorizes Van Til as “an Evangelical scholar in the Dutch Reformed tradition.”99 
“Van Til's Princeton education,” notes White, “was also strongly influenced by B. 
B. Warfield, Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck.”100  White further 
comments that “Van Til has often been criticized for taking his systematic 
theology too uncritically from both Warfield and Bavinck.”101 This latter 
assertion, however, is based merely on a passing comment in a secondary 
source.102 Nevertheless, for our purposes it is significant that White mentions 
Bavinck and Kuyper as important influences on Van Til’s thought despite the 
98. Bradley J. Swygard, “The Basis for the Doctrine of the Incomprehensibility of God in 
Gordon Clark and Cornelius Van Til” (Th.M. Thesis, Dallas, TX: Dallas Theological Seminary, 
1991), 63 and 55, respectively.
99. James Emery White, What Is Truth? A Comparative Study of the Positions of Cornelius Van  
Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F. H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, Millard Erickson (Nashville, TN: Broadman & 
Holman, 1994), 36n1 and 36, respectively.
100. White, What Is Truth?, 38.
101. White, What Is Truth?, 38.
102. White refers to Clowney, “Preaching the Word of the Lord,” 249, wherein Clowney 
writes the following: “Van Til has been accused of being too traditional in theology, of taking his 
systematic structure too uncritically from the Reformed confessions, and from Bavinck and 
Warfield. Certainly Van Til’s labors have been directed to showing the implications of Reformed 
theology for the defense of the faith rather than to developing theological formulations. But Van 
Til's staunch defense of Reformed orthodoxy reveals his commitment to the coherence and 
harmony of God's revelation.”
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lack of explication on either score.
In 1995 John M. Frame, a former student of Van Til’s, published the first 
major critical analysis of his teacher’s apologetics.103 Frame is clearly mindful of 
Van Til’s “rich appreciation of the Dutch Reformed tradition,” noting especially 
Van Til’s esteem for Abraham Kuyper.104 Frame offers only one sentence about 
Bavinck’s direct influence upon Van Til, but this brief remark is significant for 
our thesis: “In systematic theology more narrowly understood, Van Til’s chief 
resource was Herman Bavinck. . . .”105 In his footnotes, moreover, Frame remarks 
that Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics has not yet been fully translated into 
103. Frame, Cornelius Van Til. This is not, however, Frame’s earliest publication on Van Til. In 
1976 Frame published an essay which summarized the theological contribution of his teacher 
(idem, “The Problem of Theological Paradox”; also published separately as a booklet entitled Van 
Til: The Theologian). In the essay Frame laments the lack of serious, critical interaction with Van 
Til’s thought to date (297-98n10); yet, given that this comment follows Frame’s three pages’s 
worth of near hagiography (i.e., 295-97), it seems difficult to take both his lament and his 
concluding sentiment seriously—“If I am right, then I have furnished herein the best and only 
justification for further research into this extremely important thinker” (330).
104. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 20. Similarly, Frame asserts elsewhere that Van Til “was 
steeped in the Dutch theological and philosophical literature” (idem, “Systematic Theology and 
Apologetics,” 91). In his 1976 essay, moreover, Frame noted Van Til’s appropriation of Dutch 
theology, including Bavinck’s: “Where Van Til does discuss theological issues, furthermore, he 
includes little exegesis. . . . What exegesis he does present is usually borrowed from other sources. 
His dogmatic formulations, too, are often simple repetitions or paraphrases of the creeds and of 
the great Reformed theologians from Calvin onward. Even when Van Til's theology sounds most 
strange to American ears (for example, his strong emphasis upon the ethical/metaphysical 
distinction), he is very often paraphrasing ideas from the Dutch tradition. (In the case of the 
ethical/metaphysical distinction, the source is Bavinck)” (idem, “The Problem of Theological 
Paradox,” 295; also cf. ibid., 316). In the same essay Frame further notes that Van Til appropriated 
the “archetypal-ectypal” terminology from Kuyper (312n75).
105. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 20. Additionally, Frame offers a related comment in his earlier 
dictionary article on Van Til: “During his years in the Dutch Reformed community, Van Til 
became very impressed with the great Dutch church leaders Abraham Kuyper and Herman 
Bavinck. Kuyper was a Renaissance man: scholar, university founder, politician (briefly prime 
minister of the Netherlands), newspaper editor. With boundless energy and intellectual creativity, 
he sought to claim all areas of human life for the lordship of Christ. Bavinck, his colleague and 
follower, focused more narrowly on the discipline of systematic theology and produced a 
monumental four-volume Reformed Dogmatics. The work of Klaas Schilder, a more recent Dutch 
thinker, also commanded Van Til's deep respect and interest” (idem, “Cornelius Van Til,” 156-57). 
However, Frame’s later dictionary article on Van Til mentions only Kuyper as an influence: 
“Major influences on Van Til’s thought were the Dutch Reformed theologians, particularly 
Abraham Kuyper. . .” (idem, “Cornelius Van Til,” in New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 739).
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English,106 and throughout his analysis Frame makes passing references to Van 
Til’s reliance upon Bavinck for specific theological points.107 Beyond stating a 
general caveat108 regarding Van Til’s critically-appreciative stance toward his 
theological predecessors, however, Frame does not attempt to analyze the 
relationship between Van Til and Van Til’s “chief resource.”109
Philip Thorne’s dissertation on the Evangelical reception of Karl Barth in 
North America, published in 1995, includes some important remarks concerning 
Van Til’s neo-Calvinist context.110 After noting Van Til’s general definition of 
Christianity as “the Reformed faith as revealed in Scripture and accurately 
interpreted by the Reformed creeds and classic Reformed theologians,” Thorne 
comments more specifically that “Van Til, following Herman Bavinck, endeavors 
to acknowledge God as the Principium Essendi of knowledge.”111 Thorne further 
notes that Van Til’s apologetic method “extends, in a particular direction, the 
‘principial’ thinking of Abraham Kuyper.”112 In terms of theological 
prolegomena, therefore, Thorne finds significant appropriation of neo-Calvinist 
theology in Van Til’s apologetics.
106. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 20n5; cf. Frame, “Cornelius Van Til,” 157n3.
107. See Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 54, 115, 124, 220.
108. Frame’s caveat is as follows: “Influenced as he was by such Reformed theological giants 
as B. B. Warfield, Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck, Van Til nevertheless sought to warn us 
against elements in their thinking that he deemed unscriptural” (Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 11).
109. Frame follows a similar approach in his 2007 essay, “Divine Aseity and Apologetics,” in 
Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 115-130, wherein he notes that Van Til quotes approvingly one of 
Bavinck’s statements regarding aseity. Frame, however, fails to note that Van Til’s appropriation 
of Bavinck is not limited to one statement regarding aseity; rather, Van Til’s discussion of God’s 
attributes is largely a summary of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. See chapter 3 below.
110. Phillip R. Thorne, Evangelicalism and Karl Barth: His Reception and Influence in North 
American Evangelical Theology, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Allison Park, PA: 
Pickwick Publications, 1995).
111. Thorne, Evangelicalism and Karl Barth, 34.
112. Thorne, Evangelicalism and Karl Barth, 34.
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In his 1997 theological-biographical essay on Van Til, Wesley A. Roberts 
describes Van Til as “a student of both the old Princeton school of theologians 
and the great Dutch Reformed thinkers,” and he names Charles Hodge, B. B. 
Warfield, Francis L. Patton, William Brenton Greene Jr., J. Gresham Machen, 
Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck as representatives of both traditions.113 
Van Til's “pioneering insight,” which, according to Roberts, was confirmed by his 
readings in Kuyper and Bavinck, is “that in apologetics the presuppositions and 
not merely attendant arguments have to be biblical.” “He [i.e., Van Til] admits,” 
continues Roberts, “his indebtedness to the classic Reformed theologians and 
quotes freely from them. He is willing to go beyond them, however, in areas 
where he thinks they are weak.”114 The sole example Roberts provides is that Van 
Til follows Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s insights regarding Holy Scripture as the 
principium cognoscendi externum.115 Therefore, despite the lack of elaboration, 
Roberts clearly notices the dual neo-Calvinist influence of Kuyper and Bavinck 
upon Van Til.
“He [i.e., Van Til] was Dutch through and through, from wearing wooden 
shoes (“klompen”) to being raised on the Heidelberg Catechism,” recalls a 
former student and protege of Van Til’s, Greg Bahnsen, in his systematic analysis 
113. Wesley A. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its  
Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 173. NB: The 
essays in this book were originally published in Reformed Theology in America: A History of Its  
Modern Development (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1985) and in the following three 
volumes published by Baker Book House (Grand Rapids, MI) in 1989: (1) The Princeton Theology:  
Reformed Theology in America; (2) Dutch Reformed Theology: Reformed Theology in America; (3) 
Southern Reformed Theology: Reformed Theology in America.
114. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” 174.
115. Roberts, “Cornelius Van Til,” 178; Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek 
Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker Books, 2006), s.v., principium cognoscendi externum.
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of Van Til’s apologetics.116 Bahnsen notes that Van Til had become familiar with 
the works of Kuyper and Bavinck during college and that during his year at 
Calvin Seminary he studied theology under Louis Berkhof and philosophy under 
W. H. Jellema.117 Van Til’s interest in Bavinck, comments Bahnsen, continued on 
into his academic career as evidenced by the fact that his second academic 
publication is a review of two works by Bavinck.118 Therefore, Bahnsen is well 
aware of Bavinck’s influence on Van Til,119 but he sees Kuyper and Warfield as 
Van Til’s predominant theological influences.120 Much like Frame’s analysis, 
moreover, Bahnsen’s study provides only scant comments about Van Til’s 
published criticisms of Bavinck without attempting to analyze Bavinck’s 
influence upon Van Til’s thought.121 Likewise, in his 2010 posthumous 
publication Bahnsen interprets Van Til’s apologetic as a critical appropriation and 
marked advancement of both B. B. Warfield’s and Abraham Kuyper’s apologetics 
formulations.122
Norman Geisler’s 1999 analysis of Van Til’s apologetics wholly ignores the 
116. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 7.
117. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 8; cf. idem, “Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical 
Tradition of the OPC,” in Pressing Toward the Mark: Essays Commemorating Fifty Years of the  
Orthodox Presbyterian Church, ed. Charles G. Dennison and Richard C. Gamble (Philadelphia, PA: 
The Committee for the Historian of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 1986), 264.
118. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 10; cf. idem, “Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical 
Tradition of the OPC,” 265.
119. Cf. Bahnsen, “Socrates or Christ,” 234: “The incisive and decisive analysis of apologetics 
which was lacking in Warfield’s day was being supplied a generation later by a young scholar 
who realized that he was standing on the shoulders of his Reformed fathers: Calvin, Hodge, 
Warfield, Kuyper, Bavinck.“
120. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 596.
121. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 14-15; Van Til's primary critiques of Bavinck are listed at 
14n42. Despite his lack of elaboration on Bavinck, Bahnsen analyzes Van Til’s critiques of 
Warfield and Kuyper at length (pp. 596-600).
122. Greg L. Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended (Powder Springs, GA 
and Nacogdoches, TX: American Vision Press and Covenant Media Press, 2008), 21-22.
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theological and ecclesiastical contexts of Van Til’s thought.123
A somewhat different story emerges when we turn to survey Van Til 
scholarship that has appeared since the inception of the Bavinck translation, 
namely, Bavinck’s influence upon Van Til’s thought is more apparent.
2. Scholarship after the Reformed Dogmatics Translation (2003–Present)
In his 2003 introduction to the second edition of Van Til’s Christian 
Apologetics William Edgar presents Van Til’s apologetics as “a third way” 
between Karl Barth and Abraham Kuyper.124 Edgar further notes Van Til’s 
general “Dutch and Presbyterian” theological context, but he mentions only one 
theological influence—Geerhardus Vos.125 However, in an editorial note 
regarding Van Til's relation to Dutch neo-Calvinist philosophers, Edgar remarks, 
“The full story of Van Til's relationship to the Amsterdam philosophy, and 
especially to Herman Dooyeweerd, has not yet been told.”126 Moreover, in his 
2007 introduction to Van Til’s An Introduction to Systematic Theology, Edgar notes 
the following: (1) Van Til closely follows Bavinck’s doctrine of God;127 (2) Van Til 
123. Norman L. Geisler, “Cornelius Van Til,” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1999), 751-758. Compare idem, Christian Apologetics (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976), 56-58, wherein Geisler briefly describes Van Til as speaking 
“from a strong Reformed, Biblical perspective theologically and yet in an absolute revelational 
presuppositionalism apologetically,”  without any elaboration regarding Van Til’s Reformed 
predecessors or theological context. Thus abstracting Van Til’s methodology from his theology, 
Geisler classifies Van Til (along with Blaise Pascal, Sören Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth) as a 
“methodological fideist” (see ch. 3, pp. 47-64).
124. Edgar, “Introduction,” 1-3.
125. Edgar, “Introduction,” 3, 12.
126. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 57n4. Compare the earlier classification by Robert D. 
Knudsen, “Crosscurrents,” Westminster Theological Journal 35, no. 3 (1973): 313: “My own 
interpretation of Van Til's position, as I have said, places him squarely within the camp of those 
who hold to this general philosophical position [i.e., ‘the so-called Calvinistic philosophy’]. There 
is a broad unity of the major proponents of this school, namely, Herman Dooyeweerd, D. H, Th. 
Vollenhoven, C. Van Til, and Hendrik Stoker, in their attempt to erect a philosophy on the 
foundation of a Reformed world-and-life-view.”
127. William Edgar, “Introduction,” in An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and  
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considers Hepp’s view of reason to be an improvement over Bavinck’s alleged 
neutrality;128 (3) Van Til insists on “subtle difference with Bavinck, whom he 
otherwise admires [to] no end”; and (4) on the doctrine of the Trinity Van Til 
builds his idiosyncratic insights upon Bavinck’s Reformed orthodox presentation 
of the doctrine.129 Therefore, whereas Edgar only hints at Van Til’s neo-Calvinist 
heritage in Christian Apologetics, he clearly elucidates Bavinck’s influence upon 
Van Til’s thought in An Introduction to Systematic Theology.130
Lane Tipton’s 2004 dissertation on Van Til’s trinitarian formulations omits 
Van Til’s neo-Calvinist predecessors altogether.131 Although Tipton mentions in 
passing that Van Til’s robust view of the Trinity echoes Herman Bavinck’s,132 
Tipton limits his study to Van Til’s appropriation of the trinitarian “categories 
given to him from earlier theologians, notably John Calvin, Charles and A. A. 
Hodge.”133 Whether or not this limited scope is appropriate for Tipton’s purpose, 
such a limited purview truncates the full picture of Van Til’s trinitarian theology. 
In his critique of James Daane’s theology, for example, Van Til writes explicitly of 
his dependence upon Bavinck’s trinitarian theology: 
Actually there is nothing appreciably different in what I have said about 
the ontological trinity from what Berkhof and Bavinck have previously 
stated nor has Daane sought to prove that there is. In fact, I have not 
the Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 
2007), 5.
128. Edgar, “Introduction,” 6.
129. Edgar, “Introduction,” 7.
130. See Edgar's editorial notes in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29n8, 89n1, 
319n1, 323n8, 335n33, 341n53, 353nn12, 14, 354n20, 369n1. Edgar discusses Van Til’s relation to 
Warfield and Kuyper in William Edgar, “Frame the Apologist,” in Speaking the Truth in Love: The 
Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 408-13.
131. Lane G. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God: Trinitarian Theology in the Thought of 
Cornelius Van Til” (Ph.D. diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 2004).
132. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God,” 2.
133. Tipton, “The Triune Personal God,” 7.
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dealt with the subject other than to use what was already ascertained 
and established, especially by Bavinck, for apologetic purposes.134
Elsewhere he writes:
No one has better than he [i.e., Bavinck] set forth the struggle in the early 
church to attain a truly biblical view of the immanent or ontological 
trinity as the presupposition of the intelligibility of human experience. 
. . . Moreover, no one brought out more forcibly than did Bavinck that 
God as self-sufficient is not fully comprehensible to man, not even to 
regenerate man.135
Furthermore, in the primary work in which he explicates his idiosyncratic 
trinitarian formulations, Van Til himself notes his neo-Calvinist theological 
heritage. “My indebtedness to such former Reformed theologians” writes Van 
Til, “as Louis Berkhof and, back of him, Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper, 
is apparent throughout [this work].”136 Additionally, Van Til appeals to Bavinck 
for confirmation of his interpretation of The Nicene Council.137 Therefore, by 
focusing primarily on Van Til’s American Presbyterian predecessors and 
excluding his neo-Calvinist predecessors, Tipton oddly omits perhaps the most 
significant influence upon Van Til’s trinitarian theology—Herman Bavinck.138
A similar omission occurs in Tipton’s 2007 essay wherein he asserts that Van 
Til “relied on the exegesis of theologians such as Charles Hodge, B. B. Warfield, 
Herman Bavinck, and John Murray.”139 However, instead of substantiating this 
134. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 33.
135. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
136. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 13.
137. Van Til, “My Credo,” 11.
138. In a 2002 article Tipton makes one passing, enigmatic reference to Bavinck’s affirmation 
of God’s unity vis-à-vis allegedly similar affirmations by Hodge and Van Til (see Lane G. Tipton, 
“The Function of Perichoresis and the Divine Incomprehensibility,” Westminster Theological  
Journal 64, no. 2 (2002): 293n18). 
139. Lane G. Tipton, “Paul's Christological Interpretation of Creation and Presuppositional 
Apologetics,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint 
and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 95, writes: “Van Til understood that his 
uniquely Reformed approach to apologetics lacked a full-fledged line of exegetical 
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point with references either to the exegetical work of these theologians140 or to 
Van Til’s citations of these theologians’ exegetical works, Tipton instead provides 
a redemptive-historical reading of Colossians 1:15–2:8 à la Herman Ridderbos, 
M. G. Kline, and Geerhardus Vos.141 Thus, not only is the assertion 
unsubstantiated, but also, insofar as the essay does not substantiate Van Til’s 
relation to any Reformed theologians, the generalized conclusion regarding 
“Reformed apologetics in the tradition of Van Til” is a non sequitur.142 
Nevertheless, Tipton’s essay provides a second passing reference to Bavinck as a 
theological predecessor of Van Til.
Kenneth Boa and Robert Bowman’s 2005 survey of apologetics provides an 
extensive historical analysis of Van Til’s apologetic in relation to (1) the history of 
apologetics in general and (2) the history of Reformed apologetics in particular.143 
They summarize Van Til’s relation to his Reformed predecessors as follows:
Van Til is by far the most controversial of the major Reformed apologists 
of the twentieth century. He combined the apologetic tradition of Old 
Princeton (which drew from both classical and evidentialist approaches) 
with the anti-apologetic theology of Kuyper. He used the concept of a 
transcendental argument, which was at the heart of Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy, but employed it as an overtly apologetic argument. The 
result is a theory of apologetics that has been both highly influential and 
severely disputed.144
argumentation. Instead, his method developed along dogmatic and theological lines, and he 
relied on the exegesis of theologians such as Charles Hodge, B. B. Warfield, Herman Bavinck, and 
John Murray.”
140. E.g., with regard to Colossians 1:15–2:8, cf. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. 
(New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1873), 1:515-16.
141. Tipton, “Paul's Christological Interpretation,” nn. 3-9, 12-16, 19, 23-27, 35, devotes the 
bulk of the essay to representing Ridderbos’ exegetical views.
142. Tipton, “Paul's Christological Interpretation,” 111.
143. On the former, see Boa and Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 23-32; on the latter, see ibid., 
pp. 221-334.
144. Boa and Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 256. These various streams of influence upon 
Van Til are developed at length throughout the book. On the relation between Old Princeton, Van 
Til, and Van Til’s successors, see pp. 26, 51-54, 68, 229-232, 241-42, 256, 264-65, 447-48; on the 
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Boa and Bowman’s sole reference to Bavinck is a brief comment regarding Van 
Til's ambivalent appropriation of Bavinck's teaching on natural theology.145 These 
writers, therefore, find in Van Til’s apologetic a predominant neo-Calvinist 
influence (i.e., Kuyper and Dooyeweerd) nuanced by Van Til’s sensibilities for 
the old Princeton tradition.
“. . . Van Til has represented a distinctive and specific theological-
philosophical position,“ writes Juha Ahvio in his 2005 dissertation on 
contemporary Reformed apologetics in America, “which has endeavored to 
synthesize the best elements from the Old Princeton tradition and from 
Amsterdam Theology into a consistent and definitive Reformed thought.”146 
Ahvio views Van Til as an inheritor of the theology of Archibald Alexander, 
Charles Hodge, A. A. Hodge, B. B. Warfield, J. Gresham Machen, Abraham 
Kuyper, Herman Bavinck, and Herman Dooyeweerd.147 Further, he summarizes 
the theological influences of Van Til’s graduate and post-graduate education as 
follows:
relation between “the father of the Reformed apologetic tradition” (i.e., Kuyper, p. 330) and Van 
Til, see pp. 25-26, 29, 232-43, 248, 251, 256, 264-65, 268-84, 457, 494, 528; On the relation between 
Dooyeweerd and Van Til, see pp. 25-26, 28-29, 238-40, 261-62, 251, 256-57, 261-62, 268, 299, 447, 
494, 496. Regarding the controversial nature of Van Til’s apologetic in the twentieth century, 
compare p. 240.
145. Boa and Bowman, Faith Has Its Reasons, 302.
146. Juha Ahvio, Theological Epistemology of Contemporary American Confessional Reformed  
Apologetics, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft 59 (Helsinki, Finland: Luther-Agricola-
Seura, 2005), 21.
147. Ahvio, Theological Epistemology, 19-22, 30-31n33. On Van Til as a member of the 
“Kuyperian neo-Calvinist tradition,” see p. 236. Regarding Dooyeweerd, Ahvio remarks that 
although he was “the most significant representative of the so-called Amsterdam School of 
thought and its neo-Calvinist philosophical tradition in the twentieth century,” Van Til developed 
his own “more confessionally theological form of presuppositionalism” at the same time as 
Dooyeweerd yet without being directly dependent upon Dooyeweerd’s thought (30-31n33). Van 
Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 50-51,  however, explicitly admits his reliance upon 
Dooyeweerd’s interpretation of the history of philosophy. Van Til also briefly approbates 
Dooyeweerd’s epistemology contra modern philosophy (A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 340).
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Both Calvin Theological Seminary and Princeton Theological Seminary 
were at that time committed to the Reformed confessional orthodoxy 
thereby making it possible for Van Til to familiarize himself thoroughly 
with the Kuyper-Bavinck Dutch tradition and the Hodge-Warfield 
Princeton tradition.148
Throughout his extensive analysis of Van Til’s apologetics, Ahvio twice mentions 
Van Til’s critiques of Bavinck’s alleged inconsistencies regarding the 
epistemological implications of theological principia.149 Ahvio, however, does not 
attempt to analyze these criticisms. In sum, although Ahvio provides scant 
primary source substantiation of Van Til’s neo-Calvinist dogmatic moorings, his 
analyses of secondary sources clearly show Van Til to be an inheritor of the Old 
Amsterdam and Old Princeton traditions.
Donald Macleod begins his 2006 essay on Bavinck’s Prolegomena in light of 
the old-Amsterdam-vs.-old-Princeton apologetics debate by admitting that the 
new English translation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek is the raison d'être for his study.150 
Additionally, he asserts that a direct theological link exists between Bavinck and 
Van Til:
There are two distinct questions concerning Amsterdam and Old 
Princeton. One is the relationship between Bavinck and his Princeton 
contemporaries, most notably B. B. Warfield. The other is the link 
between Bavinck and Cornelius Van Til, who, by taking his 
presuppositional theism into Westminster Seminary, effectively took 
Amsterdam into Old Princeton.151
After noting that Van Til frankly acknowledges his indebtedness to Bavinck and 
Kuyper, Macleod remarks further:
148. Ahvio, Theological Epistemology, 37. In a footnote Ahvio further lists James Orr as “an 
essential influence on Van Til” (37-38n52).
149. Ahvio, Theological Epistemology, 297, 322, 322-23n198.
150. Donald Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena: Fresh Light on Amsterdam, Old Princeton, 
and Cornelius Van Til,” Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 2 (2006): 261.
151. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 263.
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What Van Til learned from his Dutch mentors was, above all, the 
principle that the existence of God is not the conclusion of an elaborate 
argument, but the presupposition of all thought.152
Moreover, Macleod acknowledges that Van Til emphasizes the need to assert the 
fact of God at the very outset of all epistemological discussion more forcefully 
than Bavinck; nevertheless, he interprets this point as a “difference in emphasis” 
that “is due mainly to their differing vocations [i.e., apologist and dogmatician]” 
rather than as a difference in principle.153 He concludes therefore that Bavinck’s 
and Van Til’s formulations of presuppositional theism are basically the same.
Given the fact that Macleod omits any reference to Van Til’s criticisms of 
Bavinck’s thought—criticisms of the very points that Macleod lauds as 
similarities between the two, such as, Thomism, a proper response to Kant, and 
innate knowledge of God154—his conclusion may require further nuancing. 
Nevertheless, his essay is a clear example of the fact that, thanks to the 
translation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, scholars are beginning to re-read Van Til in 
light of his neo-Calvinist predecessor.
Jeffrey Waddington, in a 2008 essay on Van Til and foundationalism, argues 
that Van Til appropriated and expanded the Reformed orthodox distinction 
between theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa in his epistemological 
formulations.155 “The tradition of the archetype/ectype distinction,” suggests 
152. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 264.
153. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 264.
154. Macleod, “Bavinck's Prolegomena,” 264-68.
155. Jeffrey C. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or 
Foundationalist?,” in Reforming or Conforming: Post-Conservative Evangelicals and the Emerging 
Church, ed. Gary L. W. Johnson and Ronald N. Gleason (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2008), 
154-165; cf. Muller, Dictionary, s.v., theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa. A nearly identical thesis, 
namely, that Van Til (unknowingly?) appropriated the traditional Reformed orthodox distinction 
between theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa, can be found in the following two essays: R. Scott 
Clark, “Janus, The Well-Meant Offer of the Gospel, and Westminster Theology,” in The Pattern of  
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Waddington, “would most likely have come down to Van Til through Dutch 
Reformed theologians such as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.”156 
Waddington makes two more references to Bavinck’s discussion of theological 
principa, but he provides no substantiating argumentation regarding whether or 
not Van Til actually appropriated Bavinck’s formulations; thus, it is unclear 
whether Waddington attempts to adduce further evidence for a connection 
between the two.157 His passing note, furthermore, regarding Van Til’s 
appropriation of Kuyper’s theological principia formulations adds further 
unclarity.158 This ambiguity notwithstanding, we find in Waddington’s essay yet 
another reference to the twin neo-Calvinist theological influences upon Van Til’s 
thought—Kuyper and Bavinck.
K. Scott Oliphint, in his 2008 forward to Van Til’s The Defense of the Faith, 
echoes Greg Bahnsen’s earlier sentiment regarding the crux of Van Til’s thought. 
“To understand Van Til’s contribution to Reformed apologetics,” avers Oliphint, 
one needs to see not simply his criticisms of Kuyper, Bavinck, and 
Warfield, but, more importantly, the ways in which he was able to take 
the best of these Reformed theological giants and incorporate their 
theological insights into his own apologetic methodology.159
Sound Doctrine: Systematic Theology at the Westminster Seminaries; Essays in Honor of Robert B.  
Strimple, ed. David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004), 149-179; Horton, “Consistently 
Reformed.” Waddington notes the Clark essay (see 159-60n30) but omits the Horton essay; he 
further cites two books by Horton which provide no substantiation for his archetypa-ectypa thesis.
156. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or Foundationalist?,” 160.
157. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or Foundationalist?,” 162, 
163n45.
158. Waddington, “Cornelius Van Til: "Principled" Theologian or Foundationalist?,” 163n44.
159. Oliphint, “Forward,” ix-x; cf. Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 597: “A person who can 
explain the ways in which Van Til agreed and disagreed with both Warfield and Kuyper, is a 
person who understands presuppositional apologetics.” For Van Til’s own assessment of 
Warfield’s and Kuyper’s apologetic methodologies, see A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 229-54; 
idem, The Defense of the Faith, 345-82; idem, The New Synthesis, 11, 42-43. Oliphint’s historical 
assessment here seems to be in tension with his earlier revolutionary interpretation of Van Til 
noted above. Nevertheless, Oliphint continues to insist on the novelty of Van Til, remarking, “The 
need of the hour, it seems to me, is not to move beyond Van Til, but rather, perhaps for the first 
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In passing Oliphint further asserts that “’presupposition’ for Van Til is just 
another way of saying what Kuyper, Bavinck, and behind them the Reformed 
scholastics had always said with regard to the principia of theology.”160 Other 
than providing brief editorial notes regarding Van Til’s Dutch heritage in 
general161 and Van Til’s critical appropriation of Bavinck’s theology in 
particular,162 Oliphint nowhere explicates the relationship between Van Til and 
his Dutch neo-Calvinist predecessor at any length. The lack of elaboration 
notwithstanding, Oliphint clearly notes that “Van Til . . . himself claims Bavinck 
as one of his primary spiritual and intellectual influences.”163
In contradistinction to previous biographies and analyses, John Muether’s 
2008 biography of Van Til164 evinces a marked attempt to interpret Van Til in light 
of Bavinck’s recently translated Reformed Dogmatics. This nuance can be seen in 
two ways. First, Muether’s study contains a deeper appreciation of Bavinck’s 
profound influence on Van Til’s thought. Muether writes, for example:
Although interpreters often portray him as a hybrid of Kuyper and 
Warfield, Van Til himself generally included Bavinck in his list of 
interlocutors. Indeed, Bavinck is arguably the greatest of all of these 
influences, the evidence for which grows as Bavinck’s dogmatics is 
translated into English. As this survey of Van Til’s seminary scholarship 
time, to grasp the depth and breadth of his approach” (p. x). “Once Van Til’s thought is grasped,” 
insists Oliphint, “the implications for the work of the church are most profound” (xi).
160. Oliphint, “Forward,” x-xi. Cf. Oliphint’s editorial note in Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 
348n17. Regarding Oliphint’s equation of “presupposition” in Van Til’s thought with the 
Reformed scholastic principa terminology, note the similarity with Waddington’s thesis surveyed 
immediately above.
161. In an essay published in 2007 Oliphint, “Appendix: Cornelius Van Til and the 
Reformation of Christian Apologetics,” 295n45, makes the following comment: “The Dutch 
influence of Van Til could arguably be the most significant influence that has contributed to his 
Reformed apologetic.”
162. See Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 2n6, 9-10n37, 29n10, 33n17, 374-78nn42-51.
163. K. Scott Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck,” in Speaking the 
Truth in Love: The Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 206.
164. Muether, Cornelius Van Til.
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indicates, he was less concerned with distinguishing himself from these 
antecedents than with applying their best insights with a rigorous 
consistency.165
Muether argues, furthermore, that one reason Van Til received sharp criticism 
within Presbyterian circles was a lack of familiarity with Bavinck:
American Presbyterian disquiet over Van Til’s employment of 
presuppositional reasoning owed, as previously noted, to its 
unfamiliarity with the Reformed tradition, and especially unfamiliarity 
with Bavinck. Van Til imported many of his ideas from Bavinck, whose 
four-volume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek was largely inaccessible to the 
English-speaking world.166
Most notably, after citing two passages in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics which 
allegedly adumbrate Van Til’s apologetic methodology, Muether avers: “Van Til 
did not so much create a new apologetic as he refined Bavinck’s approach, 
applying it to modernism, old and new.”167 
Second, Muether’s study offers a more nuanced interpretation of Van Til’s 
criticisms of Bavinck and Kuyper. Whereas Frame, Bahnsen, and Oliphint, for 
example, give brief, general statements regarding Van Til’s unabashed criticisms 
of Bavinck and other Dutch Neo-Calvinist theologians, Muether argues for a 
more complex and positive relationship between Van Til and his theological 
predecessors. Referring to Van Til’s criticisms of Warfield, Bavinck, and Kuyper, 
Muether remarks:
The Reformed epistemology that was latent in all three theologians 
ultimately permitted no zone of neutrality, no epistemological common 
ground. In bringing the Reformed tradition to more consistent 
epistemological expression, Van Til could state with truthfulness that 
with respect to the ‘inimitable trio of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Warfield,’ he 
165. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56.
166. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 115.
167. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 116.
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stood on the shoulders of giants.168
Therefore, compared to earlier studies, Muether’s interpretation of Van Til’s life 
and work is much more attuned to Bavinck’s theological influence upon Van Til.
In a 2008 journal article Brian Mattson examines Van Til’s criticisms of 
Bavinck “with the added advantage of having Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics in 
English.”169 After analyzing Van Til’s allegations, Mattson concludes notably as 
follows:
Van Til’s superficial and at-times uncharitable reading of Bavinck is 
unfortunate, but not nearly so unfortunate as the impression he gives 
that Bavinck has more in common with a “traditional” approach to 
epistemology and apologetics than he has in common with Van Til. If 
this article establishes anything it is the deep affinity in their theological 
instincts. Van Til never had an intellectual “friend” like Herman Bavinck. 
The fact that he sometimes failed to realize it is no reason for 
contemporary readers of Bavinck to do likewise. One hopes that those 
whose apologetic sympathies lie with Van Til, yet have new opportunity 
to study Herman Bavinck in English, might do so without Van Til's often 
needless and excessive reservations. . . .170
Similar to Muether’s interpretation of Bavinck’s influence on Van Til, Mattson 
finds “deep affinity in their theological instincts.” He likewise avers, moreover, 
that the new English translation of Bavinck’s works provides English readers a 
fresh perspective on the dogmatic affinity between the two thinkers, Van Til’s 
criticisms notwithstanding. The two studies from Muether and Mattson, 
therefore, provide the clearest examples of a nascent reassessment of Van Til’s 
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought.
In his 2008 bibliographic guide to Herman Bavinck’s writings, Eric D. 
168. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56.
169. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 111. Although Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck were noted 
much earlier (e.g., Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, 14n42), Mattson is the first scholar to analyze 
them.
170. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 127.
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Bristley remarks in passing that Bavinck’s philosophical and apologetical
views exerted a formative influence on the reformational philosophy of 
D. H. Th. Vollenhoven (1891–1979), the presuppositional apologetics of 
Cornelius Van Til (1895–1979), and the reformed epistemology of Alvin 
Plantinga.171
Not every recent analysis of Van Til, however, follows the lead of Muether and 
Mattson in noting Bavinck as Van Til’s preeminent predecessor. For example, 
relying heavily on Thorne’s 1995 study (noted above), John P. Lewis’ 2009 
publication on the reception of Karl Barth’s theology in North America classifies 
Van Til in the genus of American fundamentalism172 and the species of “North 
American fundamentalist Calvinism.”173
Insofar as Lewis’ main goal is to paint Van Til as a fundamentalist, he fails to see 
any connections to Van Til’s theological predecessors outside of American 
Evangelical fundamentalism. 
Additionally, in his 2010 publication on the history of the Reformed two 
kingdoms doctrine David VanDrunen devotes a chapter to Van Til in which he 
interprets him as a developer of “another stream in the Kuyperian tradition” in 
distinction from Herman Dooyeweerd.174 Van Til offered “one of the most 
ambitious attempts to apply classic Reformed and Kuyperian theology in the 
twentieth century,” claims VanDrunen.175 The only reference to Bavinck appears 
171. Eric D. Bristley, Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation 
Heritage Books, 2008), 24.
172. John P. Lewis, Karl Barth in North America: The Influence of Karl Barth in the Making of a  
New North American Evangelicalism (Resource Publications (OR), 2009), 33-49, 213
173. Lewis, Karl Barth in North America, 44.
174. See ch. 10, “The Kuyperian Legacy (II): Cornelius Van Til and the Van Tillians,” in David 
VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social  
Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 386-422; quotation at p. 386.
175. VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 387.
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in a footnote which lists Van Til’s Dutch Reformed interlocutors in his debates 
over the doctrine of common grace.176 Thus VanDrunen’s analysis of Van Til is 
mostly silent regarding Bavinck’s influence.177 Nevertheless, it is significant to 
note that VanDrunen interprets Van Til primarily in terms of Neo-Calvinism, 
specifically in relation to Kuyper.178
3. Summary
This survey of Van Til scholarship yields several salient insights into the 
scholarly perception of Van Til’s theological heritage. First, scholars following the 
“Copernican” line of interpretation have tended to produce little by way of 
historically contextualized analysis. The largest and most robust analyses of Van 
Til’s thought (i.e., the works by Bahnsen and Frame) are devoted primarily to 
exposition of Van Til’s allegedly unique views. Hence these works provide little 
by way of historical contextualization. The Copernican line of Van Til scholarship 
tends to read the entire history of Christian thought in light of Van Til—as if he 
appeared ex nihilo—rather than reading Van Til in light of the history of Christian 
thought, especially in light of the neo-Calvinist context within which he lived, 
moved, and had his being. Nevertheless, despite the hyperbole and lack of 
historical criticism evident in this line of scholarship, several of the studies 
therein have noted, albeit briefly, Bavinck’s profound influence upon their 
176. VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 397n55.
177. VanDrunen does reference Muether’s biography and the two analyses by Frame and 
Bahnsen, all of which take note of Bavinck’s influence (VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two 
Kingdoms, 386-387n1).
178. In an earlier essay, VanDrunen, “A System of Theology?,” 213, remarks that “Van Til 
consciously grounded his understanding of apologetics in the broader truths of Reformed 
doctrine. . . .” The context of VanDrunen’s citation at 213n26 refers to John Murray (1898–1975), 
who was professor of systematic theology at Westminster Seminary during Van Til’s tenure. 
VanDrunen thus implicitly includes Murray as an influence upon Van Til’s thought.
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“Copernicus.”
Second, before the 2003–2008 translation of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek, many scholars noted Bavinck’s significant influence upon Van Til’s 
thought, but not a single study elaborated upon this relationship based on 
primary sources. As the four volumes of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek began to appear in 
English translation, however, Van Til scholars started to notice more and more 
correlations between the two thinkers. By 2008 a nascent reassessment of Van Til 
vis-á-vis Bavinck is evident, most notably in the studies by Muether and Mattson 
and in the editorial notes by Edgar and Oliphint that accompany the new 
editions of Van Til’s works. Therefore, although we cannot draw a hard-and-fast 
rule, there does appear to be an incipient trend in Van Til scholarship—the more 
that Bavinck’s works are published in English, the more Van Til scholars are re-
reading Van Til in light of the work that Van Til himself lauded as “the greatest 
and most comprehensive statement of Reformed systematic theology in modern 
times.”179 However, even though a nascent reassessment of Van Til’s 
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought is evident in studies published subsequent to 
the translation of Bavinck’s magnum opus, a robust theological analysis of Van 
Til’s Reformed apologetics vis-á-vis Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics  
remains outstanding. 
Third, in the scholarly literature Bavinck’s influence upon Van Til is largely 
overshadowed by Kuyper’s. Several Van Til biographers and interpreters 
highlight 
“Father Abraham’s” influence while virtually neglecting Bavinck’s. Yet, oddly, 
179. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89.
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despite the scholarly hubbub over Kuyper, there are no extant historical or 
theological studies which elaborate this relationship in any depth using primary 
source materials. Therefore, similar to the scant treatment of Bavinck’s influence 
in Van Til scholarship, Kuyper’s dominant neo-Calvinist influence upon Van Til’s 
thought remains underdeveloped.
D. The Thesis: Neo-Calvinist à la Bavinck
In light of the predominant Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s thought, I 
raised the question as to whether such ahistorical, abstract, revolutionary 
readings of Van Til’s work can be sustained vis-à-vis his modest self-assessments, 
his polemics against theological novelty, and his appropriation of Kuyper’s neo-
Calvinist vision. Then, focusing upon one aspect of this question—Van Til’s 
appropriations of Bavinck’s thought—I surveyed the current scholarship on Van 
Til and found that, although recent scholars have begun to notice Bavinck’s 
pervasive influence upon Van Til’s thought, a thorough analysis of Van Til’s 
specific appropriations of Bavinck’s theological formulations remains 
outstanding.
Therefore, in order to shed light upon this underdeveloped area in Van Til 
scholarship I will argue the following thesis in response to the aforementioned 
question: Considered in concreto, Van Til’s theological formulations are neither 
revolutionary nor de novo; rather, his presupposition of “the Reformed system of 
doctrine” is largely an appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek. If it can be demonstrated that Van Til pervasively appropriates 
theological formulations from his preeminent Dutch neo-Calvinist predecessor, 
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then the use of the following two adjectives in Van Til scholarship will need to be 
reassessed accordingly: “Copernican” and “Van Tilian.”
E. The Argument: A Précis
My argument proceeds in three steps. Step one—which we have already 
completed in chapter 1—is to set our thesis within the context of Van Til 
scholarship. We have seen that, contrary to the Copernican interpretation of Van 
Til’s thought which abstracts his basic presupposition of “the Reformed system” 
out of his neo-Calvinist context, a more concrete, historically-contextualized 
analysis is needed in order to account for Van Til’s own interpretation of his 
work.
Accordingly, in step two I will examine three concrete aspects of Van Til’s 
presupposition. First, I will argue in chapter 2 that a major formal element of Van 
Til’s presupposition derives from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, namely, the priority of 
dogmatics over apologetics in theological encyclopedia. Second, based upon a 
survey of Van Til’s presentation of Reformed dogmatics in his book, An 
Introduction to Systematic Theology, I will demonstrate in chapter 3 that, 
considered materially, the bulk of Van Til’s presupposition comprises 
voluminous appropriations—both explicit and tacit—from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. 
Third, based on several of his polemical writings, I will demonstrate in chapter 4 
that Van Til frequently employs Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the paragon of Reformed 
orthodoxy contra the work of several modern Reformed theologians whom Van 
Til repudiates as promulgators of heterodoxy. In sum, then, step two of my 
argument seeks to demonstrate that, formally, materially, and polemically, Van 
48
Til’s presupposition is not Copernican but neo-Calvinist à la Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
In step three I will confront what at first glance appears to be the Achilles’ 
heel of my thesis, namely, the fact that Van Til levels totalizing critiques against 
the patent scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought. After surveying his catalog of 
criticisms in chapter 5, I will then analyze Van Til’s overall critique in two ways 
in chapter 6. First, concerning its source, I will demonstrate that Van Til’s critique 
is an appropriation of Herman Dooyeweerd’s prior criticisms of the scholasticism 
in neo-Calvinist theology. Second, concerning its validity, I will argue that, since 
Van Til’s critique is based upon (1) an ahistorical, idiosyncratic definition of 
“scholasticism” that is imposed upon Bavinck’s thought from without and (2) an 
unsound, bipolar, dialectical interpretation of Bavinck’s thought, it is both 
methodologically unsound and historically untenable.
CHAPTER II. 
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN CONCRETO (PART 1):
FORMAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
The relationship between apologetics and dogmatics is a key structural 
aspect of Van Til’s thought; for, the question inherent in this relationship is 
whether apologetics is grounded upon a foundation independent of theology’s 
principia. If so, then apologetics takes on an autonomous nature, and its task is to 
provide philosophical foundations for theology independent of divine revelation. 
If not, then apologetics is a fully dogmatic in nature, and its task is to vindicate 
both theology’s principia and the content of her dogmas, not autonomously but in 
full dependence upon dogmatics. Thus the relationship between the two is no 
mere theological nicety; rather, a host of implications follow upon how Van Til 
views the nature of this relationship.
As indicated by his basic presupposition, Van Til clearly takes the latter 
position, namely, that Reformed apologetics presupposes Reformed dogmatics 
rather than vice versa. Thus the question we are pursuing in this chapter is not 
concerning which position Van Til takes, but, given the claims of the Copernican 
line of scholarship, we will ask: Is Van Til’s position regarding the relationship of 
dogmatics and apologetics revolutionary? Does he formulate this position de 
novo, or is he appropriating insights from his neo-Calvinist tradition, and, in 
particular, from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek?
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I will argue that this formal feature of Van Til’s thought is not a Copernican 
revolution but an appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s formulation of the 
relationship between dogmatics and apologetics. At first glance this argument 
may seem unlikely since Van Til couches the debate on this point mostly in terms 
of “old Amsterdam” (i.e., Kuyper) vs. “old Princeton” (i.e, Warfield). Yet, a closer 
look will reveal that Van Til’s position is closer to Bavinck’s than to Kuyper’s.
In order to make this case Bavinck’s position will be presented first, then Van 
Til’s view will be compared with Bavinck’s.
A. Dogmatics and Apologetics in Bavinck’s Dogmatiek
Apologetics makes its first appearance in the Reformed Dogmatics only 
tangentially, yet the context within which it appears is highly significant, namely, 
a discussion on the place of dogmatics in theological encyclopedia.1 Following 
Kuyper’s fourfold schema,2 Bavinck lists apologetics as a member of the third 
group of theological sciences (i.e., the dogmatological group) which also includes 
1. Two formal differences between the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek and the Reformed Dogmatics 
are important to note for the following discussion. First, in the Dogmatiek Bavinck’s discussion of 
theological encyclopedia is its own paragraph (i.e., § 2, “Encyclopaedische Plaats der 
Dogmatiek,” in Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 7th ed., 4 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1998), 1:23-36), which 
includes subparagraphs ##9–12. The English translation inserts many sub-headings not present 
in the Dutch, thus creating a more complex hierarchy than exists in the original. If we are to 
follow Bavinck’s original organization, therefore, ##9–12 should be read as its own paragraph 
rather than as the seventh sub-section of ch. 1 as it appears in the English translation. Second, in 
the Dogmatiek each of the paragraphs begins with a list of sources which Bavinck interacts with 
throughout the paragraph. This structural feature is absent from the English translation. Keeping 
this feature in mind helps make better structural sense of Bavinck’s seemingly long excursus on 
Schleiermacher and Bavinck’s interaction with Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie throughout ##9–12.
2. Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles, trans. J. Hendrik De Vries 
(New York: Charles Scribnerʼs Sons, 1898), 630, classifies the theological sciences into four groups: 
(1) Bibliological, (2) Ecclesiological, (3) Dogmatological, and (4) Diaconiological. Idem, 
Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1909), 3:365-66, organizes 
the dogmatological group into three sub-groups: (1) diathetic, (2) thetic, and (3) antithetic. 
Polemics, elenctics, and apologetics comprise the antithetic sub-group. Kuyper’s two-tiered 
schema is therefore more elaborate than Bavinck’s.
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dogmatics, ethics, symbolics, and the history of dogma.3 He then turns abruptly 
to a lengthy critical analysis of Schleiermacher’s singular deviation whereby 
dogmatics is classified as an historical rather than a dogmatological discipline. 
Bavinck’s critique of this seemingly pedantic point reveals the tip of what he 
takes to be a deadly iceberg for dogmatics—the rejection of the scientific nature 
of theology.4 Therefore, insofar as Bavinck considers both apologetics and 
dogmatics to be dogmatological sciences, before we can understand Bavinck’s 
placement of apologetics within the theological encyclopedia we must first 
survey his view of the scientific nature of theology.
1. The Nature of Theology as a Science
Bavinck views theology as the science of the knowledge of God. In modern 
theology, however, man had replaced God as the proper object of theology, and 
dogmatics had been redefined as the science of faith, according to Bavinck. 
Positivism slowly swallowed metaphysics, he reasons, objectivity gave way to 
subjectivity, and theology as knowledge degenerated into theology as faith. 
Accordingly, dogmatics devolved from a normative, objective science into a 
systematic historical account of subjective religious belief; therefore, Bavinck 
remarks that theology’s scientific nature came to be seen in merely formal terms.5 
This monumental shift, argues Bavinck, began early in the history of 
3. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1, Prolegomena 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 47; also cf. pp. 54, 54n57. At the head of § 2 in his 
Dogmatiek Bavinck references Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie, vol. 3, pp. 346–467.
4. Bavinck gives extended attention to Schleiermacher in #9 (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47-50), 
but his discussion of the underlying issue relating to Schleiermacher’s reinterpretation of the 
nature of dogmatics extents throughout ##4–12 (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34-58).
5. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34-37; also cf. idem, Essays on Religion, Science, and Society, 
ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 
2008), 49-51, 61-62.
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dogmatics. He finds evidence for the shift already in the thought of Lombard, 
Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Hugo St. Victor, and even in some Lutheran 
and Reformed theologians—all of these theologians made religion (i.e., man) 
instead of revelation (i.e., God) theology’s object. “Thus, step by step, the 
subjective practical notion of theology began increasingly to find acceptance.”6 
The result of this shift, asserts Bavinck, was that, after Kant and Schleiermacher,
dogmatics became the account of the historic phenomenon that is called 
the Christian religion and manifests itself in a unique faith and doctrine. 
Now when dogmatics is understood in this sense, it ceases to be 
dogmatics and simply becomes the account of what in a certain specific 
circle is held to be true in the sphere of religion.7
Bavinck eschews this Kantian, subjective, positivistic revision of theology’s 
scientific nature and insists upon the classical objective view with God, not man, 
as theology’s object. “For God to be knowable,” argues Bavinck, 
he must have revealed himself not only in deeds but also in words. 
Contained in that revelation is the knowledge of God in the objective 
sense, and as such it is the object of theology, more specifically of 
dogmatics.8
Thus he avers the following ultimatum:
A choice has to be made: either there is room in science for metaphysics 
and then positivism is in principle false, or positivism is the true view of 
science and metaphysics must be radically banished from its entire 
domain. One who specifically devotes his energies to the restoration of 
metaphysics in the science of religion has in principle broken with the 
6. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34-35; quote at p. 35.
7. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:36-37. Also note Bavinck’s comment that the Higher 
Education Act of 1876 in Holland embodies this shift (p. 36).
8. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42; also cf. pp. 53-54. Throughout his Prolegomena Bavinck 
follows standard Reformed scholastic distinctions regarding the principia of theology 
distinguished as follows: God is the princpium essendi; Revelation is the principium cognoscendi 
externum; Faith is the princpium cognoscendi internum; Cf. Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and 
Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally From Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich. 
Baker Books, 2006), s.vv., princpium essendi, principium cognoscendi externum, and princpium 
cognoscendi internum; idem, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena to Theology, 
2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 430-50.
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basic idea from which the science of religion took its rise and is, again in 
principle, returning to the old view of theology.9
Echoing his earlier citation of Thomas’ classic definition,10 Bavinck defines 
dogmatics in unabashedly metaphysical terms as “the knowledge that God has 
revealed in his Word to the church concerning himself and all creatures as they 
stand in relation to him.”11 Thus he clearly supports the “old view.”
For Bavinck dogmatics is a science because dogmatics deals with objective, 
revealed truth.12 He insists that “if the revelation contains such a knowledge of 
God [i.e., an objective, revealed knowledge], it can also be thought through 
scientifically and gathered up in a system.”13 Accordingly, he insists that “a 
theologian’s sole responsibility is to think God’s thoughts after him and to 
reproduce the unity that is objectively present in the thoughts of God and has 
been recorded for the eye of faith in Scripture.”14 “Like every other departmental 
discipline,” argues Bavinck, “theology too has its own object and principle, 
method and aim.”15 According to Bavinck, the normative nature of dogmatics is 
therefore a concomitant of its metaphysical object. “[D]ogmatics is a normative 
science,” he insists, “that prescribes what we must believe.”16
Bavinck uses Julius Kaftan’s position as a foil to defend the scientific nature 
9. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:37. Bavinck frequently recapitulates this ultimatum (i.e., “a 
choice has to be made”); cf. pp. 75, 218, 231, 276, 340, 458.
10. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34, 36.
11. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:38. Cf. Bavinck’s explication of the normative, ecclesial, 
and catholic dimensions of his definition of dogmatics at p. 46.
12. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:37.
13. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42.
14. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:44; also cf. p. 588.
15. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:43.
16. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:46.
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of dogmatics.17 Kaftan, according to Bavinck, accepted a faith-knowledge of God 
but rejected a scientific knowledge of God. Thus by denying the existence of an 
objective, scientific knowledge of God, argues Bavinck, Kaftan falls prey to the 
same problem as Schleiermacher—subjectivity—despite Kaftan’s own critiques 
of Schleiermacher’s subjectivity.18 Bavinck rejoins against Kaftan’s attempt to 
ground dogmatics in a quasi-objective faith-knowledge as follows:
This, however, is a dead-end road. For if strictly speaking there is no 
science of God, then neither can there be a faith-knowledge of God. 
Conversely, if indeed there exists a true and trustworthy knowledge of 
God, even though it is acquired in a special way that corresponds to the 
nature of its object, then one can certainly speak properly of a science of 
God. Correctly assuming a faith-knowledge of God, therefore, Kaftan 
should have pushed consistently forward along that line, broken with 
Kant’s dualism, reviewed the modern concept of science, and made a 
simple and decisive assertion: Precisely because a true faith-knowledge 
of God exists, dogmatics has the knowledge of God as part of its content 
and can rightly claim to be a science.19
To embrace the Kantian shift of theology’s object from revelation to religion, as 
evidenced in the views of Schleiermacher and Kaftan, requires the relegation of 
dogmatics to the realm of subjective faith, a move which Bavinck sees as self-
contradictory; for, without an objective grounding in God’s revelation, dogmatics 
could not even produce true subjective knowledge of God. Such a shift would 
further create a dichotomy between knowledge and faith, a move which Bavinck 
also rejects. “Faith (religion, the knowledge of faith) and theology,” insists 
Bavinck, “are not related as pistis and gnosis but differ only in degrees.”20 
17. Bavinck treats Kaftan’s view of dogmatics in ##6–8 (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:38-46). 
Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian 
and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 38, interprets Bavinck’s critique of Kaftan as an exemplar 
representing Bavinck’s larger critique of Kantian dualism in modern theology.
18. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42.
19. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:43.
20. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:42.
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The only path which maintains an organic unity between faith and 
knowledge in dogmatics, according to Bavinck, is the one paved with an 
objective, scientific revelation of God. Conversely, a non-scientific dogmatics is as 
impossible as a non-dogmatic science.21 The scientific nature of theology 
grounded upon a divinely given revelation is therefore an all-important 
controlling principle in Bavinck’s thought; indeed, it is the only context for 
understanding Bavinck’s assertion that theology is the veritable “queen of 
sciences” who selflessly serves all her subjects, blessing each one with her 
manifold gifts.22
2. The Place of Dogmatics in Theological Encyclopedia
With Bavinck’s view of dogmatics as a science (in the pre-Kantian, classical 
sense) in mind, we can now return to where we left off—Bavinck’s critique of 
Schleiermacher’s theological encyclopedia. Schleiermacher rejected theology as a 
science, argues Bavinck, and insisted instead upon a rigorous separation between 
dogmatics and apologetics: The former deals with the history of religious faith 
(i.e., religion), the latter with Christian truth (i.e., science). In principle, therefore, 
a dichotomy between faith and knowledge, theology and philosophy, 
subjectivity and objectivity, religion and science controls Schleiermacher’s 
thought, reasons Bavinck.23 The implication is that apologetics (a philosophical, 
objective science) deals with truth, whereas dogmatics (a non-scientific, 
subjective discipline) does not. Contra Schleiermacher’s view, Bavinck insists that 
21. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:43.
22. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:54; also cf. idem, “Herman Bavinckʼs ‘Common Grace’,” 
Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1 (1989): 65.
23. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47-48.
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dogmatics, no less than apologetics, is a science which deals with objective truth. 
“The Christian church cannot be satisfied,” insists Bavinck, “with an objective 
account of the content of its faith but wishes that its faith be unfolded and set 
forth also as truth.”24 
Bavinck observes that Schleiermacher could not practice his own principles; 
rather, Schleiermacher’s rigorous dichotomies actually resulted in a complete 
fusion of philosophy and theology.25 Nevertheless, notes Bavinck, 
Schleiermacher’s influence prevailed in the so-called “mediating theology,”26 a 
school of thought which advocated a dichotomy between the university and the 
church, the science of religion and ecclesiastical theology.27 If theology does not 
deal with truth, reasoned the mediating theologians, then it does not belong in 
the university and should be relegated to the church instead.28
“Against this division,” Bavinck rejoins ardently, “there are so many 
theoretical and practical objections that it should be viewed as profoundly 
inadvisable.”29 The main thrust of his rejoinder is as follows:
The word of God has an objective content that was established before, 
and persists apart from, our faith, just as much as the world of colors and 
sounds exists independently of the blind and the deaf. In that case, 
24. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47.
25. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:48.
26. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:49, 49n49.
27. The separation between the university study of religion and the ecclesiastical study of 
theology was an issue that Bavinck fought vehemently throughout his own career, most notably 
in his role as mediator between the seminary at Kampen and the Free University of Amsterdam. 
Bavinck led several attempts to form a merger between these institutions, but ideological 
differences regarding the nature of theology prevented the merger time and again. Furthermore, 
Bavinck’s own life story, notably his own transition from Kampen to Amsterdam, reflects this 
very tension. Cf. Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2010), 225-315.
28. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:49-50.
29. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:50. For Bavinck’s detailed array of arguments against this 
dichotomy, see pp. 50–54. 
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however, knowledge of the objective content of revelation has 
significance of and for itself. This is true of all science.
. . . Truth as such has value. Knowledge as such is a good. To know 
God in the face of Christ—by faith here on earth, by sight in the hereafter
—not only results in blessedness but is as such blessedness and eternal 
life. It is this knowledge dogmatics strives for in order that God may see 
his own image reflected and his own name recorded in the human 
consciousness. And for that reason theology and dogmatics do not 
belong, by the grace of a positivistic science, in a church seminary, but in 
the university of the sciences (universitas scientiarum).30
Therefore, Bavinck insists that, since theology derives from God’s objective 
revelation, the proper throne for the queen of sciences is the university, not the 
seminary.
3. The Place of Apologetics in Theological Encyclopedia
If theology is a science, and if dogmatics and apologetics both belong to the 
third division of theological sciences (i.e., the dogmatological group), then 
dogmatics must be distinguished from apologetics by some criterion, reasons 
Bavinck. All of the dogmatological sciences deal with dogma, he remarks, but the 
specific manner in which each one does so provides its distinguishing feature. He 
therefore distinguishes the two as follows: Dogma “set forth thetically and 
positively, and at the same scientifically, in a systematic form” is dogmatics; 
Dogma “defended and maintained in its truthfulness and legitimacy against its 
opponents” is apologetics.31
The place of apologetics among the theological sciences, however, has varied 
widely, notes Bavinck. Some have elevated apologetics as the philosophical 
presupposition of dogmatics, while others have denigrated apologetics as a mere 
30. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:53-54.
31. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:54.
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practical afterthought to theology. “There is no valid reason for either such 
overvaluation or such disdain,” retorts Bavinck.32 Those who, like 
Schleiermacher, elevate apologetics as the philosophical presupposition of 
dogmatics did so because they had rejected theology’s own principia and “were 
forced to look elsewhere for a foundation on which the building of theology 
could rest.”33 Bavinck, however, rejects such attempts to ground theology upon 
philosophy, to separate the principia of dogmatics and apologetics: 
If, however, theology is deduced from its own source, i.e., from 
revelation, it has its own certainty and does not need the corroboration of 
philosophical reasoning. Accordingly, apologetics cannot and may not 
precede dogmatics but presupposes dogma and now gets the modest but 
still splendid task of maintaining and defending this dogma against all 
opposition. It now attempts to do this, not in response to some specific 
challenge, but fundamentally in terms of the opposition that dogmas as 
the truth of God encounter at all times, be it in ever changing forms, 
from the side of the “natural man.”34
The object of theology—revelation—is all-determining for the nature and task of 
apologetics, according to Bavinck. All theological sciences receive, rather than 
create, their principia. Even the name “apologetics,” notes Bavinck, indicates that 
it is not a heuristic science which searches out its own content independent of 
dogmatics.35 Apologetics therefore cannot have a separate foundation than 
dogmatics:
Apologetics cannot precede faith and does not attempt a priori to argue 
the truth of revelation. It assumes the truth and belief in the truth. It does 
not, as the introductory part or as the foundational science, precede 
theology and dogmatics. It is itself a theological science through and 
through, which presupposes the faith and dogmatics and now maintains 
32. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55.
33. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55.
34. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55-56; also cf. pp. 515-17.
35. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:55.
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and defends the dogma against the opposition to which it is exposed.36 
For Bavinck the science of apologetics is in no sense pre-dogmatic; rather, it 
presupposes dogmatics and is built upon the same principia. If theology is the 
“queen of sciences,” then apologetics is her steady and skillful handmaiden. Both 
belong to the dogmatological sciences, yet in terms of proper logical order the 
handmaiden serves the queen, not vice versa. Therefore, Bavinck’s view of the 
relation between apologetics and dogmatics follows the traditional Protestant 
scholastic view of the relationship between prolegomena and dogmatics, namely, 
that theological prolegomena (including the principia of theology) are not 
vordogmatisch but fully dogmatisch.37
4. The Task of Apologetics
Bavinck assigns this handmaiden three specific tasks within her overall 
responsibility to defend and vindicate the truthfulness of dogma. First, 
apologetics forces theology to account for its principia and its content, its 
foundation and its superstructure. “It brings Christian theology out of the 
shadows of the mysticism of the human heart,” writes Bavinck, “into the full 
light of day. Apologetics, after all, was the first Christian science.”38 Second, 
apologetics emboldens Christians and keeps them from embarrassed silence in 
the face of critics. Bavinck boldly asserts, “The Christian worldview alone is one 
36. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515; cf. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic  
Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 90-91.
37. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:121, writes the following regarding the 
relation between prolegomena and dogmatics in Protestant scholasticism: “We note, again, that 
theological prolegomena are never vordogmatisch: they are an integral part of dogmatic system 
that develops in dialog with basic dogmatic conclusions after the system as a whole has been set 
forth.”
38. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515.
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that fits the reality of the world and of life.”39 Third, apologetics is a mighty tool 
in God’s hands by which “will very definitely succeed in impressing opponents 
with the truth of Christian revelation, refuting and silencing them.” As such, 
“apologetics, like the ministry of the Word, can be a source of consummate 
blessing.”40 In each of her tasks, therefore, the handmaiden willingly serves the 
queen.
B. Dogmatics and Apologetics in Van Til’s Thought
Van Til frequently repeated materials throughout his writings, and he often 
provides further explication in his later writings of points he made earlier. In 
order to get the full picture, therefore, we need to collate his various 
presentations of the relationship between dogmatics and apologetics in 
theological encyclopedia. We begin with his introductory syllabus on apologetics.
1. Theological Encyclopedia in Christian Apologetics
“Apologetics,” writes Van Til in the opening lines of Christian Apologetics, “is 
the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of 
the non-Christian philosophy of life.”41 Just like Bavinck’s assertion that 
apologetics must vindicate both Christianity’s principia and its content, so Van Til 
asserts that vindication has two components: facts and philosophy of fact, 
Christianity and theism, history and philosophy. “It is impossible and useless,” 
he claims, “to seek to vindicate Christianity as a historical religion by a 
39. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515.
40. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:515.
41. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
P&R, 2003), 17.
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discussion of facts only.”42 “To interpret a fact of history,” reasons Van Til, 
“involves a philosophy of history.” Thus he concludes: “In short, there is a 
historical and there is a philosophical aspect to the defense of Christian theism.”43
Van Til uses martial imagery to explain the nature of apologetics. The 
historical aspect of apologetics is like ground troops who march about doing the 
detailed work of war, and the philosophical aspect is like the big guns which 
clear the way for the ground troops. The troops and the guns are mutually 
interdependent, and they both are fighting the same war.44
Van Til continues to use the martial metaphor in his explication of the place 
of apologetics in the theological encyclopedia. His argument had two parts. First, 
he divides up the theological disciplines into three groups: (1) Biblical studies, (2) 
systematic theology, and (3) church history. Second, he claims that each of the 
three disciplines must vindicate the truth in its own field. Yet, if each discipline 
must defend its own turf, reasons Van Til, it would appear that there is no place 
left for apologetics. However, in order to show that this is not the case, Van Til 
introduces another martial image—apologetics as “messenger boy.”45
The messenger boy has two basic tasks, according to Van Til. First, he goes 
back and forth between divisions carrying messages from general to general. For 
example, Van Til describes the messenger boy bringing a map to someone on the 
front lines in order to remind that soldier of the big picture as an analogy of the 
42. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 18.
43. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 19.
44. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 18.
45. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 20-21. William Edgar, at p. 21n1, notes the following: “Here, 
Van Til sets forth a comprehensive view of apologetics. It ought to function acros the disciplines, 
showing in each field of knowledge, however specialized, that a defense and commendation of 
the whole of Christian faith should constantly be kept in view.”
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exegetical scholar who needs to be reminded by the apologist of Christianity’s 
big theological picture. Second, the messenger boy serves as a scout who 
stealthily detects the enemies advances and as a nightwatchman who guards the 
fort.46 “The net result, then,” remarks Van Til, “seems to be that in apologetics we 
have the whole field to cover.”47 Thus even though each discipline must perform 
its own apologetic task, apologetics finds an indispensable place as the 
messenger boy in Van Til’s theological army.
Combining his various metaphors yields the following picture. Van Til 
explicates theological encyclopedia in terms of warfare. Each discipline must 
defend its own turf. The vindicatory task of apologetics therefore differs only in 
degree from that of biblical studies, systematic theology, and church history. 
More than the practitioners of the three main disciplines, the apologist stands 
guard, scouts, and moves in and out between disciplines, always defending and 
vindicating the whole in light of the parts and vice versa. The others do their 
own share of vindicating, but not to the extent of the apologist.48
Unlike Bavinck, Van Til only explicitly describes the relationship between 
systematic theology and apologetics in passing:
It is apparent from our discussion so far that systematic theology is more 
closely related to apologetics than are any of the other disciplines. In it 
we have the system of truth that we are to defend.49
Yet if we extend Van Til’s martial imagery to include what is implicit in his 
statement, the relationship he describes is very similar to Bavinck’s formulation: 
46. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 21-23.
47. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 22.
48. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 22-23.
49. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 23.
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Dogmatics, as chief commander, defines the battle field and draws up the battle 
plans. Apologetics, as messenger boy, receives his maps and his missions from 
the commander. The nature and task of apologetics is therefore governed by 
dogmatics.
2. Theological Encyclopedia in An Introduction to Systematic Theology
In contrast to Bavinck’s strong insistence that theology is the scientia de Deo, 
Van Til provides scant reflection on the scientific nature of theology. At one point 
he seems to dismiss the attempt to claim that theology is a science on the ground 
that such an attempt overvalues the use of reason, but he does not elaborate this 
point.50 Whether or not he views theology as a science, Van Til clearly affirms the 
ground upon which Bavinck makes this claim, namely, that theology is grounded 
upon objective truth. Like Bavinck, Van Til notes that in modern theology 
“religion” has been redefined in subjective terms. “But since Christianity claims 
to be the true religion,” objects Van Til, “it follows that for it the objective 
reference is of prime importance.”51 He asserts accordingly that theology should 
no longer be defined as “the science of religion” due to this definition’s subjective 
connotation in modern times.52 Apart from these two brief assertions, however, 
Van Til does not elaborate on whether theology is a science.
Van Til’s explication of theological encyclopedia is brief. Similar to the 
threefold schema he presents in Christian Apologetics, Van Til arranges the 
theological disciplines into the following three groups: (1) exegesis and biblical 
50. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 56-57.
51. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 16.
52. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 15-16.
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theology, (2) systematic theology, (3) practical theology. The only major change 
he makes here is that practical theology has replaced church history in this 
arrangement. Van Til then relates systematic theology to apologetics as follows: 
Systematics arranges the fruits of exegesis and biblical theology “into a 
concatenated system,”53 and apologetics defends and vindicates this system 
“against false philosophy and false science.”54 Thus Van Til recapitulates the 
commander and messenger boy relationship between dogmatics and apologetics, 
albeit without the martial motif.
Like Bavinck, Van Til notes that the relationship of apologetics and 
systematics is a disputed point in the Reformed tradition. “The point of 
difference,” he asserts, “concerns chiefly the nature of apologetics.”55 He 
summarizes the debate as follows: On the one hand, B. B. Warfield and the 
Princeton school of apologetics maintains that apologetics must establish the 
presuppositions of systematics; On the other hand, Kuyper, Bavinck, and the 
Amsterdam school of apologetics maintains that apologetics defends the system 
of theology it receives from systematics. According to Van Til, Warfield insists 
that the Amsterdam method begs the truth question, whereas Kuyper insists that 
the Princeton method inappropriately places the Christian position before a non-
Christian bar of reason.56
Reticent to disagree with either, Van Til attempts to incorporate Warfield’s 
53. Thanks to my student colleague Andrew M. McGinnis for noting that on this point Van 
Til has clearly appropriated B. B. Warfield’s formulation of the task of systematic theology in 
terms of a systematic “concatenation” of the knowledge of God. Cf. Benjamin B. Warfield, The 
Works of Benjamin B. Warfield (1932; repr., Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000), IX:51, 93.
54. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 17.
55. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 17.
56. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 17-18.
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concerns within Kuyper’s position.57 He reasons that even on Kuyper’s terms 
apologetics can come first in practice, provided it presupposes the truth of the 
Christian system. Along with Kuyper, however, Van Til rejects Warfield’s 
insistence that apologetics must employ a different method than all of the other 
theological disciplines. “All the disciplines must presuppose God,” argues Van Til, 
“but, at the same time, presupposition is the best proof. Apologetics takes particular 
pains to show that such is the case. This is its chief task.” Van Til concludes 
accordingly, recapitulating his messenger boy metaphor in the following terms: 
Apologetics defends the outer edge of systematics’ circle of truth.58
3. Theological Encyclopedia in The Defense of the Faith
In The Defense of the Faith Van Til presents a similar picture of apologetics’ 
place within the theological encyclopedia, yet he deals with the topic only 
implicitly. Before one can defend the faith, he argues, one must first know the 
faith that is to be defended. Therefore, with respect to theological encyclopedia, 
Van Til reasons that apologetics must receive its statement of faith from the other 
theological disciplines, especially systematic theology, before it can defend that 
faith.59 He cites the work of his former professor, Louis Berkhof, as an example of 
the Reformed system of faith which apologetics first receives and then defends. 
57. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
P&R, 2008), 310, displays similar reticence toward disagreeing with either Warfield or Kuyper in 
the following statement: “Are we to be reprimanded in advance for not agreeing with Kuyper? 
Or for not agreeing with Warfield? Let us rather seek to listen to both Warfield and Kuyper and 
also to Calvin, and then do the best we can as we ask just what the genius of the Reformed Faith 
requires of us. Is there anything else that anyone today can do?”
58. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 18-19; quotes at p. 19.
59. Johannes Heinrich August Ebrard, Apologetics; Or The Scientific Vindication of Christianity, 
trans. William Stuart and John Macpherson, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886), 2-3, presents a 
similar argument: Christian apologetics is not the science of defense in abstracto, but the defense 
of its concrete object, namely, Christianity.
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Drawing out what is implicit in Van Til’s view, therefore, insofar as faith must 
have content before it can be defended, the what of apologetics must precede the 
how, the commander must precede and govern the messenger boy.60
Van Til takes up the Princeton-Amsterdam debate again, this time devoting 
the entirety of chapter 13 to the topic in contrast with his shorter treatment in An 
Introduction to Systematic Theology.61 Van Til anticipates chapter 13 with the 
following rhetorical question in chapter 12:
Have not certain Reformed theologians been willing in some measure to 
cooperate with Romanists in defending theism and with evangelicals in 
defending evangelicalism, in order, after that, to defend the specific 
doctrines of Calvinism? Are they all wrong and are you alone right?62
“The answer to this objection is not easy,” answers Van Til. “It would require 
separate and extensive discussion to do it justice.”63 After noting that the nature 
and task of apologetics is a disputed point among Reformed theologians in 
general, he comments specifically, “The difference between Warfield and Kuyper 
on the question of apologetics is well known.”64 The “extensive discussion” in 
chapter 13, therefore, appears to be Van Til’s attempt (1) to deal with the 
objection that he thinks his apologetic alone is true and (2) “to listen to both 
Warfield and Kuyper and also to Calvin. . . .”65
Throughout chapter 13 Van Til analyzes the issues in the Princeton-
60. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 28-29.
61. Cf. ch. 13 in Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 345-382. At p. 345n1 Van Til notes that most 
of this chapter recapitulates material from ch. 8 in idem, A Christian Theory of Knowledge 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 221-54. In this latter work Van Til further 
remarks that his argument presupposes the material found in idem, “Nature and Scripture,” in 
The Infallible Word: A Symposium by the Members of the Faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary, 
2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967), 263-301.
62. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 309.
63. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 309.
64. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 310.
65. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 310.
67
Amsterdam debate, critiques representatives from both schools of thought (i.e., 
Warfield, Kuyper, William Brenton Greene Jr., Floyd E. Hamilton, and Bavinck), 
and presents his own view as a via media between Warfield and Kuyper which he 
sees as more faithful to Calvin and to Paul. We will limit our attention to the 
following two points apropos of theological encyclopedia specifically.66
First, Van Til views the underlying issue between Warfield and Kuyper to be 
differing evaluations of natural theology. Using Kuyper’s epistemological 
terminology of the “natural [i.e., non-Christian] principle” and the “special [i.e., 
Christian] principle,” Van Til summarizes the debate as follows: Warfield insists 
that the natural principle can interpret general revelation correctly whereas 
Kuyper maintains the opposite.67 Thus Van Til finds the two positions to be 
mutually exclusive. “It is impossible,” he insists, “to hold with Kuyper that the 
Christian and the non-Christian principles are destructive of one another and to 
hold with Warfield that they differ only in degree.”68
Second, contra K. Scott Oliphint’s assertion to the contrary,69 Van Til 
intentionally sides with Kuyper’s antithetical “natural principle” and “special 
principle” over against Warfield’s view of “right reason,” but he does so with a 
caveat on Kuyper’s allegedly negative view of apologetics. He writes:
For myself I have chosen the position of Kuyper.70 But I am unable to 
66. For an analysis of Van Til’s critiques of Bavinck in this chapter (i.e., The Defense of the  
Faith, 374-79), see Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” Westminster Theological  
Journal 70, no. 1 (2008): 116-23; Also, we will examine Van Til’s critiques further in chapters 5–6 
below.
67. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 346-51.
68. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 351; also cf. p. 360.
69. Cf. K. Scott Oliphint’s editorial note in Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 352n27: “To put 
the matter more succinctly, it is not the case that Van Til has chosen Kuyper over Warfield.”
70. With respect to Van Til’s choice of Kuyper’s position over Warfield’s, cf. Van Til, The 
Defense of the Faith, 284: “If Masselink wants to remain true to the basic commitment of Kuyper, he 
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follow him when from the fact of the mutually destructive character of 
the two principles he concludes to the uselessness of reasoning with the 
natural man.71
Van Til presents his caveat only indirectly; for, instead of arguing his point from 
Kuyper’s works directly, he employs the analogy of Reformed vs. Arminian 
preaching. The unsubstantiated implication of Van Til’s caveat is that Kuyper 
should have viewed apologetics to be as valuable and as necessary as 
preaching.72 However, despite this caveat, Van Til explicitly chooses Kuyper’s 
view over Warfield’s. Accordingly, in the following sections Van Til criticizes the 
views of Greene and Hamilton using Kuyper’s view as his explicit criterion.73
Therefore, it is evident that Van Til sought to appropriate Kuyper’s 
epistemological antithesis while at the same time emphasizing rather than 
diminishing the value of apologetics. He attempted to incorporate the main 
encyclopedic concerns of both Warfield and Kuyper, notwithstanding his 
rejection of Warfield’s epistemology.
4. The Task of Apologetics
Van Til’s view of the task of apologetics may be deduced from his three 
presentations of the relationship between apologetics and systematics in 
theological encyclopedia. The task of apologetics is twofold: (1) Apologetics first 
will need to admit that the Old Princeton apologetics, with its conception of natural theology and 
with its appeal to ‘neutral’ reason in apologetics, is untenable. Masselink will have to choose 
between Kuyper and Warfield.” Also compare Van Til’s explicit siding with Kuyper in idem, 
Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Theological 
Seminary, 1974), 1:10: “Surely then we must follow Kuyper as over against Warfield at this point.”
71. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 351; cf. Henk Van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck and 
Benjamin B. Warfield on Apologetics and the Autopistia of Scripture,” Calvin Theological Journal 
45, no. 1 (2010): 32.
72. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 351-52.
73. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 360, 368.
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receives its statement of faith primarily from systematic theology just as a 
messenger boy receives his commands from the general; (2) Apologetics then 
defends and vindicates this faith against the non-Christian philosophy of life in a 
similar manner that a night watchman patrols the edge of the fortress. 
Additionally, apologetics assists the other theological disciplines in their own 
vindicatory tasks just as a messenger boy relays messages between the command 
post and the front lines.74
In Van Til’s view the twofold task of apologetics derives from the fact that 
apologetics is fully dogmatisch rather than vordogmatisch. In this respect he clearly 
sides with Kuyper over against Warfield. Therefore, according to Van Til 
apologetics does not provide an independent foundation for theology; rather, 
apologetics is based on the same foundation as theology—divine revelation.
C. Analysis
Van Til’s formulation of the relationship between dogmatics and apologetics 
is a composition of elements from both the Amsterdam (i.e., Kuyper and 
Bavinck) and the Princeton (i.e., Warfield) traditions. He not only expressly states 
that he is attempting to build upon how this relationship has been formulated 
within these two traditions, but also his formulations are obviously 
simplifications of Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Warfield’s more detailed 
formulations, notwithstanding the fact that Van Til alleges that he is purifying 
74. I am summarizing Van Til’s own martial metaphors—the messenger boy, the scout, the 
big guns and little guns, etc.—which he uses to describe the relationship between apologetics and 
systematics. Cf. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 18-23; idem, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 
18-19.
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the scholasticism inherent in these earlier formulations.75
Nevertheless, Van Til clearly sides with the Amsterdam tradition over 
against the Princeton position insofar as he explicitly sides with Kuyper’s 
formulation of the relationship between dogmatics and apologetics over against 
Warfield’s. However, Van Til qualifies his preference for Kuyper’s view by 
stating that apologetics should not be disdained as a useless tool but esteemed 
and applied in every theological discipline. Whether or not Van Til’s 
interpretation of Kuyper’s alleged undervaluation of apologetics is correct, his 
caveat places his view in very close proximity to Bavinck’s formulation of the 
relationship between dogmatics and apologetics in theological encyclopedia. For 
example, consider the following similarities between Bavinck’s and Van Til’s 
views:
In the first place, both note that the place of apologetics is disputed in 
Reformed theology, and both opt for a via media between extreme formulations. 
Bavinck explicitly rejects both the overvaluing and the undervaluing of 
apologetics. Similarly, Van Til rejects the alleged extremes of Kuyper’s and 
Warfield’s views while at the same time insisting upon Kuyper’s emphasis upon 
the antithesis in over against Warfield’s non-antithetical approach.
In the second place, both share the neo-Calvinist conviction that not only is 
Christianity an entire “worldview,” but also that the task of apologetics is to 
vindicate the Christian worldview as the only worldview that can truly make 
sense of the world.
In the third place, both hold that apologetics, as defender of the entire 
75. See chapters 5–6 below on Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck.
71
Christian worldview, must vindicate both the foundation and the content of 
Christianity. Bavinck describes this apologetic necessity in terms of principia and 
dogma, whereas Van Til describes it in terms of (1) philosophy and evidences or 
(2) philosophy of fact and facts themselves.
In the fourth place, both use Kuyper’s Encyclopedia as a starting point for 
their own presentations of theological encyclopedia. Bavinck explicitly uses 
Kuyper’s fourfold schema, though he does not employ Kuyper’s second- or 
third-level sub-categories. Although Van Til does not employ Kuyper’s fourfold 
schema, he does explicitly side with Kuyper’s more general point in the 
Encyclopedia regarding the priority of dogmatics over apologetics.
In the fifth place, both assert that dogmatics precedes apologetics. Bavinck 
rejects Schleiermacher’s separation of dogmatics and apologetics. He insists 
upon the metaphysical nature of theology and the objectivity of revelation as 
theology’s foundation. Apologetics, therefore, neither grounds theology nor 
builds upon a separate foundation than theology; rather, apologetics is itself 
founded upon the same principia as theology. Hence apologetics serves the 
“queen of sciences” as a handmaiden. Likewise, Van Til rejects Warfield’s alleged 
separation of apologetics and theology. Instead, he insists that apologetics 
receives its statement of faith from systematic theology, including its 
foundational principles. Therefore, Van Til asserts that apologetics serves its chief 
commander—systematic theology—as a “messenger boy.”
In addition to these several significant similarities between Bavinck’s and 
Van Til’s formulations, the following nuanced discontinuities should be noted.
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In the first place, Bavinck asserts that within theological encyclopedia 
dogmatics is most closely related to ethics,76 whereas Van Til avers that 
apologetics is most similar to systematic theology.77
In the second place, whereas Bavinck explicitly insists upon the scientific 
nature of dogmatics and the role of theology as the queen of sciences, Van Til 
does not comment on whether theology is a science. He does, however, share the 
same view as Bavinck regarding the objective nature of theology. Furthermore, 
based on Van Til’s assertions (1) that the Bible speaks of everything in the 
universe either directly or indirectly78 and (2) that Christianity provides the only 
valid presuppositions upon which science can operate,79 it is valid to infer that, 
materially, Van Til held a similar view to Bavinck’s regarding the nature of 
theology as the queen of the sciences.80
In the third place, related to the nature of theology as the queen of sciences, 
Bavinck explicates theological encyclopedia in the context of a university,81 
whereas Van Til defines theological encyclopedia in relation to a seminary 
curriculum.82
D. Summary
In light of the several significant continuities and few nuanced 
discontinuities between the two, it is clear that Van Til’s position is essentially the 
76. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:56.
77. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 23.
78. See, e.g., Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 19-20.
79. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 57-58.
80. Cf. Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 282-83.
81. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:47-54.
82. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 20.
73
same as Bavinck’s with respect to the relationship between dogmatics and 
apologetics in theological encyclopedia. “According to Bavinck,” writes Van Til, 
“apologetics cannot precede systematics. A true apologetics, he says, 
presupposes dogma.”83 Van Til’s summation of Bavinck’s formulation accurately 
summarizes his own view as well. Hence on this point Van Til undoubtedly 
follows Bavinck and the neo-Calvinist tradition.
Although at first glance the fact that Van Til takes the same position as 
Bavinck with respect to the relation between dogmatics and apologetics may 
appear to be banal, it is in fact highly significant for our thesis in two respects.
In the first place, the relationship between dogmatic and apologetics is a key 
formal aspect not only of Van Til’s first presupposition, but also of the entire 
structure of his thought; for, when he asserts that he presupposes Reformed 
dogmatics for his Reformed apologetics, Van Til is intentionally placing his work 
in a neo-Calvinist theological context. Specifically, albeit not exclusively, his 
presupposition is an appropriation of the position articulated within Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek. For this reason alone the Copernican approach to Van Til’s thought is 
manifestly misdirected since it goes directly against Van Til’s first presupposition
—a presupposition that itself presupposes a neo-Calvinist dogmatic context for 
its own intelligibility—by insisting that Van Til is doing something revolutionary.
In the second place, Van Til’s presupposition implies that his formulation of 
apologetics cannot exist without Reformed dogmatics; for, in his view the 
function of apologetics is directly dependent upon the material—the dogma—of 
dogmatics. This material aspect of Van Til’s presupposition thus raises a further 
83. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 90.
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question that will be examined in the next chapter: If Van Til insists that he has 
never formulated a Reformed dogmatics and that he instead presupposes 
Reformed dogmatics, then from whom does Van Til receive his statement of “the 
Reformed system of doctrine” upon which he then builds his Reformed 
apologetics?
CHAPTER III. 
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN CONCRETO (PART 2):
MATERIAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
In the previous chapter we analyzed a primarily formal question regarding 
the relationship between apologetics and dogmatics in Van Til’s thought. We 
found that Van Til’s presupposition with respect to this relationship is an 
appropriation of the neo-Calvinist position clearly articulated in Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek, namely, that dogmatics precedes apologetics and provides the 
dogmas that apologetics defends and vindicates. Hence, considered formally, 
Van Til’s position on the relationship between dogmatic and apologetics is 
identical to Herman Bavinck’s.
In the present chapter we now turn our attention to a concomitant material 
question regarding Van Til’s presupposition: (1) Since in Van Til’s thought 
dogmatics supplies apologetics its material content—its dogma—and (2) since 
Van Til explicitly asserts that he does not formulate his own dogmatics but insists 
instead that he presupposes “the Reformed system of doctrine,” then from whom 
does he appropriate the dogmatic system that undergirds his apologetics?
It would be incorrect to assert that the answer to this question could be 
limited to just one dogmatician; for, we have already noted in chapter 1 that Van 
Til considers himself to be standing on the shoulders of a host of classic 
Reformed theologians (e.g., Calvin, Kuyper, Bavinck, Warfield, Machen, Berkhof, 
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Vos, et al.). Nevertheless, we also noted in chapter 1 that Van Til lauds Herman 
Bavinck as the greatest of the modern Reformed dogmaticians. Given his 
preeminent esteem for Bavinck, it is fitting to suspect that Van Til frequently 
appropriates theological formulations from his most highly esteemed neo-
Calvinist predecessor. Thus we will ask specifically in this chapter: Does Van Til 
appropriate his dogmatics from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek? And if so, then to what 
extent does he do so? 
We will focus our investigation upon Van Til’s most explicitly 
dogmatological work.
A. Appropriations in An Introduction to Systematic Theology
In the preface to An Introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til makes a 
modest statement regarding his reliance upon earlier theologians. “My 
indebtedness,” he writes, ”to such former Reformed theologians as Louis 
Berkhof and, back of him, Herman Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper, is apparent 
throughout.”1 Likewise, in the editorial introduction to this book, William Edgar 
writes unassumingly, “The last chapters on the doctrine of God follow Bavinck’s 
Reformed Dogmatics rather closely.”2
However, a comparison of Van Til’s book with Bavinck’s and with Berkhof’s 
writings reveals that both Van Til’s and Edgar’s passing remarks are too modest; 
1. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of  
Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 13. I am 
choosing to omit Kuyper in the following analysis since Van Til only references Kuyper and does 
not appropriate his writings to the same extent as he does Berkhof’s and Bavinck’s. For Van Til’s 
explicit references to Kuyper, see pp. 17-18, 50-55, 349n3. Additionally, pp. 379-85 are possibly an 
implicit appropriation of Kuyper’s thought; cf. William Edgar’s editorial note at 379n36.
2. See William Edgar’s Introduction in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 5.
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for, not just in the latter chapters, but throughout the entire book Van Til 
appropriates extensive amounts of material from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.3 
Furthermore, Berkhof himself has pervasively appropriated extensive amounts 
of material from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek; thus, in the places where Van Til might 
appear to be indebted to Berkhof, Bavinck’s Dogmatiek is the true source, albeit 
indirectly.4 Therefore, a less modest description of Van Til’s explicit and tacit 
appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek is not only warranted, but also necessary 
according to a close comparison of select passages throughout An Introduction to 
Systematic Theology with Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
1. Explicit Appropriations
In An Introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til explicitly appropriates large 
amounts of Bavinck’s dogmatic formulations, hence Bavinck’s name appears 
nearly 100 times throughout the book. In chapters two and three, for example, 
Van Til admits that his thoughts on Christian epistemology are a summary of 
Berkhof’s and Bavinck’s more detailed presentations of theological principia.5 In 
chapter five, Van Til cites approvingly Bavinck’s formulations regarding 
theological principia, even translating two lengthy passages from Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek into English before then turning around and alleging that “Bavinck 
has himself not been fully consistent in the application of the principle here laid 
before us.”6 Similarly, Van Til begins chapter 6 by summarizing Bavinck’s 
3. Van Til’s first explicit appropriation of Bavinck’s thought, e.g., is found in ch. 2 (An 
Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29ff.), which Edgar himself notes (pp. 29n8, 70n32).
4. On Berkhof’s pervasive appropriation of Bavinck’s thought, see chapter 1, §§A–B, above.
5. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 29-30, 70.
6. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89-91; quote at p. 91. For an analysis of Van 
Til’s criticisms herein and elsewhere, see Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” 
Westminster Theological Journal 70, no. 1 (2008): 111-127. Additionally, Van Til’s criticisms of 
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historical analysis of conceptions of revelation.7 In chapter 15, moreover, Van Til’s 
discussions of innate and acquired knowledge of God are prefaced with the 
assertion that if we begin with Bavinck’s view then “we cannot go far wrong,”8 
and his entire treatment of both topics comprises a critical discussion of 
Bavinck’s formulations. Additionally, in chapters 16 and 18 Van Til’s explications 
of God’s incommunicable9 and communicable10 attributes are largely summaries 
of Bavinck’s formulations.11 Even in Van Til’s discussion of the trinity in chapter 
17,12 which discussion incorporates a wider compendium of theologians than his 
other chapters,13 Van Til nevertheless gives Bavinck the predominant theological 
voice.14
2. Tacit Appropriations
In addition to these extensive explicit appropriations, Van Til tacitly 
appropriates vast amounts of Bavinck’s thought, especially in his chapters on the 
doctrine of God. 
Bavinck will be analyzed in chapters 5–6 below.
7. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 117-18, 118n4. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial 
notes regarding Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought at 118nn4–6 and 119n10.
8. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 310, 314.
9. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 323-47. Van Til explicitly 
references Bavinck’s Dogmatiek throughout this section at 323n8, 327nn15-16, 333n27, 334nn28-30, 
and 335n31. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial notes regarding Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s 
thought at 335nn32-33 and 341n53.
10. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 369-97. Van Til explicitly references 
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek throughout this section at 370n3; 371nn4-5, nn8-9, n11; 372nn12-13; 373n17; 
377n29; 378n32; and 388n50. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial notes at 369n1, 371n10, 374n19, 375n23, 
377n28, 378n33, 379n36, 385n40, 386n43, 388n49, 390n54, 391n56, 392n57, 394n63, and 396n66.
11. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 2, God and 
Creation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 110-37, 148-255.
12. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 348-68.
13. See Van Til’s references to Kuyper (349n3), Berkhof (350n5), A. A. Hodge (351n7), W. G. T. 
Shedd (352n9), Calvin (352n10), B. B. Warfield (352n11, 360n34, 361nn35-38), Charles Hodge 
(355n23, 357n27).
14. See Van Til’s references to Bavinck at 353n12, 354nn17-19, 355n21, 362n42, 363n43, 
364n46. Cf. William Edgar’s editorial notes at 348n1, 349n4, 353n12, n14, 354n20.
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2.1. Extensive Appropriations in Chapter 10
In the first place, Van Til’s presentation of “the names used to indicate special 
revelation” and “the modes of special revelation”—nearly 20 pages of material15
—is a close synopsis of Bavinck’s longer treatment of the exact same topics 
without citation.16 For example, contra William Edgar’s suggestion that Van Til 
appropriates B. B. Warfield’s formulation of the biblical terminology for divine 
revelation,17 Van Til’s tabulation of three Hebrew verbs and six Greek verbs that 
represent the biblical names for special revelation—along with their 
corresponding biblical references—is exactly the same as Bavinck’s non-tabular 
presentation.18 Edgar fails to note that Warfield himself lists the first volume of 
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek among the primary sources for his essay, “The Biblical Idea 
of Revelation,”19 hence he misses the fact that both Warfield and Van Til 
recapitulate Bavinck’s list of biblical terms for divine revelation.
Additionally, Van Til’s exposition of the meanings of the Greek verbs, 
ἀποκαλυπτειν and φανερουν, is a near verbatim appropriation of Bavinck’s 
presentation. To see this similarity, first consider Van Til’s explanation:
Etymologically, apokalyptō indicates the removal of a covering under 
which something was hidden, while phaneroō signifies the making 
known of something that was unknown. The former takes away the 
hindrances that kept something from being manifest, while the latter 
manifests the matter itself. The former is always used with the objective 
aspect of the “special principle,” while the latter applies to both the 
15. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 202-22.
16. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1, 
Prolegomena (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 324-39; cf. Louis Berkhof, Introduction To 
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1979), 133-36.
17. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 202n33.
18. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:324-25; with Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic  
Theology, 202-03.
19. Cf. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield, 1:34.
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objetive and the subjective aspect. . . . It has, therefore, an objective and a 
subjective aspect.
. . . They speak both of the new light that must be given the sinner 
and also of the new power of sight that he needs. These two are 
constantly taken in conjunction with one another.20
Then compare Bavinck’s more detailed original:
Etymologically, however, ἀποκαλυπτειν indicates the removal of a cover 
by which a given object was hidden, and φανερουν denotes making 
known a matter that was hidden or unknown before. In the former, then, 
the stress is on the removal of a hindrance that prevented knowledge of 
what was hidden, on the mysterious nature of what up until then had 
not been understood, and on the divine deed that removed the cover and 
caused the mystery to be understood. The latter word generally indicates 
that something that was hidden and unknown before has now become 
manifest and public. Ἀποκαλυψις takes away the cause by which 
something was hidden; φανερωσις makes known the matter itself. 
Associated with this distinction is that φανερωσις is always used of 
objective revelation, while ἀποκαλυψις is used both of objective and 
subjective revelation. Also, φανερωσις repeatedly denotes both general 
and special revelation, but ἀποκαλυψις almost always refers to special 
and only rarely to general revelation. And these two words are in turn 
distinguished from γνωριζειν and δηλουν by the fact that the former two 
verbs bring things to light and the latter two, in consequence of this, now 
also make these things into the content of our thinking consciousness.21
This comparison clearly shows that Van Til has simply summarized Bavinck’s 
more elaborate presentation of the names of special revelation, without citation.
A similar conclusion—though to a much lesser degree—may be drawn from 
B. B. Warfield’s and Louis Berkhof’s presentations of the same topic; for both of 
their presentations recapitulate aspects of Bavinck’s formulation.22 However, 
contra William Edgar’s various assertions that Van Til has appropriated his 
material regarding special revelation from Warfield and Berkhof,23 Warfield 
20. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 203.
21. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:325.
22. Benjamin B. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1932), 1:32-34; Berkhof, Introduction To Systematic Theology, 133-36.
23. See Edgar’s editorial notes in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 202n33, 
204n35, 204n37, 205n39, 212n59, 216n69.
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explicitly lists Bavinck’s Dogmatiek among the sources for his presentation. 
Furthermore, neither Warfield nor Berkhof appropriate Bavinck’s formulation to 
the near-verbatim extent as does Van Til. Without a doubt, therefore, Van Til has 
appropriated straight from Bavinck’s formulation rather than from Warfield’s or 
Berkhof’s more generalized recapitulations of Bavinck’s formulation.
Just as with his presentation of the names of revelation, so with his 
explication of its modes: Van Til tacitly appropriates his formulation from 
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. First consider Van Til’s summary of the three modes of 
revelation:
In the main, we may speak of three modes of special revelation. In the 
first place, there is theophany. In paradise God walked and talked with 
man. Man needs God near to himself. Even in the state of sin man has 
realized something of the need of a god who is near him. In fact, the 
sinner has brought God too near to him; he has identified the creator 
with the creature. In idolatry we have an expression on the part of the 
sinner which points to his need of a god who is near.
In the second place, there is prophecy. In paradise man knew himself 
to be a re-interpreter of God’s interpretation. When sin entered into the 
world man sought to be his own ultimate interpreter. Hence in special 
revelation God had to reappear to him as his ultimate interpreter and he 
himself has constantly felt that there is something lacking in all his 
interpretations of the universe. He has felt something of the need of an 
ultimate interpreter. Hence, we have false prophecy or divination as a 
caricature of true prophecy.
In the third place, if man had not sinned God would have 
maintained him in paradise and wrought out for him a future glory. 
When sin came in God no longer wrought for but against man. Hence if 
man was to be saved God had to reveal to man by way of miracle the fact 
that God was working in the universe for the salvation of the universe.24
Then compare Bavinck’s formulation of the three modes, noting especially his 
detailed references:
All the means of revelation can be reduced to three. In the first place, 
religious belief desires a God who is near and not far away (Acts 17:27); 
24. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 204.
82
it was at all times convinced, therefore, that gods appeared in one form 
or another, under one sign or another, and at one place or another. In 
almost every religion there are holy places, holy times, and holy images. 
The gods are not like human beings and do not live with them on equal 
terms. The sphere of the sacred is separate from that of the profane. Still, 
the gods do live near and among human beings at certain places, in 
special objects, and impart their blessing at certain times. Idolatry, taken 
in its broadest sense, is born of the human need for a God who is near.25 
Integral to all religions, secondly, is the belief that the gods in some way 
make known their thoughts and will, either by human beings as their 
mediums, such as fortune-tellers, oracles, dreamers, necromancers, 
occult visionaries, etc., or, artificially and externally, by the stars, the 
flight of birds, the entrails of sacrificial animals, the play of flames, the 
lines of the hand, the chance opening of a book, etc., divination. “No 
man ever became great without some kind of divine inspiration.”26 
Present in all religions, finally, is belief in the special intervention and 
assistance of the gods in times of distress. Widespread everywhere is 
magic: the art by which, using mysterious means, sacred words and 
formulas, amulets, liquors, etc., people make the divine power 
subservient to themselves and produce marvelous effects.27 Theophany, 
mantic, and magic are the ways by which all revelation comes to human 
beings.28
Once again it is clear that Van Til has directly appropriated Bavinck’s 
presentation, albeit in a much simplified form and without any references to 
Bavinck’s work or to the sources that Bavinck cites. Also, as in the previous 
example, Berkhof’s formulation of this point in terms of “theophanies,” 
“communications,” and “miracles” is based on a general outline of Bavinck’s 
25. On this point Bavinck references P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der 
Religionsgeschichte, 2 vols. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1905), I, 54ff., 114ff. Cf. Bavinck, 
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326n4.
26. Bavinck’s reference on this point is as follows: Cicero, De natura deorum, II, 66 [modern 
English edition, The Nature of the Gods, trans. P. G. Walsh (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997)]; cf. 
concerning divination and oracles Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, Histoire de la divination dans 
l’antiquité, 4 vols. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1879–82); de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch, I, 93ff. Cf. Bavinck, 
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326n5.
27. Bavinck’s reference on this point is as follows: Joseph Ennemoser, Geschichte der Magie, 2d 
ed. (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1844); in English translation as The History of Magic, trans. William 
Howitt (London and New York: George Bell & Sons, 1893); Alfred Wiedeman, Magie und Zauberei  
im alten Ägypten (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1905); A. G. L. Lehmann, Aberglaube und Zauberei von den 
ältesten Zeiten an bis in die Gegenwart (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1898); de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch, I; Zöckler, 
“Magier, Magie,” PRE3, XII, 55–70. Cf. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326n6.
28. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:326.
83
presentation; yet, he does not follow Bavinck’s Dogmatiek to the same nearly-
thought-for-thought extent as does Van Til.29
For yet another example of Van Til’s tacit appropriations from Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek, consider first Van Til’s explanation of the role that angels play as 
means of revelation:
Besides revealing himself symbolically in inanimate things, God 
appeared to his people by way of self-conscious creatures. This is 
especially the case with angels. Angels have a definite function to 
perform in the economy of redemption. According to Acts 7:53 and 
Galatians 3:19, they “ordained the law.” Especially after the exile they 
came forth as the media of revelation (Dan. 8:13; 9:11; 10:5; Zec. 1:7; 6:5). 
In the New Testament they function at nearly every critical point in the 
revelation of God to man. It is especially noteworthy that they perform 
an important function when Christ is about to become flesh, when the 
tabernacle of God is to dwell with men on earth in the person of Christ 
himself. Finally they shall also play an important role in connection with 
the second coming of Christ, that is, when the tabernacle of God shall 
permanently dwell with men.30
Then compare Bavinck’s earlier, more detailed formulation of this point:
God does not appear only in impersonal signs, however, but also visits 
his people in personal beings. Surrounded and served by many 
thousands of angels (Isa. 6:2, 6), he sends them to the earth in human 
form to make known his word and will. They already occur in Genesis 
18; 19; 28:12; 32:1, 2; Deuteronomy 33:2; Job 33:23; 1 Kings 13:18; and, 
according to Acts 7:53 and Galatians 3:19, serve at the time of the giving 
of the law but function as mediators of revelation especially after the 
exile (Dan. 8:13; 9:21; 10:5; Zech. 1:7–6:5). They appear even more 
frequently in the NT. They are present at the birth of Jesus (Matt. 1:20; 
2:13, 19; Luke 1:11; 2:9), repeatedly in his life (John 1:51; Matt. 4:6), at the 
time of his suffering (Matt. 26:53; Luke 22:43), and at the resurrection and 
ascension (Matt. 28:2, 5; Luke 24:23; John 20:12; Acts 1:10). In the history 
of the apostles, they repeatedly make appearances (Acts 5:19; 8:26; 10:3; 
11:13; 12:7; 23:9; 27:23; Rev. 22:6, 16). Finally, at his return Christ will be 
accompanied by the angels (Matt. 16:27; 25:31; Mark 8:38; Luke 9:26; 1 
Thess. 3:13; etc.).31
29. Cf. Berkhof, Introduction To Systematic Theology, 134-36.
30. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 211.
31. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:328-29.
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Once again Van Til’s presentation of this point is simply a scaled down versions 
of Bavinck’s formulation, without citation. He lists the same main points, and he 
even employs the same dicta probantia as does Bavinck. The appropriation is thus 
undeniable.
The same is true for some of Van Til’s comments with respect to the special 
nature of the Angel of the Lord. First, consider this remark:
Among these angels there is one who differs from them all. It is the 
“angel of the Lord.” He is not a creature. He is identified with God. This 
angel appeared unto Hagar: “And she called the name of the Lord that 
spake unto her, Thou God seest me: for she said, Have I also here looked 
after him that seeth me” (Gen. 16:13)? Here Hagar speaks of the angel of 
the Lord and calls him God. Again when the angel of the Lord spake to 
Jacob he said, “I am the God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar” 
(Gen. 31:13).32
Then, compare Bavinck’s earlier formulation:
Among all these envoys of God the Messenger of the Lord (הוהי ךאלמ) 
occupies a special place. He appears to Hagar (Gen. 16:6–13; 21:17–20); to 
Abraham (Gen. 18; 19; 22; 24:7; 40); to Jacob (Gen. 28:13–17; 31:11–13; 
32:24–30; cf. Hos. 12:4; Gen. 48:15, 16); to, and at the time of, Moses 
(Exod. 3:2f.; 13:21; 14:19; 23:20–23; 32:34; 33:2f.; cf. Num. 20:16; Isa. 63:8, 9; 
and further also Josh. 5:13, 14; Judg. 6:11–24; 13:2–23). This Malak YHWH 
is not an independent symbol nor a created angel but a true personal 
revelation and appearance of God, distinct from him (Exod. 23:20–23; 
33:14f.; Isa. 63:8, 9) and still one with him in name (Gen. 16:13; 31:13; 
32:28, 30; 48:15, 16; Exod. 3:2f.; 23:20–23; Judg. 13:3), in power (Gen. 
16:10, 11; 21:18; 18:14, 18; Exod. 14:19; Judg. 6:21), in redemption and 
blessing (Gen. 48:16; Exod. 3:8; 23:20; Isa. 63:8, 9), in adoration and honor 
(Gen. 18:3; 22:12; Exod. 23:21). . . .33
Again, Van Til’s appropriation of this point is nearly self-evident. Moreover, his 
further explication of this point is an additional appropriation of Bavinck’s work. 
First, consider Van Til’s explication:
The Angel of Jehovah can, therefore, be none other than the second 
32. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 211.
33. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:329.
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person of the Trinity who will soon come into the flesh. Soon he in whom 
the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily (Col. 1:19; 2:9) will dwell with 
men on earth.
Of course the incarnation of Christ is the climax as fas as the history 
of redemption in the form of theophany is concerned.34
Then compare Bavinck’s longer remark about the climax of biblical theophanies:
But theophany is incomplete. . . . The angel of the covenant again 
appears in prophecy (Zech. 1:8–12:3) and will come to his temple (Mal. 
3:1). Theophany reaches its climax, however, in Christ who is the 
ἀγγελος, δοξα, εἰκων, λογος, υἱος του θεου, in whom God is fully 
revealed and fully given (Matt. 11:27; John 1:14; 14:9; Col. 1:15; 2:19; etc.). 
By him and by the Spirit whom he sends forth, the dwelling of God in 
and among his people even now becomes a true spiritual reality (John 
14:23; Rom. 8:9, 11; 2 Cor. 6:16). The believing community is [now] the 
house of God, the temple of the Holy Spirit (Matt. 18:20; 1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19; 
Eph. 2:21). . . .35
Once again Van Til’s thought is a condensation, without citation, of Bavinck’s 
longer and more nuanced presentation in his Dogmatiek.
Furthermore, Van Til’s explanation of the various modes of prophecy is a 
near thought-for-thought synopsis of Bavinck’s longer, more detailed 
formulations. First, consider Van Til’s following summary statement:
In the Old Testament times there were several forms in which the 
revelation came. God sometimes let his will be known through the lot. 
Then again God spoke through the Urim and Thummim. Many times he 
spoke through dreams. God even spoke through dreams to some that did 
not belong to his people. . . .
A somewhat higher medium of revelation than those just mentioned 
was the vision. . . .36
Then, compare the following summary statement by Bavinck:
In communicating his thoughts, however, God frequently adopted those 
lower forms by which also among pagans the gods were deemed to 
make known their will. . . . Especially to be mentioned in this connection 
are the lot, the Urim and Thummim, the dream, and the vision.
34. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 212.
35. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:329.
36. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215.
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Van Til follows Bavinck’s order exactly: lot, Urim and Thummim, dreams, and 
visions. Yet Van Til not only follows Bavinck’s order, but also appropriates 
Bavinck’s explanations of these types of prophetic revelations. For example, with 
respect to prophetic dreams, first consider Van Til’s explication:
God even spoke through dreams to some that did not belong to his 
people. In Genesis 20 we have the story of Abimelech who received a 
revelation from God through a dream. The baker and the butler of 
Pharaoh received true revelations from God through dreams (Gen. 40). 
When Gideon came into the camp of the Midianites he found that one 
man told another a dream about the destruction that was to come (Judg. 
7:3).37
Then compare Bavinck’s earlier explication of dreams:
Also dreams occur in Scripture as means of revelation. . . . [T]hey occur 
among Israelites but also repeatedly among non-Israelites (Gen. 20; 31; 
40; 41; Judg. 7; Dan. 2 and 4), and convey either a word, a 
communication from God (Gen. 20:3; 31:9, 24; Matt. 1:20; 2:12, 19, 22; 
27:19), or a representation of the imagination, which then often requires 
explanation (Gen. 28; 37:5; 40:5; 41:15; Judg. 7:13; Dan. 2 and 4).38
Van Til has clearly taken Bavinck’s point regarding dreams occurring “repeatedly 
among non-Israelites” and has expanded briefly upon two of Bavinck’s dicta  
probantia (i.e., Genesis 40 and Judges 7).
Likewise, Van Til’s passing summary of prophetic visions not only follows 
Bavinck’s order of topics, but also his content. First, consider Van Til’s brief 
remark:
Many times these seers were in a high state of emotional excitement 
when they perceived their revelations. It became customary to think of a 
prophet as being in a high state of emotion, as the story with respect to 
Saul clearly indicates (1 Sam. 10:5ff).39
Then compare Bavinck’s lengthier explication of prophetic ecstasy:
37. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215.
38. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:332.
39. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215.
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Visions were often accompanied by a kind of ecstatic experience. Music, 
dance, and ecstasy go together; prophecy and poetry are related (1 Sam. 
10:5f.; 19:20–24; 2 Kings 3:15; 1 Chron. 25:1; 2 Chron. 29:30). When the 
hand of the Lord comes upon the prophets (Isa. 8:11; Ezek. 3:14; 11:5) or 
the Spirit comes upon them, they frequently enter a state of rapture 
(Num. 24:3; p 333 2 Kings 9:11; Jer. 29:26) and fall to the earth (Num. 24:3, 
15, 16; 1 Sam. 19:24; Ezek. 1:28; 3:23; 43:3; Dan. 10:8–10; Acts 9:4; Rev. 
1:17; 11:16; 22:8). In that state they are given to see and hear the thoughts 
of God in symbolic form. In images and visions his counsel is revealed to 
them (Jer. 1:13f.; 24:1f.; Amos 7–9; Zech. 1–6; Rev.; etc.), especially with 
regard to the future (Num. 23f.; 1 Kings 22:17; 2 Kings 5:26; 8:11f.; Jer. 
4:23f.; 14:18; Ezek. 8; Amos 7; etc.). In that state they also hear a variety of 
voices and sounds (1 Kings 18:41; 2 Kings 6:32; Isa. 6:3, 8; Jer. 21:10; 49:14; 
Ezek. 1:24, 28; 2:2; 3:12; Rev. 7:4; 9:16; 14:2; 19:1; 21:3; 22:8; etc.) They are 
even taken up in the spirit and translocated (Ezek. 3:12f.; 8:3; 43:1; Dan. 
8:2; Matt. 4:5, 8; Acts 9:10, 11; 22:17; 23:11; 27:23; 2 Cor. 12:2; Rev. 1:9; 12; 
14:1; 21:10). After the reception of a vision, Daniel was sick for some days 
(7:28; 8:27).40
Van Til, again, has truncated Bavinck’s more detailed explication and has simply 
expanded briefly upon Bavinck’s first dicta probantia (i.e., 1 Samuel 10:5).
Van Til continues to follow Bavinck’s presentation with respect to the modes 
of prophetic revelation when he comments on the final mode—illumination. To 
see the similarity once again, first consider Van Til’s remark:
A still higher mode of prophetic revelation was that of direct spiritual 
communication by the Spirit to the prophets. This communication must 
be clearly distinguished from the illumination that believers are given in 
order that they may be able to understand the revelation that comes to 
them. Believers today are not given a new revelation; they do not need a 
new revelation.41
Then, compare Bavinck’s longer, more detailed, and more nuanced summary of 
the Spirit’s role in illumination that begins as follows: “The last form of 
revelation to be mentioned is interior illumination. . . . The revelation then occurs 
inwardly by the Spirit as the Spirit of revelation. . . .”42 
40. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:332-33.
41. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 215-16.
42. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:334-35.
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Contra Edgar, who assumes that Van Til appropriates Warfield’s position 
regarding illumination as a mode of prophetic revelation,43 Van Til clearly follows 
Bavinck’s formulation of this point; for, Van Til does not use Warfield’s 
terminology for prophetic revelation (i.e., “internal suggestion”44), but Bavinck’s 
(i.e., “illumination”). It is possible, however, that Van Til’s cessationist remark 
derives from Warfield’s presentation.45 Nevertheless, the fact that Van Til follows 
Bavinck primarily on this specific point (and pervasively throughout the entirety 
of chapter 10) is further evinced by Van Til’s final comment regarding prophetic 
revelation, namely, that Christ is its unique climax; for, on this point he clearly 
follows Bavinck’s order and appropriates Bavinck’s material, the similarity 
between Warfield’s and Bavinck’s formulations notwithstanding.46 First, consider 
Van Til’s remark:
All these modes of prophecy were the beginnings of the work of the 
Great Prophet upon whom the Spirit would dwell without measure, who 
43. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 216n69.
44. Warfield classifies the modes of revelation into a threefold schema within which 
prophetic revelation is classified under the second term: (1) “external manifestation,” (2) “internal 
suggestion,” and (3) “concursive operation.” Cf. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge  
Warfield, 1:15, 28.
45. Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield, 1:28: “Whatever truth men have been 
made partakers of by the Spirit of truth is His (for all things whatsoever the Father hath are His) 
and is taken by the Spirit of truth and declared to men that He may be glorified. Nevertheless, 
though all revelation is thus summed up in Him, we should not fail to note very carefully that it 
would also be all sealed up in Him—so little is revelation conveyed by fact alone, without the 
word—had it not been thus taken by the Spirit of truth and declared unto men. The entirety of 
the New Testament is but the explanatory word accompanying and giving its effect to the fact of 
Christ. And when this fact was in all its meaning made the possession of men, revelation was 
completed and in that sense ceased. Jesus Christ is no less the end of revelation than He is the end 
of the law.” But note also that Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:339, citing Augustine, takes a 
cessationist position with respect to the continuation of miracle-revelation; thus, it is inconclusive 
whether Van Til’s remark regarding cessationism is an appropriation from Warfield, Bavinck, or 
both.
46. Regarding Warfield’s assertion that Christ is the sui generis climax of prophetic revelation, 
a comparison of Warfield, The Works of Benjamin Brekinridge Warfield, 1:28, with Bavinck, Reformed 
Dogmatics, 1:335, leads this writer to conclude that Warfield’s formulation is a nuanced 
recapitulation of Bavinck’s earlier formulation in the same way that, as was noted above, 
Warfield’s list of biblical terms for special revelation is a recapitulation of Bavinck’s list.
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was himself the Word become flesh and who declared the Father unto 
us.47
Then, compare Bavinck’s formulation:
In the NT the supreme, the unique and true prophet makes his 
appearance. As Logos he is the full and complete revelation of God (John 
1:1; 18; 14:9; 17:6; Col. 2:9). He does not receive a revelation from above 
or from outside of himself but is himself the source of prophecy. The 
Holy Spirit does not come upon him and does not fall upon him but 
indwells him without measure (John 3:34). . . .48
The similarities are self-evident.
For all of these reasons it is beyond doubt that, regarding the modes of 
prophetic revelation, Van Til has tacitly appropriated not only Bavinck’s exact 
order of topics but also several of his formulations, even to a thought-for-thought 
degree at points.
Additionally, Van Til’s explication of the interrelationship between word and 
deed with respect to miracles likely derives from Bavinck’s formulation. The 
similarity can be seen by first considering Van Til’s remarks about (1) the 
necessity of an actual change in sinful man beyond a mere addition of 
information and (2) the intimate connection between God’s redemptive words 
and deeds:
When man fell into sin, he not merely needed new information, but he 
needed to be changed. Things had to be done for him in the objective 
sphere, and things had to be done for him in the subjective sphere. . . .49
Again and again the Lord shows his people that it is his miraculous 
saving power that is alone sufficient to save his people from destruction.
All of this at the same time that it displays the glory of the saving 
power of God also corroborates the truth of the salvation that he has 
sworn he would give to his people. When God speaks we must accept 
47. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 216.
48. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:335.
49. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 219.
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the truth at his word. When God acts, we must see the fact that he acts in 
these acts themselves. Yet the words corroborate the deeds and the deeds 
corroborate the words. Together they give forth such an eloquent 
testimony of the grace, the power and the truth of God, that men should 
marvel.50
Then, compare Bavinck’s formulation:
Just as human beings, aside from their appearance and words, also make 
themselves known by their deeds, so God not only reveals himself by his 
words but also by his works. Word and deed are intimately connected. 
God’s Word is an act (Ps. 33:9), and his activity is speech (Ps. 19:2; 29:3; 
Isa. 28:26). Word and deed accompany each other, both in creation and 
re-creation. Usually the word comes first, as a promise and a threat, but 
in principle it already contains within itself a deed. God’s Word does not 
return to him empty, but it accomplishes what he wants (Isa. 55:10, 11). 
The word demands the deed; miracle accomplishes prophecy; not only 
consciousness but being itself must be renewed.51
In this case it is highly likely that Van Til has simply expanded upon Bavinck’s 
formulations regarding (1) the need for “being itself” to be renewed by God’s 
miraculous activity and (2) the intimate connection between God’s redemptive 
words and deeds.
2.2. Extensive Appropriations in Chapter 16
In the second place, Van Til’s discussion of the names of God in chapter 1652 
is a virtual reproduction of Bavinck’s presentation of this topic, again without 
citation.53 Also, it should be noted that, as we saw in chapter 10, Berkhof also 
appropriates Bavinck’s general outline of this topic.54 Unlike Van Til, however, 
Berkhof provides an explicit reference to Bavinck in order to indicate that he is 
50. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 221.
51. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:336.
52. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 319-22; also cf. William Edgar’s editorial 
notes regarding Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought at 319nn1-2.
53. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:137-47; cf. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh; 
Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 48-51.
54. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 47-51.
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loosely following Bavinck’s threefold classification of God’s names.55
The fact that Van Til appropriates Bavinck’s formulation of God’s names can 
be demonstrated in several ways. First, Van Til’s opening assertions regarding (1) 
God’s prerogative to name himself, (2) God’s essence being revealed in his 
names, and (3) the analogical character of man’s knowledge of God’s names all 
derive from Bavinck’s formulations. To see the appropriations, first consider Van 
Til’s summary remark:
These names must, in the nature of the case, be given to us by God 
himself. It is not man’s idea of God with which we deal, but it is God’s 
idea of himself that stands before us in his names.
The names that God gives us of himself are not mere marks of 
denotation; there is none other beside himself from whom he need be 
distinguished. The names of God reveal to us something of the nature or 
essence of God. They cannot reveal this nature fully, but they 
nevertheless are expressive of something of that nature. If they were not, 
they would have no meaning at all.56
Then, compare the following more detailed remarks by Bavinck. With regard to 
God’s prerogative to name himself, Bavinck writes:
There is an intimate link between God and his name. According to 
Scripture, this link too is not accidental or arbitrary but forged by God 
himself. We do not name God; he names himself. In the foreground here 
is the name as a revelation on the part of God, in an active and objective 
sense, as revealed name. In this case God’s name is identical with the 
attributes or perfections that he exhibits in and to the world: his glory 
(Ps. 8:1; 72:19), honor (Lev. 18:21; Ps. 86:10–11; 102:16), his redeeming 
power (Exod. 15:3; Isa. 47:4); his service (Isa. 56:6; Jer. 23:27); his holiness 
(1 Chron. 16:10; Ps. 105:3). The name is God himself as he reveals himself 
in one relationship or another (Lev. 24:11, 16; Deut. 28:58).57
55. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 48: “Dr. Bavinck bases his division of the names of God on 
that broad conception of them, and distinguishes between nomina propria (proper names), 
nomina essentialia (essential names, or attributes) and nomina personalia (personal names, as 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). In the present chapter we limit ourselves to the discussion of the 
first class.” 
56. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 319.
57. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:98.
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With regard to God’s essence being revealed in his names, Bavinck further 
writes:
The name of God in Scripture does not describe God as he exists within 
himself but God in his revelation and multiple relations to his creatures. 
This name, however, is not arbitrary: God reveals himself in the way he 
does because he is who he is. Summed up in his name, therefore, is his 
honor, his fame, his excellencies, his entire revelation, his very being. 
Upon those to whom it is revealed, therefore, the name confers special 
privileges and imposes unique obligations. The name of God implies 
that, having revealed himself in it, God expects to be called by it. The 
“divulged” name becomes the name “called upon.” In Scripture, “to be” 
and “to be called” are two sides of the same thing. God is what he calls 
himself and calls himself what he is. What God reveals of himself is 
expressed and conveyed in specific names. To his creatures he grants the 
privilege of naming and addressing him on the basis of, and in keeping 
with, his revelation. The one name of God, which is inclusive of his entire 
revelation both in nature and in grace, is divisible for us in a great many 
names. Only in that way do we obtain a full view of the riches of his 
revelation and the profound meaning of his name. We call him and 
indeed may call him by all that has become known of his being in 
creation and re-creation. But all those names, as designations of God, 
impose on us the obligation to consecrate and glorify them. It is the one 
name, the full revelation and to that extent the very being of God 
himself, with which we are dealing in all those names. By his name God 
puts himself in a certain relation to us, and the relation we assume to him 
must be congruent with it.58
With regard to the analogical character of man’s knowledge of God’s names, 
Bavinck writes:
There is no fully adequate knowledge of God. We cannot name him as he 
is within himself. All his names are derived from the world of creatures. 
But this does not make them untrue, a product of human imagination. 
Just as there is resemblance between various parts of the world, making 
comparison between them a possibility, so also there is kinship between 
God and his creatures, a kinship that warrants the use of creaturely 
language in speaking of him. Furthermore, though temporally the 
natural is prior to the spiritual, logically and ideally the spiritual 
precedes the natural. The natural could never guide us to the spiritual if 
it had not itself proceeded from the spiritual. . . . It is God himself who 
made all things, including the material world, subservient to the 
manifestation of his perfections. . . . Hence, while it is true that we call 
58. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:99.
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God by names derived from the world of creatures, these names were 
first increated in those creatures by God himself. It is true: we first apply 
to creatures the names by which we speak of God because we know 
them before we know God. But materially they first apply to God and 
then to creatures. All perfections are first in God, then in creatures. He 
possesses them because they belong to his essence; we possess them only 
by participation. . . .59
Regarding this same point Bavinck further asserts:
One must, however, keep in mind that Scripture knows nothing of a 
divine essence that can be discovered and known by the powers of the 
human intellect apart from revelation. It posits no split, much less a 
contrast, between God’s ontological existence and his “economic” self-
revelation. As God reveals himself, so is he; in his names he himself 
becomes knowable to us. Though he is indeed infinitely superior to all 
his creatures—so that we can possess only an analogical knowledge of 
him not an exhaustive (adequated) knowledge—yet his several 
attributes, attributes that come through in his revelation, bring to our 
mind, each time from a special perspective, the fullness of his being.60
Van Til’s appropriations of these three points from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek are 
undeniable. Just like his tacit appropriations of Bavinck’s thought in chapter 10, 
so also at the opening of chapter 16 Van Til simply appropriates and truncates 
Bavinck’s more detailed formulations without citation.
Second, Van Til’s use of the technical term, nomina propria,61 to classify the 
names of God derives from Bavinck’s threefold classification.62
59. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:106-07; also cf. the overall argument throughout pp. 104-
110.
60. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:111.
61. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 320.
62. Cf. Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 7th ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1998), 2:81; with 
idem, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:111. NB: The Latin technical term did not get carried over as a 
technical term in the English translation; rather, as in this case, it was translated as “proper 
names.” We note this here to show that the term does not originate with Berkhof. In this regard, 
see also Abraham Kuyper, Dictaten Dogmatiek van Dr. A. Kuyper: College-Dictaat van een der  
studenten; niet in den handel, 2nd ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1910), 1:162. However, despite the fact that 
Berkhof is not the source of the term, it should be noted that in the specific place where Bavinck 
asserts his threefold classification of God’s names, he does not use the Latin terms that Berkhof 
employs in his summary of Bavinck’s threefold classification cited above; Cf. Bavinck, Reformed 
Dogmatics, 2:135; with Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 48.
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Third, not only Van Til’s selection of names, but also the order in which he 
treats the names (i.e., El, Adonai, Shaddai, Jehovah, theos, Kyros, Father) and the 
philological comments he makes regarding the derivation of the names are direct 
appropriations and truncations of Bavinck’s more detailed formulations—all 
without citation. To display just one brief example among the many longer ones 
that could be demonstrated throughout this section, first, consider Van Til’s 
description of the name Adonai:
Adonai indicates God as the Ruler to whom everything is subject and 
whom man is therefore bound to obey. In earlier times it was the usual 
name by which God was addressed.63
Then, compare Bavinck’s longer description of the same name:
ʾĒdōnāy (יָנֹדֵא), used alternately with hā-ʾādôn (ןודאה), which is further 
intensified in “Lord of lords” (םיִנֹדֲא ֹןודָא) or “Lord of all the earth” (ֹןודָא 
ֶץָראָה-לָָכ), refers to God as the Ruler to whom all things are subject and 
to whom humans are related as servants (Gen. 18:27). In an earlier period 
the name Baʿal (לַעַב) was used of God with the same meaning (Hos. 2:16 
[18MT]), but later this use was discontinued because of its idolatrous 
connotations.64 Now these names are not proper names in the restricted 
sense. They are used as well of idols, people (Gen. 33:10; Exod. 7:1; 4:16), 
and authorities (Exod. 12:12; 21:5–6; 22:7; Lev. 19:32; Num. 33:4; Judg. 5:8; 
1 Sam. 2:25; Ps. 58:1 [2 MT]; 82:1) but are nevertheless the usual names by 
which God is called and addressed. They are, moreover, common Semitic 
names referring to God in his transcendence over all creatures. The 
Semites loved to call God “Lord” or “king.” They felt deeply dependent 
on him, and as his servants they humbly bowed before him. They did not 
use these names to give expression to philosophical theories about God’s 
essence but to give prominence to his relation to his creatures, especially 
to human beings.65
Once again Van Til has clearly appropriated Bavinck’s formulation without 
63. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 321.
64. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:139n144, inserts the following reference: “J. Robertson, 
Israel’s oude godsdienst (Culemborg: Blom en Olivierse, 1896), 200ff.; ed. note: Eng. edition: The 
Early Religion of Israel, 2d ed. (New York: Westminster Press [Thomas Wittaker], 1903).”
65. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:139n145, inserts the following reference: “W. Robertson 
Smith, Die Religion der Semiten (Freiburg: Mohr, 1899), 48.”
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citation of Bavinck’s work or the several references that Bavinck himself cites. 
The same is true for Van Til’s entire treatment of God’s names.
Due to Van Til’s high degree of appropriation of Bavinck’s thought 
throughout this section, Edgar’s generalized editorial notes regarding (1) Van 
Til’s following the traditional order of Reformed theology and (2) Van Til’s 
making a similar point as Bavinck regarding anthropomorphism66 are insufficient 
at best and misleading at worst; for, there is nothing general to note about these 
points. Rather, Van Til has tacitly appropriated all of his formulations of God’s 
names directly from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
Ironically, when Van Til turns next to explicate the attributes of God, he 
includes an explicit reference to Bavinck’s Dogmatiek!67 The oddity of this 
footnote, and the several other explicit references to Bavinck’s Dogmatiek 
throughout the remainder of the chapter,68 is stark considering how much 
material Van Til has appropriated from Bavinck already in the first sections of the 
chapter without citation. What is more, Van Til’s explicit references to Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek drop off in the last section of the chapter, though his appropriation of 
Bavinck’s thought does not. Thus the editor inserts a note in the last section to let 
the readers know that “Van Til continues to follow the order in Bavinck. . . .”69 
The pattern of appropriation in this chapter therefore may be summarized as 
follows: (1) extensive tacit appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek in the 
66. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 319nn1-2, respectively.
67. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 323n8.
68. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 327nn15-16, 333n27, 334nn28-30, 335n31.
69. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 341n53. Additionally, in the same footnote 
Edgar incorrectly asserts that Bavinck labels God’s oneness “as the last of his communicable 
attributes.” Rather, Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:170, writes: “The last of the incommunicable 
attributes is Gods’ oneness, differentiated into the unity of singularity and the unity of 
simplicity” (emphasis added).
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beginning section, (2) a extensive explicit appropriations in the middle section, 
and (3) more extensive tacit appropriations in the last section.
Whatever the reasons may be for Van Til’s odd omission of references in the 
beginning and latter sections, it is nevertheless abundantly evident that the bulk 
of Van Til’s presentation of God’s names and incommunicable attributes is an 
appropriation of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
3. Appropriations of Various Motifs
Beyond explicit citations and tacit appropriations, several of the motifs that 
Van Til employs throughout An Introduction to Systematic Theology derive from 
Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. In the first place, Van Til’s programmatic statement 
regarding humanity’s epistemological duty to “think God’s thoughts after him”70 
is rooted in Bavinck’s assertion that
. . . a theologian’s sole responsibility is to think God’s thoughts after him 
and to reproduce the unity that is objectively present in the thoughts of 
God and has been recorded for the eye of faith in Scripture.71 
In the second place, Van Til’s programmatic insistence that the ontological trinity 
is the necessary presupposition of all predication72 is adumbrated—according to 
70. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 292, 364, 376, 387; also cf. idem, A Christian 
Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 16; idem, Christian 
Apologetics, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 77, 131, 140, 172; idem, The Defense of the Faith, 
4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 124, 130, 151, 329.
71. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:44; also cf. p. 588. James Eglinton, “Bavinckʼs Organic 
Motif: Questions Seeking Answers,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 51-52, notes that 
Bavinck’s dictum reflects the wider organic motif underlying his thought, a motif which posits 
Christ as the center of all history. The fact that Van Til praises Bavinck’s dictum but criticizes 
Bavinck for being inconsistent with it provides further warrant for viewing Van Til’s formulations 
as a recapitulation of Bavinck’s. E.g., see Cornelius Van Til, “Review of Paedagogische Beginselen, 
Derde Druk (Kampen:J. H. Kok, 1928) and De Nieuwe Opvoeding, Tweede Druk, (Kampen: J. H. 
Kok, 1928), by Herman Bavinck” Princeton Theological Review 27 (1929): 135-36.
72. E.g, Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 59, writes, “Human knowledge 
ultimately rests upon the internal coherence within the Godhead; our knowledge rests upon the 
ontological Trinity as its presupposition.” Compare pp. 13, 80-81, 124, etc.
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Van Til’s own statements elsewhere—in (1) Bavinck’s critique of “the ethical 
theologians (Tethischen)” (which critique Van Til then levels against the followers 
of Berkouwer, whom he labels “the Cahiers men”)73 and in (2) Bavinck’s survey of 
early trinitarian theology.74 
In the third place, given his praise of “the analogical system of Bavinck” in 
opposition to Aquinas,75 it is highly likely that Van Til’s incessant insistence that 
humans can only know God analogically76 is a recapitulation of Bavinck’s 
formulations regarding analogical knowledge of God.77 Horton argues that Van 
Til inherited the Creator-creature distinction and its correlate—analogical 
reasoning—“from the Amsterdam school.”78 However, he does not note that it is 
from Bavinck specifically that Van Til appropriates the phrase “thinking God’s 
thoughts after him” nor that it is from Bavinck and Berkhof specifically that Van 
Til appropriates the language of theological principia. 
In the fourth place, Van Til’s seemingly odd statements regarding the 
73. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 94.
74. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus, (Philadelphia, 
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974), 1:10: “No one has better than he [i.e. Bavinck] set 
forth the struggle in the early church to attain a truly biblical view of the immanent or ontological 
trinity as the presupposition of the intelligibility of human experience.”
75. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 37-40; quote at p. 40.
76. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 31-44, 63, 97, 116, 177-85, 274, 279, 292, 294, 
298, 328, 373-75, 381, 384, 393.
77. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:47-52, 70, 107-111, 121, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, 186; cf. 
David Waring Diehl, “Divine Omniscience in the Thought of Charles Hartshorne and Cornelius 
Van Til: A Systemic Comparative Study” (Ph.D. diss., Yorktown Heights, N. Y. The Hartford 
Seminary Foundation, 1978), 50. Additionally, Michael S. Horton, “Consistently Reformed: The 
Inheritance and Legacy of Van Tilʼs Apologetic,” in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed 
Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 135, argues 
that Van Til inherited the Creator-creature distinction and its correlate, analogical reasoning, 
“from the Amsterdam school”; however, he does not note that it is from Bavinck specifically that 
Van Til appropriates the phrase “thinking God’s thoughts after him” nor that it is from Bavinck 
and Berkhof specifically that Van Til appropriates the language of theological principia.
78. Horton, “Consistently Reformed,” 135.
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epistemological necessity of circular reasoning79 are recapitulations of Bavinck’s 
formulations regarding the circularity inherent in theology’s principia,80 especially 
as these formulations are summarized by Berkhof. Contra Frame and Bahnsen, 
for example, both of whom attempt to analyze Van Til’s assertions regarding 
circularity without comparing Berkhof’s and Bavinck’s formulations,81 Van Til 
virtually repeats Berkhof’s formulation.82
In the fifth place, Van Til’s robust treatment of general revelation,83 especially 
his insistence upon the clarity of general revelation, derives—according to his 
own admission—from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. For instance, first consider the 
following summary statement by Van Til regarding the clarity of general and 
special revelation: 
. . . it is the objective clarity, or perspicuity of God’s revelation, of 
whatever kind that revelation may be, natural or supernatural, general 
or special, that must be stressed at all costs.84
Then, compare Van Til’s remark elsewhere regarding Calvin and Bavinck as the 
sources of his formulations regarding the clarity of general and special 
revelation: 
Calvin and Bavinck, following Paul, have, by teaching this [i.e., the 
clarity of both general and special revelation], led us away from 
Scholasticism toward a unified interpretation of all the facts of human 
experience in terms of the primacy of the grace of God in Christ.85
79. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 242-44; idem, Christian Apologetics, 130; 
idem, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 33; idem, The Defense of the Faith, 123, 314-26. 
80. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:253, 455-59, 581-600.
81. John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 
1995), 301-09; Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 
1998), 143n144, 170n42, 201-02, 214n116, 218n128, 284-85, 482-83, 518n122.
82. Berkhof, Introduction To Systematic Theology, 125-26.
83. Cf. chs. 6-9 in Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology.
84. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 188-89
85. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:49.
99
Van Til thus explicitly links his formulations regarding the clarity of revelation to 
the Apostle Paul via Bavinck and Calvin.
B. Summary
The evidence adduced above is not intended to be a comprehensive 
tabulation, but a representative sampling. More places throughout An 
Introduction to Systematic Theology could be adduced as further evidence to 
demonstrate that Van Til appropriates—both explicitly and tacitly—vast amounts 
of theological formulations from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. However, after a certain 
point it becomes pedantic to keep on listing example after example. 
Nevertheless, when viewed as a cumulative case, these various lines of evidence 
clearly demonstrate that Van Til appropriates Bavinck’s thought not occasionally 
but pervasively. Based upon the high frequency and near thought-for-thought 
extent of Van Til’s appropriations, we can even go so far as to say that Van Til’s 
first presupposition should be reformulated as follows:
I have never been called upon to work out any form of systematic 
theology. My business is to teach Apologetics. I therefore presuppose the 
Reformed system of doctrine, especially as it has been formulated in Herman 
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek.86
This reformulation more accurately describes Van Til’s reliance upon Bavinck’s 
theological formulations than either Van Til’s or Edgar’s understated remarks in 
the preface and editorial introduction to the book, respectively. Further, this 
reformulation is more accurate than the Copernican portrayals of Van Til’s 
thought; for, it is manifestly not the case that Van Til has produced original 
86. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 27; emended and emphasis added.
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dogmatic formulations throughout An Introduction to Systematic Theology. Rather, 
he has clearly and pervasively appropriated Herman Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, and 
he has done so many times without citation. 
Furthermore, this reformulation does not imply that Van Til appropriates 
Bavinck’s thought exclusively. For, as we noted above, he clearly appropriates 
from others too, such as, Warfield and Berkhof. Additionally, he sometimes uses 
Bavinck’s formulation as a launching point for his own nuanced refinements of a 
point. For example, Van Til does not follow Bavinck’s order with respect to 
explicating the doctrine of the trinity after the divine essence and attributes.87 
However, despite these differences the evidence clearly shows that Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek is the preeminent dogmatic source from which Van Til appropriates 
“the Reformed system of doctrine” throughout An Introduction to Systematic  
Theology. Therefore, considered materially, the answer to our question regarding 
Van Til’s presupposition—From whom does Van Til appropriate “the Reformed 
system of doctrine” that undergirds his Reformed apologetics?—is undoubtedly 
Herman Bavinck.
87. Cf. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 348n1.
CHAPTER IV. 
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN CONCRETO (PART 3):
POLEMICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
In the previous chapter we examined Van Til’s presupposition materially 
through an analysis of his positive presentation of “the Reformed system of 
faith” in An Introduction to Systematic Theology. We found that, throughout this 
book, Van Til pervasively appropriates theological formulations from Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek. Hence, in terms of content, Van Til’s presupposition should be 
described not only as “the Reformed system of faith,” but also as “the Reformed 
system of faith, especially as it has been formulated in Herman Bavinck’s 
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek.”
In the present chapter we will continue to examine Van Til’s presupposition 
materially, but instead of focusing upon his positive presentation of Reformed 
dogmatics, we will analyze how Van Til employs his presupposition for 
polemical purposes. In other words, when Van Til levels critiques against his 
theological opponents, what dogmatic source does he use as his criterion for 
determining whether a theologian is orthodox or heterodox? 
Since we have already seen that Van Til pervasively appropriates Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek in his positive presentation of Reformed dogmatics, there is sufficient 
warrant for asking a more specific question with respect to his polemical 
presentations: Does Van Til use Bavinck’s Dogmatiek in particular as the paragon 
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of Reformed orthodoxy by which he determines whether other Reformed 
theologians are orthodox or heterodox?
A. Appropriations in The New Synthesis Theology of The 
Netherlands
In An introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til appropriates Bavinck’s 
thought primarily through summarizing Bavinck’s theological formulations in 
order to restate the Reformed system of faith with apologetic nuances. In The 
New Synthesis Theology of The Netherlands, however, Van Til exhibits another type 
of appropriation. In this work he wield’s Bavinck’s theology as an orthodox 
sword by which to parry the allegedly heterodox theological thrusts arising in 
the Netherlands throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Van Til’s 
argument is divided into two main sections: (1) the nineteenth century 
background to the problem and (2) the twentieth century development of the 
problem. He wields Bavinck’s theology as the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy in 
both sections, but especially in the first.
1. The Context: Synthesis Theologies vs. Pure Reformed Orthodoxy
Van Til begins with a sweeping summary of pre-Reformation Medieval 
theology as “a synthesis-theology” which “was an edifice composed of two 
‘stories,’ the first being that of the natural theology of the Greeks, and the second 
being the ‘supernatural’ theology of the Bible.”1 Protestants in the Netherlands 
1. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 2. Van Til frequently employs the two-story house 
metaphor as a critique of alleged dualism in Roman Catholic theology. See, e.g., Cornelius Van 
Til, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003), 141-42; idem, A 
Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 262; idem, The 
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who failed to depart from Roman Catholic natural theology became 
Remonstrants, according to Van Til, thus creating the need for the Synod of 
Dordt’s proclamation of “historic Protestantism, pure and simple” contra the 
Remonstrants.2
Having stated the “pure and simple” starting point, Van Til proceeds to 
explain impure deviations largely following an interpretive schema appropriated 
from Herman Dooyeweerd’s analysis of four religious motives undergirding the 
history of Western thought.3 The first is Roman Catholicism, which Van Til 
summarizes as an attempt to synthesize Socrates’ autonomous man with 
Christianity’s self-attesting Christ of Scripture. Likewise, Van Til summarizes 
modern theology as an attempt to synthesize Kant’s autonomous man with 
Christianity’s Christ à la Karl Barth’s Neo-Orthodoxy. Next, Van Til argues that 
modern Reformed theologians in the Netherlands have attempted to synthesize 
Neo-Orthodoxy with historic Reformed theology, a move which he sees as
Defense of the Faith, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 131, 308-09, 316. Arvin Vos, Aquinas,  
Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas  
Aquinas (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian University Press, 1985), 123-160, has critiqued Protestant 
“two-story” interpretations of Aquinas’ theology, including Van Til’s and Herman Dooyeweerd’s 
formulations, as insufficiently nuanced at best and as misrepresenting the actual interrelation of 
nature and grace in Aquinas’ thought at worst. I am unaware of any studies which examine Van 
Til’s interpretations of Aquinas’s theology in particular or Roman Catholicism in general, and it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt such an analysis. Were one to be attempted, however, 
Van Til’s appropriation of Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought would need to be a major focus; for, 
Van Til explicitly appropriates Dooyeweerd’s analysis of the four religious motives of Western 
thought as will be demonstrated in chapter 6 below.
2. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis, 2-3; quote at p. 3.
3. Herman Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought: An inquiry into the  
transcendental conditions of philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 59-77, presents the 
following four religious motifs: (1) matter and form; (2) creation, fall, and redemption; (3) nature 
and grace; (4) nature and freedom. Also see idem, Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and 
Christian Options, ed. Mark Vander Vennen and Bernard Zylstra, trans. John Kraay (Toronto: 
Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), 7-39. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 4, 7, only mentions 
Dooyeweerd twice; nevertheless, it is clear that Van Til’s fourfold analysis of the “Roman Catholic 
Synthesis” (pp. 3-7) is largely a summary of Dooyeweerd’s thought. Compare Van Til’s 
appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s fourfold schema in Cornelius Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism 
(Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962), 230-239.
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a turning away from the traditional Reformed Faith, and toward the 
reinterpretation (Umdeutung) of it in terms of the post-Kantian freedom-
nature scheme of thought, and, in particular, of neo-orthodox theology.4
Van Til traces the origins of this allegedly impure deviation of Reformed 
theology in the thought of H. M. Kuitert, Robert Collingwood, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
and he traces the development of it in the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
Albrecht Ritschl, and J. H. Scholten, the latter receiving the longest analysis.5 All 
of this serves as the backdrop against which to introduce the modern champions 
of pure Reformed orthodoxy: Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.
Both Kuyper and Bavinck were former students of Scholten, and both had 
the unique intellectual fortitude and giftedness required to critique their former 
teacher’s attempted reinterpretation of Reformed theology, remarks Van Til. He 
interprets Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid and Bavinck’s 
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek in this light. Both men realized, asserts Van Til, that an 
entire restatement of the Reformed worldview was needed to meet the modern 
challenges issued by Scholten’s attempted reinterpretation. “The call of the 
hour,” he writes, 
was thus to develop a self-consciously Reformed view of science and 
philosophy, consonant with the theology of the Reformed Confession 
and capable of challenging a position like Scholten’s.6
Notably, in a passing remark, Van Til interprets his own work as a continuation 
of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theological projects:
Have I, in saying this, read my own views into Kuyper and Bavinck? Yes, 
I have, at least as to their verbal expression. But what I have said was, I 
4. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 10.
5. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 10-28.
6. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 28-29; quote at p. 29.
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believe, the basic intent of both men.7
Contra the Copernican interpretations of Van Til, he interprets his own apologetic 
work as formally distinct, yet materially the same as Kuyper and Bavinck’s 
theology, his critiques of “remnants of Scholasticism” in the theology of both men 
notwithstanding.8 Within the context of this book, therefore, Van Til intentionally 
aligns his own thought with the champions of “pure” Reformed orthodoxy over 
against all attempts to synthesize Reformed theology according to modern 
theology’s freedom-necessity dualism.
2. The Crux: Modern Synthesis Theologies vs. Bavinck’s Orthodoxy
Having stated the background of Reformed theology’s impure deviations in 
the Netherlands and having held up Kuyper and Bavinck as defenders of the 
pure orthodoxy against Scholten’s reinterpretation, Van Til proceeds to wield 
Bavinck’s theology as a polemical sword against further attempts at modern 
Reformed syntheses.
2.1. Bavinck contra the “Ethical Theologians”
Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818–1874) was the father of the so-called 
“ethical theologians,” recalls Van Til. He notes that although Kuyper and Bavinck 
differed in their responses—the former wholly opposing, the latter being 
critically appreciative—Bavinck’s analysis produced the same conclusion as 
Kuyper’s: De la Saussaye’s theology is out of accord with Reformed theology.9 
7. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 30.
8. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 30. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck will be analyzed in chapter 5 
below.
9. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 31-33.
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Van Til’s entire assessment of De la Sassaye’s thought turns upon his use of 
Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology as the criterion of orthodoxy. “For example,” 
writes Van Til,
would it not seem obvious that the theology of men like Kuyper and 
Bavinck is based upon the idea of the Scriptures as the final source and 
standard of truth, whereas the theology of De la Saussaye is based upon 
the autonomous moral or ethical consciousness of man as the final source 
and standard of truth?10
Van Til considers J. H. Gunning (1829–1905) to be the second father of the 
“ethical theologians.” Just as with his analysis of Gunning’s predecessor, so with 
Gunning himself, Van Til uses Kuyper and Bavinck as the criterion of orthodoxy. 
Thus after surveying Gunning’s doctrine of Scripture Van Til concludes:
It ought to be clear from what has been said that Gunning’s final court of 
appeal was not the Scriptures, in the sense that this was true for Kuyper 
and Bavinck.11
Van Til concludes part one with a separate sub-section entitled “The Authentic 
Bavinck” which is catena of quotations from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek arranged in 
such a way as to prove that, contra Veenhof’s analysis, Bavinck unequivocally 
rejected the ethical theology arising in the Netherlands. According to Van Til, the 
essence of Bavinck’s disagreement with the ethical theologians is his 
epistemological principle of analogical reasoning:
In short, underneath all his evaluations of ancient, medieval, and 
modern thinking, Bavinck did work with an idea of analogy based upon 
that of the self-sufficient triune God of Scripture and man as His 
creature, who has sinned against Him, and in all cases responded to His 
Word with either obedience or disobedience.12
10. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 32.
11. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 35.
12. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 37; also cf. idem, “The Significance of Dort for Today,” in Crisis 
in the Reformed Churches: Essays in Commemoration of the Synod of Dort, 1618–1619 (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Reformed Fellowship, Inc., 1968), 182.
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This assertion is crucial to Van Til’s argument; for, he argues that the twentieth-
century followers of the nineteenth-century ethical theologians (i.e., Berkouwer 
and Kuitert) claimed that they were simply following Bavinck. In order for Van 
Til to be able to use Bavinck as his criterion of orthodoxy contra the twentieth-
century ethical theologians, therefore, he must first establish that Bavinck indeed 
rejected the earlier ethical theologians.13 
Not every point of Van Til’s interpretation of “the authentic Bavinck” is 
tenable. His assertion, for example, that Bavinck held Roman Catholicism to be a 
“monstrosity” after the likes of “Frankenstein’s creation” is an egregious 
hyperbole at best and a gross misrepresentation at worst.14 Bavinck’s own 
statements run directly contrary to Van Til’s “Frankenstein” interpretation. “In 
general,” writes Bavinck in the preface to the first edition of his Dogmatiek, for 
example,
Protestants know far too little about what we have in common with 
Rome and what divides us. Thanks to the revival of Roman Catholic 
theology under the auspices of Thomas, it is now doubly incumbent on 
Protestants to provide a conscious and clear account of their relationship 
to Rome.15
He further asserts:
Irenaeus, Augustine, and Thomas do not belong exclusively to Rome; 
they are Fathers and Doctors to whom the whole Christian church has 
obligations.16
Furthermore, throughout his Dogmatiek Bavinck interacts extensively with all of 
these “Fathers,” sometimes positively appropriating insights, sometimes deftly 
13. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 42-43.
14. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 36-37.
15. Herman Bavinck, “Herman Bavinck, ‘Forward’ to the First Edition (Volume I) of the 
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek,” trans. John Bolt, Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 9.
16. Bavinck, “Forward,” 9.
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critiquing weakness, yet always reading them with respect and nuance.17 To give 
just one example, Bavinck's firm yet nuanced critique of Rome’s so-called Papa 
dixit formulation is a far cry from Van Til’s hyperbolic “Frankensteinian 
monstrosity” description of Bavinck’s position.18 
Moreover, Bavinck’s very definition of theology is modeled after Thomas 
Aquinas’ definition,19 a fact which by itself repudiates Van Til’s polemical 
hyperbole. Additionally, Van Til himself acknowledges elsewhere that Bavinck 
was highly influenced by Thomas:
Everybody knows that even Herman Bavinck incorporated much of the 
thinking of Thomas Aquinas in his magnus opus, Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek.20
Furthermore, Van Til contradicts his own “Frankensteinian“ assessment; for, 
elsewhere he describes Bavinck as “a true Protestant” who “learned much from 
Romanism.”21 On this point, therefore, Van Til has lost sight of “the authentic 
Bavinck” and instead has been carried away by polemical hyperbole. 
Nevertheless, despite his misinterpretation of Bavinck’s stance toward Roman 
Catholicism, the fact remains that Van Til uses Bavinck’s theology as his paragon 
of Reformed orthodoxy contra the ethical theologians.
17. See, e.g., Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 1, 
Prolegomena (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 113-204.
18. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:81-82 [#21].
19. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:34, 36, references Thomas’ definition twice before 
formulating his own definition (p. 38), which definition clearly echoes Thomas’ formulation.
20. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus, (Philadelphia, 
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974), n.p.; cf. Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of  
Cornelius Van Til 1895–1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree Communications, 1995), s.v., 1974.G.
21. Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological  
Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 48. 
109
2.2. Bavinck contra G. C. Berkouwer
In chapter 2 Van Til introduces Bavinck straightway as the paragon of 
Reformed orthodoxy; for, according to Van Til, the current state of theology in the 
Netherlands is a devolution from Bavinck’s pristine Reformed orthodoxy to 
Barth’s heterodoxy via Berkouwer’s attempted synthesis of Bavinck’s orthodoxy 
and Barth’s heterodoxy:
The synod of Assen (1926) of the Reformed Churches symbolized the 
high-water mark of traditional Reformed theology. That of Amsterdam 
(1966), involving the same churches, symbolized the victory of neo-
orthodoxy. This change of direction from Bavinck to Barth mirrors 
perfectly the voltefact in the theology of Dr. G. C. Berkouwer in the same 
period.22
Van Til divides the chapter into two main sections, and in both he employs 
Bavinck as the criterion of orthodoxy, contra Berkouwer and Berkouwer’s 
followers (i.e., the so-called “Cahiers men”), respectively.
Van Til’s lengthy treatment of Berkouwer is divided into two sub-sections 
representing Berkouwer’s earlier and a later views of Scripture. He claims that 
the early Berkouwer presented a view of Scripture similar to that of Kuyper’s 
and Bavinck’s; for, just like Kuyper and Bavinck, so Berkouwer critiqued the 
attempts of the ethical theologians to synthesize revelation and reason according 
to a criterion independent of revelation. “This posits, according to Berkouwer, 
the problem of Scripture-criticism,” writes Van Til. “And he who seeks to ‘solve’ 
this problem, specifically in the manner in which [Wilhelm] Herrmann does will 
end with chaos,” he concludes.23 
Furthermore, Van Til recalls that the early Berkouwer begins his discussion 
22. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 44.
23. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 47.
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of the problems in the Netherlands regarding historical criticism of Scripture by 
recalling Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s positions, and with respect to this point Van Til 
reasserts that Bavinck’s view is opposite of the view proposed by the ethical 
theologians.24 He argues, moreover, that the early Berkouwer defended Kuyper’s 
and Bavinck’s view regarding the mystery of Scripture.25 Van Til notes that 
Berkouwer contrasts Barth’s position with Kuyper’s and that he also affirms 
“Bavinck’s warning to the effect that the problem of Scripture criticism is not 
merely intellectual, but also ethical. The natural man takes offense at ‘the Christ 
of the Scripture’ and ‘the Scripture of Christ.’”26 Satisfied that the early 
Berkouwer has championed the pure orthodoxy of Kuyper and Bavinck, Van Til 
therefore lauds his first book as “remarkable.”27
However, Berkouwer’s second book on Scripture is a different story, 
according to Van Til. He laments Berkouwer’s fall from Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s 
orthodox high ground to Barth’s heterodox low ground:
In 1936, Berkouwer had professed that Barth offered a merely “formal 
sovereignty” of God. More recently, however, it is the orthodox view, 
that of Kuyper and Bavinck, which is supposed to be formal and static.28
Moreover, Van Til is particularly perturbed that Berkouwer is using Van Til’s 
own paragon of Reformed orthodoxy—Bavinck—to argue against the Reformed 
orthodox view of Scripture; specifically, Berkouwer employs Bavinck’s warning 
24. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 55; also cf. pp. 58-59. This is an example of why Van Til 
needed to substantiate Bavinck’s critique of the ethical theologians in ch. 1; for, he employs 
Bavinck’s formulation as a polemic against the followers of the ethical theologians.
25. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 57. However, Van Til provides no substantiating evidence for 
either (1) his summary of Kuyper’s formulation of a “principle of absolute antithesis between the 
natural man and the redeemed man” (pp. 56-57) or (2) his concomitant assertion that Bavinck 
followed Kuyper’s view of this absolute antithesis.
26. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 61-62; quote at p. 62.
27. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 62.
28. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 64.
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to avoid viewing Scripture as a “code-book of articles” for this purpose, admits 
Van Til.29 Therefore, Van Til’s high regard for Berkouwer’s first book turns to 
astonishment at his fall away from Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s positions in his 
second book:
We may well think of him as having undergone an “agonizing 
reappraisal” in his thinking, between his first and second work on 
Scripture, not as to suggest for a moment that he has personally rejected 
the Christ of Kuyper and Bavinck, but only that his second work, as it 
stands, is unintelligible except it be thought of as a reinterpretation of 
these men in terms of the activist principle of neo-orthodoxy, which is 
based on the activist philosophy of Kant.30
Highlighting Bavinck once again as the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy, Van Til 
recalls that in his first book Berkouwer had followed “in the footsteps of Calvin, 
Kuyper, and especially Bavinck. . . .”31 “Now everything has changed,” however, in 
Berkouwer’s second book.32
Also, it is quite clear that everything has changed with respect to Van Til’s 
interpretation of Berkouwer’s work: Once Van Til sees that Berkouwer departs 
from Bavinck orthodoxy, Van Til repudiates Berkouwer’s theology. Hence despite 
his earlier remark that Berkouwer has not “personally rejected the Christ of 
Kuyper and Bavinck,” a few pages later Van Til levels the following totalizing 
repudiation against Berkouwer’s thought: 
Only the traditional Reformed view, therefore, gives adequate expression 
to the exhaustively personal, i.e., covenantal, character between every 
human being in his relationship to every fact of the universe, and the 
triune God of Scripture. Thus, when Berkouwer thought that he had 
exchanged the “causal” framework of Dordt for the “personalist” 
29. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 65.
30. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 69; also note the similar assessment at p. 71. Additionally, cf. 
idem, The Sovereignty of Grace, 32.
31. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 73; emphasis added.
32. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 73.
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framework of neo-orthodoxy, what he had actually done was to sell his 
birthright for a mess of pottage.”33
This is an unseemly metaphor. For, read in a literal sense, this metaphor would 
imply that Berkouwer is either hated by God or rejected by God without hope for 
repentance. The only way to harmonize this hyperbolic ad hominem polemic with 
Van Til’s earlier assessment of Berkouwer’s faith in Christ is to consider the 
stronger statement a gross exaggeration. Surely, on this point Van Til has drifted 
again into rhetorical excess.
2.3. Bavinck contra Berkouwer’s Followers
Van Til labels Berkouwer’s followers “the Cahiers Men” since they published 
a series of pamphlets entitled, Cahiers voor de Gemeente. Throughout his analysis 
of this movement Van Til continues to use Kuyper, and especially Bavinck, as the 
criterion of Reformed orthodoxy. He critiques T. J. Baarda’s theology, for 
example, as having traded Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s formulations for “the Kantian 
scheme of the primacy of the practical reason.”34 Van Til further critiques the 
Cahiers thinkers for rejecting the formal authority of Scripture. This position, 
according to Van Til, was repudiated long ago by Bavinck, and by resurrecting 
this view “these men have, to all intents and purposes, repudiated the position of 
Bavinck.”35 Likewise, Van Til employs Bavinck’s theology as the criterion by 
which to reject the Cahiers theologians’ reinterpretation of the “human factor” of 
Scripture.36 Notably, Van Til summarizes his entire polemic against the “Cahiers 
33. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 83.
34. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 87.
35. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 90-91; quote at p. 91.
36. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 91.
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Men” in terms of Bavinck’s theology:
Bavinck argued at length against the reduction of the idea of sin from the 
notion of enmity against God to the Roman Catholic notion of 
ontological poverty of being. Men hate Scripture as the Word of Christ, 
said Bavinck, because they hate Christ’s call to repentance heard in it.
In other words, Bavinck defended the notion of truth as being ethical 
because, with it, he defended the triune God of Scripture as the final 
reference point in all human predication. The ethical theologians 
(Tethischen) [sic] defended the notion that truth was ethical because they 
opposed the God-centered theology of Bavinck and were influenced by 
the man-centered philosophy of Kant.37
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that throughout the book Van Til appropriates 
Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology as his paragons of Reformed orthodoxy. He 
uses Bavinck’s thought especially as his criterion for determining orthodoxy; for 
he considers only those theologians who agree with Bavinck’s formulations to be 
orthodox, and he condemns those who do not as heterodox.
2.4. Excursus: Bavinck contra Berkouwer in Van Til’s Other Writings
In addition to his critiques of Berkouwer and the “Cahiers Men” noted in the 
previous sections, Van Til polemicizes voluminously against Berkouwer’s 
theology in several additional writings.38 While it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to analyze Van Til’s entire treatment of Berkouwer, it is fitting to adduce 
briefly two additional examples wherein Van Til uses Bavinck’s theology as the 
paragon of Reformed orthodoxy and hence the criterion by which he judges 
Berkouwer’s later theology to be heterodox.
In the first place, within A Christian Theory of Knowledge Van Til polemicizes 
against Vatican II as follows: First, he states Bavinck’s interpretation as the 
37. Van Til, The New Synthesis, 94.
38. See the references to Van Til’s voluminous polemics contra Berkouwer in chapter 1, §A, 3, 
above.
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orthodox Reformed position;39 Second, he presents Berkouwer’s interpretation as 
a heterodox Reformed synthesis between neo-orthodox Protestantism and 
Roman Catholicism;40 Third, he argues his own critiques against the documents 
of Vatican II.41 By sandwiching Berkouwer’s view in between Bavinck’s and his 
own, Van Til implicitly (1) contrasts Bavinck’s orthodoxy with Berkouwer’s 
heterodoxy and (2) bolsters his own view by presenting it as being in accord with 
Bavinck’s pristine orthodoxy.
In the second place, throughout The Sovereignty of Grace Van Til’s critique of 
the reappraisal of Dort along neo-orthodox lines in Berkouwer’s later writings 
presupposes that Bavinck’s theology is the criterion of Reformed orthodoxy. Van 
Til’s critique has two parts: First, he demonstrates that the early Berkouwer 
admitted to following Bavinck’s orthodox lead;42 Second, he rejects the later 
Berkouwer’s reappraisal of Dort and argues that his later theology is not an 
organic development of Bavinck’s thought but a heterodox departure from it. 
Hence Van Til avers a Bavinck-or-Barth ultimatum:
The reader will note that at this stage of his thinking Berkouwer defends 
the neo-orthodox teleology of the Confession of 1967 and at the same 
time commends the orthodox teleology of Bavinck. Berkouwer’s 
thinking passes back and forth between these two mutually exclusive 
teleologies as though they were friends, together opposing the formal 
view of some reactionary form of fundamentalism. Whoever says that 
Scripture must be related to Christ seems to speak the truth whether this 
Christ be the Christ of Scripture, whom Bavinck serves or the Christ-
Event of Barth whom the neo-orthodox theologians serve.
It becomes increasingly clear, however, that Berkouwer, though 
seeking continuity with Bavinck and Calvin, in practice employs the 
teleology of neo-orthodoxy in order to escape synergism theology and 
39. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 175-77.
40. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 177-86.
41. Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 186-93.
42. Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace, 33, 37, 41, 45.
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formalism in relation to Scripture.43
Since the later Berkouwer appropriates Barth’s neo-orthodoxy, Van Til asserts: 
“We shall therefore go back to Calvin, to Bavinck and to the earlier Berkouwer 
for help.”44
Furthermore, Van Til himself summarizes his main critique in this book in 
terms of Berkouwer’s devolution from Bavinck’s orthodoxy to Barth’s 
heterodoxy:
I have been interested from the beginning in the new approach to 
theology in the Netherlands. In his day, Masselink criticized me for 
departing on relative points from Kuyper, Bavinck, and in particular Dr. 
Hepp. Now Berkouwer has departed further from these men than I have 
ever thought of doing, but no one in the Christian Reformed Church 
criticizes Berkouwer. . . . Of course, Berkouwer does not admit for one 
moment that he is involving himself in the approach of modern 
existentialism. However, even his friends are beginning to realize that he 
is seeking now to combine Barth and Bavinck, and that Barth is gaining 
on Bavinck.45
In both of these books, therefore, Van Til consistently uses Bavinck’s theology as 
the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy by which he judges Berkouwer’s thought to 
be  heterodox.
3. Summary
Van Til’s entire polemic throughout The New Synthesis Theology of the 
Netherlands turns upon the hinge of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. According to Van Til, 
the story of modern Reformed theology in the Netherlands is a story of 
devolution from Kuyper and Bavinck’s orthodoxy to Barth’s heterodox neo-
43. Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace, 77.
44. Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace, 55-56.
45. Van Til, “The Development of My Thinking,” an unpublished letter to John Vander Stelt, 
1968; Reproduced in Bristley, Guide, 14-17; quote at p. 16.
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orthodoxy by means of G. C. Berkouwer’s attempt to synthesize Bavinck’s 
theology with Barth’s. This attempted synthesis is an utter failure, according to 
Van Til; hence his vehement polemic.
This story is particularly perturbing to Van Til since, as we noted in chapter 1 
above, (1) Van Til viewed his own life’s work as that of carrying on Kuyper’s 
antithetical vision and (2) Van Til’s Alma Mater—Princeton Seminary—had 
already fallen prey to Barth’s neo-orthodox theology. Van Til sees that the same 
devolution that happened at Princeton is now happening at De Vrije Universiteit  
in the chair of dogmatic theology—the very chair in which both Kuyper and 
Bavinck had sat! This chair is now occupied by G. C. Berkouwer, who, according 
to Van Til, is allowing Barth’s theology to infiltrate De Vrije Universiteit. 
Therefore, in Van Til’s view Berkouwer has become the mortal enemy not only of 
Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision, but also of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatiek.
Additionally, although throughout the book Van Til mentions Kuyper along 
with Bavinck, the majority of his polemical arguments are based upon Bavinck’s 
theological formulations rather than Kuyper’s. Thus, Van Til, acting as a self-
styled guardian of Kuyper’s antithesis, employs Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as his chief 
polemical sword against the novel “synthesis theology” that is invading the 
country of his birth.
B. Appropriations in The Theology of James Daane
In 1954 James Daane—who studied for his Th.D. under the supervision of G. 
C. Berkouwer at De Vrije Universiteit—published a polemic against Van Til’s 
doctrine of common grace. “It is a peculiar circumstance,” remarks Daane, “that 
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few, if indeed any, of the proponents of Van Til’s thought claim to understand 
it.”46 Against this peculiarity Daane attempts in particular to demonstrate that 
Van Til’s view of common grace is out of accord with the traditional view as 
found in the thought of Kuyper and Bavinck and in the Three Points of the 1924 
Kalamazoo Synod of the Christian Reformed Church.47 
In 1959 Van Til published a reply to Daane’s critique.48 Van Til describes his 
reply as follows: 
James Daane wrote a book in criticism of my views. I answered by a little 
book about his evidences. . . . My purpose in doing so was not so much 
to answer Daane as to point out to the Christian Reformed Church that 
to flirt with neo-orthodoxy is to play with fire.49
Thus, rather than vindicating his own views directly, Van Til offers only an 
indirect vindication by means of a polemic against “the drift and direction” of 
Daane’s entire theology.50 The following analysis is limited to the several salient 
points of Van Til’s counter-polemic in this book which evince appropriations of 
Bavinck’s thought.51
In the first place, Van Til sets up his critique of Daane’s “dynamic” view of 
Scripture by first asserting Bavinck’s view as the criterion of a truly “dynamic” 
view, even translating a quotation from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek:
So far from being static this view of Scripture is alone truly dynamic. 
46. “Preface” in Daane, A Theology of Grace, n.p.
47. Daane, A Theology of Grace, 15-17.
48. Cf. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane.
49. Van Til, “The Development of My Thinking” in Bristley, Guide, 15.
50. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 21.
51. For Van Til’s additional polemics against Daane’s theology, cf. The Defense of the Faith, 6-7, 
20-22, 43n49, 43-44n52, 58n16, 77n3, 89n41, 204-215, 395-408; idem, “Letter to James Daane,” The 
Reformed Journal 6, no. 11 (December 1956): 20-21; James Daane, “Reply to Cornelius Van Til,” The 
Reformed Journal 6, no. 11 (December 1956): 21-23; Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 363-
365n25.
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“Scripture is not a dry tale of an old chronicle, but it is the ever living 
youthful word which God at the present time and always sends out to 
his people. It is the ever continuing speech of God to us.… It is the viva 
vox Dei epistola omnipotentis ad suam creaturam” (Bavinck Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek I, p. 405). It is they who work on any other foundation than 
that of this Word who will ultimately end up with staticism.52
He then implies that Daane’s view of Scripture is a devolution from Bavinck’s 
view, the lack of any references to Daane’s works notwithstanding.53 
In the second place, “following Kuyper and Bavinck” regarding the Bible’s 
self-authenticating authority,54 Van Til alleges that Daane has deviated from the 
orthodox Reformed doctrine of God’s decree, a doctrine which Van Til views as a 
necessary correlate of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture. “In other 
words,” alleges Van Til, “he rejects what Calvin, Hodge, Bavinck and Berkhof 
taught in plain terms on this point.”55
In the third place, Van Til begins his response to Daane’s critique regarding 
the doctrine of the ontological trinity as an epistemological principle56 by 
asserting that he has simply reiterated Bavinck’s doctrine of the trinity:
Actually there is nothing appreciably different in what I have said about 
the ontological trinity from what Berkhof and Bavinck have previously 
stated nor has Daane sought to prove that there is. In fact, I have not 
dealt with the subject other than to use what was already ascertained 
and established, especially by Bavinck, for apologetic purposes.57
Van Til then levels a counter polemic against Daane’s position by adducing a 
series of quotations from Bavinck's Dogmatiek in order “to indicate that Daane 
52. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 22.
53. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 23.
54. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 23.
55. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 26.
56. Even though Van Til does not reference it explicitly, Daane’s critique comprises ch. 7 in 
Daane, A Theology of Grace, 100-111.
57. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 33.
119
would find no support in Bavinck for his contrast between the idea of the 
ontological trinity and his christological approach.”58 He concludes his counter 
polemic by further adducing quotations from B. B. Warfield’s writings in order to 
show that “[Warfield] as well as Bavinck points out that only those who have 
deviated from sound theology have objected to the idea of the ontological trinity 
as being the basis of all theology.”59 Van Til’s rejoinder on this point, therefore, is 
grounded predominantly upon Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the paragon of Reformed 
orthodoxy.
In the fourth place, Van Til accuses Daane’s view of election and reprobation 
to be Arminian rather than Reformed according to the criterion of Bavinck’s and 
Calvin’s orthodoxy. “It would clarify the air,” writes Van Til, “if Daane would tilt 
directly at Bavinck and Calvin. Is Daane with Pighius or is he with Calvin?”60
In the fifth place, Van Til begins his chapter on supralapsarianism and 
infralapsarianism with this remark: “We turn to Herman Bavinck in order to note 
his analysis of the subject.”61 The entirety of the chapter is a synopsis of Bavinck’s 
formulations interspersed with criticisms against Daane’s alleged deviations 
from Bavinck’s orthodoxy. For example, after praising Bavinck’s “all-important” 
58. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 34-35; quote at p. 35.
59. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 35-38; quote at pp. 35-36.
60. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 66.
61. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 81. Idem, Common Grace and the Gospel, 227, asserts (1) 
that within The Theology of James Daane he follows Bavinck’s formulation regarding double 
predestination and (2) that he is “following the lead of Bavinck” in asserting that the 
supralapsarian-infralapsarian distinction should not be carried on in modern theology. Regarding 
the latter assertion, however, Van Til misinterprets Bavinck’s nuanced discussion of the topic in 
two ways: (1) Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:180, 361-392, never asserts that the supralapsarian-
infralapsarian distinction should be dropped from Reformed dogmatics; rather, he claims that 
neither the supra position nor the infra position alone can accurately present the richness of God’s 
decree; (2) Bavinck himself continues to employ this distinction throughout his dogmatics 
(Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:180; idem, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:278, 564; idem, Sin and Salvation in 
Christ, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 3, Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2006), 182, 278).
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point regarding the unity of the infralapsarian and supralapsarian positions on 
the matter of God’s sovereign control over all events, Van Til avers: “It is this 
basic Reformed position, common to the supra and the infra position, which 
Daane finds so objectionable.”62 Similarly, regarding the question of the equal 
ultimacy of election and reprobation, Van Til uses Bavinck’s thought as his 
criterion of orthodoxy. “When Bavinck says that the first sin was in any case due 
to the sovereign will of God,” writes Van Til, “Daane, in complete contradiction 
of this, says that Adam could have decided not to sin.”63
Moreover, three of Van Til’s four rejoinders against Daane’s view of election 
in Christ are restatements of Bavinck’s theology.64 For example, his second 
rejoinder is an explicit judgment against Daane’s alleged deviation from 
Bavinck’s historic Reformed orthodoxy:
(2) Bavinck himself, throughout his truly great work on dogmatics, 
constantly speaks of the object of election as being the Christus mysticus, 
Christ with his body the church.
We may therefore await the production of evidence on the part of 
Daane to prove that Berkhof, the adherents of 1924, or others have, in 
this respect, departed from Bavinck and the Reformed tradition.65
In the sixth place, having presented a synopsis of Bavinck’s orthodox view of 
election in chapter 6, Van Til then summarizes Karl Barth’s heterodox view in 
chapter 7, the longest chapter in the book. The contrast of Barth’s view with 
Bavinck’s by means of juxtaposition is intentional; for, Van Til’s purpose is to 
show that the source of Daane’s theological aberrations is Barth’s theology, and 
he seeks to call Daane back to the historic Reformed position as maintained by 
62. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 86.
63. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 91.
64. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 92-94.
65. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 92; For all four points see pp. 92-94.
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Bavinck:
Can he [i.e., Daane] show us how to be of service to modern theology in 
any other way than by following in the footsteps of Calvin, Dort, Bavinck 
and Berkhof; and telling men that there is no truly biblical view of the 
grace of God, unless it is based upon the sovereign God of Scripture who 
doeth among the armies of heaven and earth as he will?66
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that throughout the book Van Til frequently 
appropriates Bavinck’s theology as the orthodox criterion by which he judges 
Daane’s views to be heterodox. The most obvious and extensive appropriations 
appear in the chapter on the trinity and in the chapter on lapsarianism.
C. Appropriations contra Karl Barth
Van Til’s polemic against Karl Barth’s alleged “new modernism” is as 
vehement as it is voluminous.67 His categorical rejection of Barth’s thought is 
well known in scholarship regarding the reception of Barth’s theology in 
America.68 What is not well known, however, is the fact that Van Til employs a 
Bavinck-vs.-Barth motif as one of his primary polemics against Barth’s views. 
66. Van Til, The Theology of James Daane, 117. Even though herein Van Til mentions Calvin, 
Dort, and Berkhof in addition to Bavinck, the juxtaposition of this chapter and the previous 
chapter is a clear contrast between Barth’s and Bavinck’s views. Furthermore, throughout the 
entire book Van Til does not adduce any evidence from Berkhof’s writings to support his polemic 
against Daane, nor does Van Til explicate the cannons of Dort. He does, however, explicate 
Calvin’s views in multiple places throughout the book.
67. See the references to Van Til’s polemics contra Barth in chapter 1, §A, 3, above.
68. For older scholarship, see, e.g., T. F. Torrance, “Review of The New Modernism (London: 
James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1946), by Cornelius Van Til” The Evangelical Quarterly 19 (1947): 144-149; 
also cf. Alister E. McGrath, “Karl Barth's Doctrine of Justification from an Evangelical 
Perspective,” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology: Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung Wook 
Chung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 172n1. For recent scholarship, see Thorne, 
Evangelicalism and Karl Barth, 33-41; George Harinck, “‘Give Us an American Abraham Kuyper’: 
Dutch Calvinist Reformed Responses to the Founding of the Westminster Theological Seminary 
in Philadelphia,” Calvin Theological Journal 33, no. 2 (1998): 299-319; Gavin Ortlund, “Wholly 
Other or Wholly Given Over? What Van Til Missed in His Criticism of Barth,” Presbyterian 35, no. 
1 (2009): 35-52; Lewis, Karl Barth in North America, 33-67; Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “A Person of the 
Book? Barth on Biblical Authority and Interpretation,” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology:  
Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 
28-30.
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Although he does not appropriate Bavinck’s thought to the same pervasive 
extent as is evident in the polemical writings examined above, Van Til 
nevertheless uses Bavinck’s theology in the same manner, namely, as the criterion 
of Reformed orthodoxy by which to judge Barth’s formulations as heterodox. 
Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s theology contra Barth’s can be seen in his 
two book-length rejoinders.
1. Appropriations in The New Modernism
In The New Modernism69 Van Til uses Bavinck’s thought only a few times, but 
always as a paragon of orthodoxy. In the first place, he begins the book with a 
passing reference to Bavinck as the paragon of traditional Reformed orthodoxy, 
an orthodoxy which, according to Van Til, is being attacked by Barth and 
Brunner more vociferously than by Roman Catholicism or modern 
Protestantism.70 “Traditional orthodoxy,” he writes,
and especially traditional Reformed theology [i.e., the theology 
represented by Herman Bavinck], seems to be, in the eyes of Barth and 
Brunner alike, the worst offender of the three.
In view of these facts, we naturally ask whether Barth and Brunner 
will not eventually join the forces of modern Protestantism in an all-out 
final offensive against the Reformed Faith.71
Van Til thus describes the inciting incident for his polemic as an attack on 
Reformed orthodoxy as represented by the modern paragon of Reformed 
orthodoxy—Herman Bavinck.
69. The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner is Van Til’s first 
major publication. Published originally in 1946, Van Til released two subsequent editions in 1947 
and 1972 respectively, both of which contained expanded material on Barth’s theology. Cf. 
Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1946.G, 1947.A, 1972.G.
70. Van Til, The New Modernism, 1-2.
71. Van Til, The New Modernism, 2.
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In the second place, in reference to Barth’s formulation of the doctrine of 
God’s aseity, Van Til remarks that “it might even seem as though Barth’s position 
on the aseity of God were identical with that of outstanding Reformed 
theologians such as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck.”72 According to Van 
Til, however, the appearance is only formal:
Yet even the brief exposition of Barth’s conception of the freedom of God 
that we have given so far, ought to be sufficient to convince us that 
Barth’s view and that of these men are as divergent as they could 
possibly be.73
Van Til’s polemic here goes well beyond a single point regarding Barth’s 
formulation of God’s aseity; for, he further insists that the foundation of 
Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s entire theology (i.e., the distinction between the Creator 
and the creature) “would be,” in Barth’s view, “to hold to all that is evil in 
theology.”74 Van Til’s critique, therefore, is intended to totally undermine Barth’s 
entire doctrine of God vis-à-vis Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s orthodoxy.
In the third place, Van Til deems Barth’s view of Holy Scripture to be a 
degradation of the classic Reformed view championed by Bavinck, among 
others:
And Barth wants, by all means, to interpret Christ in terms of the Bible. 
But what he means by the Bible is not what Luther and Calvin, Hodge 
and Warfield, Kuyper and Bavinck meant by the Bible.75
Even though there are only three brief appropriations in this book, each one of 
them is an important part of Van Til’s polemic. Most notably, Van Til uses 
Bavinck as his paragon of orthodoxy at the beginning of the book in order to 
72. Van Til, The New Modernism, 217.
73. Van Til, The New Modernism, 217.
74. Van Til, The New Modernism, 218.
75. Van Til, The New Modernism, 483.
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insinuate a that Barth’s thought is a direct contradiction of Reformed orthodoxy 
as represented by Bavinck. Therefore, we find here, albeit only in seed form, the 
polemic that Van Til later expands and levels against Berkouwer in The New 
Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands as noted above—Barth’s neo-orthodoxy is the 
antipode of Bavinck’s Reformed orthodoxy.
2. Appropriations in Christianity and Barthianism 
After spending six chapters within Christianity and Barthianism on 
summarizing aspects of Barth’s thought, Van Til turns in the seventh toward 
adducing evidence from orthodox Reformed theologians that proves Barth’s 
theology to be heterodox. The first theologian Van Til uses in this polemical 
manner is Herman Bavinck. He argues that the orthodox view of Holy Scripture 
(i.e., the view represented by Bavinck) understands “Scripture as directly 
identical with the Word of God.”76 According to Van Til, Barth’s “activist view of 
revelation” is out of accord with the orthodox view, and thus, by implication, 
Bavinck’s view.
“That the Reformed view of Scripture,” continues Van Til, “is itself imbedded 
in and is an expression of Reformed theology as a whole was well expressed by 
Herman Bavinck and by Abraham Kuyper.”77 He then adduces five quotes from 
Bavinck (and an affirmation that Kuyper’s view is the same as Bavinck’s) as 
sufficient warrant for interpreting Barth’s view of Scripture as undoubtedly 
heterodox despite its prima facie resemblance to orthodoxy.78 “Try as they would,” 
76. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 117.
77. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 118.
78. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 118-20.
125
concludes Van Til,
Reformed theologians could not limit the dispute between themselves 
and Barth to a question of exegesis. Barth might well have the correct 
exegesis on certain passages of Scripture, and Reformed theologians may 
well have given a wrong exegesis of certain passages of Scripture. Even 
so, between historic Reformed theology and Barth there lies a basically 
different approach to the whole idea of Scripture. And with it there is a 
basically different idea of the Christ of the Scripture.79
Van Til therefore presents the orthodox Reformed response to Barth’s theology as 
primarily a contrast between Bavinck’s and Barth’s views, and he understands 
this contrast to be categorically antithetical. 
Van Til employs this Bavinck-vs.-Barth motif consistently throughout the 
remainder of the book, giving the impression that there is no agreement between 
the two thinkers on any subject whatsoever. This antithetical motif is evident in 
the following examples.
2.1. Bavinck contra Barth’s View of Scripture
Van Til argues that Berkouwer’s assessment of Barth’s view of Scripture is 
parallel to his own antithetical assessment. Van Til’s synopsis of Berkouwer’s 
criticism proceeds in three steps: First, Berkouwer alleges that Barth’s view of 
Scripture is subjectivist.80 Second, Berkouwer judges that the several attempts to 
escape subjectivism made by modern theologians, such as, Ritschl, Hermann, 
Haering, Stephan, Frank, Wobbermin, and Ihmels also fall prey to the same 
79. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 120. The “Reformed theologians” Van Til has in 
mind are the three theologians whose critiques of Barth’s theology he summarizes throughout the 
remainder of the chapter: G. C. Berkouwer (pp. 120–135), Klaas Runia (pp. 136–138), and Klaas 
Schilder (pp. 139–145). On Van Til’s personal relationship with Schilder and his reliance upon 
Schilder’s critical assessment of Barth’s theology, see Harinck, “‘Give Us an American Abraham 
Kuyper’”; idem, “‘How can an elephant understand a whale and vice versa?’: About the Dutch 
Origins of Cornelius Van Til’s Appraisal of Karl Barth,” n.d. (publication forthcoming 
(Eerdmans)).
80. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 120-121.
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subjectivism found in Barth’s view, despite prima facie similarities with Reformed 
orthodoxy.81 “Berkouwer soon makes plain,” asserts Van Til, recapitulating his 
own antithetical view, “that for all the striking similarity of words between 
Bavinck and the theologians of which he speaks, there is a basic difference of 
meaning between them.”82 Third, Berkouwer confirms his allegation that Barth’s 
view is subjectivist via a detailed analysis of Barth’s view.83
2.2. Bavinck as The Criterion of Reformed Orthodoxy
Van Til’s synopsis of Berkouwer’s criticism against Barth’s view of Scripture 
explicitly presupposes Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s formulations as the criterion of 
orthodoxy. After showing that Berkouwer quotes F. W. Grosheirde regarding the 
ultimate question of final authorities—whether God or man will have the last 
word—he avers the following ultimatum:
Thus it is that Berkouwer, with Grosheide, holds to a view of Scripture 
similar to that of Kuyper and Bavinck. Only if one holds to this view of 
Scripture does one have the true Christ. Only if one holds to this view of 
Scripture does one have a truly objective revelation. Only if one holds to 
this view of Scripture can one escape subjectivism, projectionism, and 
therefore illusionism.84
This ultimatum reappears later on in Van Til’s synopsis. After summarizing 
Berkouwer’s contrast between Barth’s view of Scripture and Kuyper’s and 
81. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 121-23.
82. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 123.
83. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 125-38.
84. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 124. Compare Van Til’s later expansion of G. C. 
Berkouwer’s  criticisms of Barth’s theology at p. 135: “It is therefore in line with Berkouwer’s 
criticism to say that two mutually exclusive views of Scripture involve two mutually exclusive 
views of Christ, and therewith of God and of man. And only the Christ of the Scriptures rather 
than the Christ of Barth can save us from subjectivism and illusionism. With all due credit to the 
influence of the Scriptures and of the Christ of the Scriptures upon Barth’s work, it must still be 
set diametrically over against the Scriptures and the Christ of Reformed theology and of historic 
Christianity.”
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Bavinck’s views,85 Van Til concludes:
It appears then that according to the arguments of the three books 
discussed, Barth’s rejection of the traditional Reformed doctrine of 
Scripture entails his reinterpretation along activistic lines of all the 
articles of the Christian faith.86
Thus he reasons that to disagree with Kuyper and Bavinck is to depart from 
Reformed orthodoxy. 
The polemical benefit Van Til receives from mentioning that Berkouwer 
interprets Barth’s view to be a departure from Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology 
is that he demonstrates that he is not the only one who is using these two 
theologians as criterions of Reformed orthodoxy. This benefit likely explains why 
Van Til mentions their names again, albeit only in passing, in a similar passage 
wherein he summarizes Berkouwer’s critique of Barth’s doctrine of providence. 87 
His insinuation is that Barth’s view is a heterodox degradation from Kuyper’s 
and Bavinck’s orthodoxy. Furthermore, Van Til mentions Bavinck in passing in 
another passage wherein he summarizes Berkouwer’s criticism of Barth’s view of 
election.88 In this passage too Van Til’s intent is clearly implied, namely, to 
demonstrate that Barth’s heterodox theology is out of accord with Bavinck’s 
pristine orthodoxy. 
This implicit Bavinck-vs.-Barth polemic is drawn out explicitly in another 
passage wherein Van Til  summarizes Berkouwer’s critique of Barth’s 
formulation of humanity’s fall into sin. “In the present work,” writes Van Til,
Berkouwer shows that, according to Barth, the belief in the historical fall 
85. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 133-34.
86. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 134.
87. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 153.
88. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 167.
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also constitutes an attack on the true idea of grace in Christ. The 
difference between Calvin and Bavinck, on the one hand, and Barth, on 
the other hand, is again shown to be one as deep as is possible. These are 
two mutually exclusive views of grace competing with one another. And 
this difference rests upon a basic difference in the view of God implied in 
both of these positions.89
According to Van Til, therefore, Berkouwer alleges that a categorical antithesis 
exists between Bavinck’s and Barth’s positions not only on the Christological and 
anthropological implications arising from humanity’s fall into sin, but also on the 
doctrine of God.
In another chapter, moreover, Van Til explicitly employs Bavinck’s theology 
(along with Berkouwer’s), albeit only in passing, as a criterion of Reformed 
orthodoxy against the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Against Balthasar’s 
description of Barth’s dialectical formulation of the principle of theology, Van Til 
rejoins: “If we apply the criterion of Bavinck or of Berkouwer, we shall have to say 
that here two forms of subjectivism are to be compared with one another.”90 He 
thus rejects both the theology of Barth and the theology of Balthasar on the 
grounds that their views of revelation are subjective when measured against 
Bavinck’s and Berkouwer’s objective formulations.
2.3. Bavinck contra Barth’s View of Christ
“Barth’s view of Christ,” asserts Van Til boldly, “does not seem to be 
anything like the Reformation view of Christ.”91 He defends this assertion in the 
following manner: First, Van Til summarizes several basic Christological points 
89. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 159.
90. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 324; emphasis added.
91. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 216.
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from Bavinck’s thought, referencing Bavinck’s Dogmatiek four times.92 Second, he 
avers, “On Barth’s view, this simple picture of the biblical view of sin and its 
origin as presented by Bavinck falls away.”93 Third, he cites Bavinck’s Dogmatiek 
three more times in an effort to summarize the Reformed view of sin’s origin and 
nature.94 Fourth, he cites several extensive passages from the Canons of the 
Synod of Dort regarding predestination.95 
Fifth, he returns to Bavinck’s theology and provides a lengthy synopsis of 
Bavinck’s views regarding the eternal trinitarian ground of redemption in the 
pactum salutis and the temporal outworking of the pactum through the covenant 
of grace.96 Van Til particularly highlights the fact that, in Bavinck’s view, Christ is 
central to the story of redemption both in God’s eternal decree and in the 
temporal outworking of that decree. He thus notes, “It is all important, says 
Bavinck, to hold that neither in the counsel of peace nor in the covenant of grace 
must Christ even for a moment be thought of as separate from his own. In both it 
is the Christus mysticus.”97 Nearly his entire presentation of the Reformed 
doctrine of Christ, therefore, is a synopsis of Bavinck’s theology. Throughout this 
fifth section alone Van Til references Bavinck’s Dogmatiek eighteen times, and he 
even translats several brief passages from the Dogmatiek into English.98
Van Til’s rhetoric against Barth’s theology is calculated to maintain a stiff 
antithesis between Barth’ and Bavinck’s views. At one point in this fifth section, 
92. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 216-17, 217nn10-13.
93. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 217.
94. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 217, 217nn14-16.
95. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 218-20.
96. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 220-21.
97. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 222.
98. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 220-24, 220-23nn29-46.
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for example, Van Til pauses his synopsis of Bavinck’s presentation of the pactum 
salutis in order to contrast Barth’s views:
It is in this manner that we can see something of the nature of the 
triumph of grace as Reformed theologians, following Calvin, have seen 
it. This grace is free or sovereign. The three persons of the trinity are 
from all eternity equally involved in its conception and in its execution. 
The triune God creates freely. There is therefore no power of any sort that 
stands over against him to resist his work. . . . There is no power of evil 
which is original. There is no non-being that stands over against being as 
a reactionary force. . . . There is no Nihil that has independent power over 
against God.99
Several polemical insinuations are embedded herein: (1) Van Til levels this 
critique immediately after summarizing Bavinck’s formulation of the pactum 
salutis. Oddly, however, Van Til makes no reference to Barth’s vehement rejection 
of the pactum.100 His insinuation, therefore, is that, contra Barth’s rejection of the 
pactum along with its underlying trinitarian distinction between the opera Dei ad 
intra and ad extra, the triumph of grace is only possible in Protestant theology by 
following Bavinck’s formulation wherein (a) the consilium Dei regarding 
redemption is understood as an opus Dei ad intra in the form of the pactum salutis, 
and (b) the execution of this consilium in time is viewed as an opus Dei ad extra in 
the form of the foedus gratiae.101 (2) His “triumph of grace” language is likely a 
veiled reference to the title of G. C. Berkouwer’s book, The Triumph of Grace in the 
Theology of Karl Barth,102 which Van Til references extensively in order to support 
99. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 221-22.
100. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. 
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2004), IV/1:65.
101. Cf. Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally  
From Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich. Baker Books, 2006), s.vv., consilium Dei, 
foedus gratiae, opera Dei ad extra, opera Dei ad intra, pactum salutis.
102. G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. Harry R. Boer 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1956); a translation of idem, De triomf der genade in de theologie van 
Karl Barth (Kampen: Kok, 1954).
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his own polemic against Barth’s views.103 Thus a double entendre appears herein 
connoting both (a) the failure of Barth’s theology to produce an actual triumph of 
grace (in contrast with Bavinck’s successful formulation of the triumph of grace 
via the pactum salutis and foedus gratiae) and (b) a polemical double whammy 
from not one but two rejoinders—Berkouwer’s and Van Til’s. (3) Van Til’s 
remark, “as Reformed theologians, following Calvin, have seen it,” implies that 
Barth does not follow Calvin and thus is not in accord with historic Reformed 
orthodoxy. (4) Van Til’s language about there existing no ultimate power of evil, 
no ultimate non-being, and especially no Nihil, is a direct polemic against Barth’s 
formulations regarding “nothingness” (i.e., das Nichtige) within the doctrine of 
creation, despite his lack of references to Barth’s writings.104 
In light of these several polemical insinuations and explicit allusions it is 
evident that Van Til’s rhetoric is calculated toward achieving his underlying aim, 
namely, presenting Barth’s theology as wholly heterodox, especially when it is 
viewed in contrast with Bavinck’s orthodoxy. Thus, notwithstanding his own 
admissions that his synopses of Bavinck’s and Dort’s formulations of the person 
and work of Christ are the “barest outline” and a “brief sketch” of “a Protestant 
view of Christianity,”105 Van Til categorically rejects Barth’s theology as out of 
accord with Protestant orthodoxy. “Barth’s views of the person and work of 
Christ,” he concludes, “are, at every point, the antipodes of this historic 
103. E.g., Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 363-65n25; idem, Christianity and 
Barthianism, 33, 42, 111-13, 134-35, 169-71.
104. See §50, “God and Nothingness,” in Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/3:289-368; cf. Joseph L. 
Mangina, Karl Barth: Theologian of Christian Witness (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2004), 100-102.
105. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 224.
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Protestant view.”106 In other words, Barth’s views are at every point the antipodes 
of Bavinck’s.
2.4. Excursus: Barth pro Bavinck
Although a full analysis of Van Til’s various polemics against Barth’s 
theology is beyond the scope of this thesis, his repeated insistence that Barth’s 
thought is “at every point” antithetical to Bavinck’s theology creates a problem 
for his own polemic which ought to be mentioned briefly; for, Van Til’s Bavinck-
vs.-Barth motif presupposes that Barth’s theology reciprocates an antithetical 
posture toward Bavinck’s thought. In actuality, however, rather than viewing 
Bavinck’s theology as the categorical antipode of his own, Barth positively 
appropriates several insights from Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. John Vissers has recently 
analyzed Barth’s appropriations of Bavinck’s thought,107 and he presents the 
following salient observations.
In the first place, Barth viewed Bavinck and Kuyper as “theologians who had 
style or class,”108 and he read Bavinck’s Dogmatiek during his preparations for his 
first lectures in dogmatics.109 “Despite the fact that some Dutch Neo-Calvinists 
sought to use Bavinck against Barth to bolster their critique,” writes Vissers 
contra Van Til’s Christianity and Barthianism, “I argue that Barth himself never 
quite saw Bavinck in that light. Bavinck represented, for Barth, a deep and rich 
106. Van Til, Christianity and Barthianism, 224.
107. John Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 
Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 79-86.
108. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 79.
109. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 79-
80.
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expression of Reformed theology.”110 Therefore,  according to Vissers, Barth’s 
general attitude toward Bavinck’s theology is appreciative rather than 
antithetical.
In the second place, Barth appropriates Bavinck’s thought seven times in the 
first volume of his Göttingen Dogmatics.111 Barth’s definition of dogmatics and his 
rejection of the anthropocentric interpretation of Reformed theology, for example, 
derive from Bavinck’s thought.112 The most notable of these seven appropriations 
is Barth’s quip regarding the ground of theology—Deus dixit; for, even though 
“Barth does not share Bavinck’s doctrine of Scripture,” writes Vissers, “he does 
share Bavinck’s fundamental affirmation concerning revelation and the 
knowledge of God . . . namely, that in revelation God shares God’s self-
knowledge with us.”113 Accordingly, Barth’s hallmark phrase—Deus dixit—is an 
appropriation of Bavinck’s earlier formulation.114
In the third place, within the Göttingen Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics,  
Barth both lauds Bavinck’s formulation of the doctrine of the trinity and seeks to 
go beyond it by giving even more prominence to the trinity.115 Accordingly, in 
both works Barth repositions the doctrine within the locus on prolegomena 
rather than following Bavinck’s classical arrangement of the doctrine under the 
locus de Deo.116 According to Vissers, Barth saw his rearrangement as more 
110. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 80.
111. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 80n7.
112. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 80-81.
113. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 81.
114. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 81-82.
115. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 82-84.
116. E.g., Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1:295-304, presents five reasons for considering the 
trinity within prolegomena (i.e., in Barth’s terms, within “The Revelation of God”), and he cites 
Bavinck approvingly at p. 302. Contrast Bavinck’s view: Although not referring to exactly the 
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befitting the ontological priority of the trinity in relation to humanity’s response 
to divine revelation—just as ontology precedes epistemology, so the trinity 
should precede all other dogmatic loci.117
There is an intriguing irony in Barth’s expansion upon Bavinck’s position on 
this point vis-à-vis Van Til’s polemics against Barth’s theology; for, Van Til himself 
reverses Bavinck’s order and presents the doctrine of the trinity before the 
doctrine of God’s communicable attributes.118 Given our earlier observations that 
within An Introduction to Systematic Theology Van Til closely follows Bavinck’s 
dogmatic formulations, it is surprising that he deviates from Bavinck’s position. 
Although Van Til does not provide any reasons for this reorganization himself, 
William Edgar suggests that Van Til’s rearrangement is designed to give 
preeminence to the ontological trinity viewed as the epistemological 
presupposition of all predication.119 Therefore, it is ironic that Van Til makes the 
same theological move mutatis mutandis as does his bête noire: Whereas Barth 
rearranges Bavinck’s placement of the trinity in order to emphasize its 
ontological priority, Van Til rearranges Bavinck’s placement in order to 
emphasize the trinity’s epistemological priority.120
same reasons presented by Barth for explicating the trinity within prolegomena, Bavinck, 
Reformed Dogmatics, 1:109-10, rejects the trinitarian schema as an organizing principle for 
dogmatics. Furthermore, Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, 
vol. 2, God and Creation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 149-150, argues that in 
dogmatics it is preferable for the doctrines of God’s essence and attributes to be treated before the 
doctrine of the trinity.
117. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 82-83.
118. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of  
Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 348-397. 
Compare the arrangement in Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:178-334, and note Bavinck’s 
argument that the divine essence and attributes ought to be treated before the trinity (pp. 149-
150).
119. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 348n1.
120. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “A Person of the Book? Barth on Biblical Authority and 
Interpretation,” in Karl Barth and Evangelical Theology: Convergences and Divergences, ed. Sung 
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In the fourth place, Barth extols Bavinck’s presentation of the 
incomprehensibility of God. According to Vissers, Barth particularly appreciates 
the fact that, in Bavinck’s view, incomprehensibility plays a fundamental role in 
the entire epistemological relationship between God and man.121 Ironically, Van 
Til’s own insistence upon the incomprehensibility of God is also rooted in 
Bavinck’s formulation, as we noted above with respect to Van Til’s book, An 
Introduction to Systematic Theology.
In light of these four examples it is evident that Van Til’s Bavinck-vs.-Barth 
motif is one-sided polemical rhetoric. Vissers demonstrates that, regardless of the 
significant dogmatic differences between Barth and Bavinck, Barth appropriates 
Bavinck’s thought positively in several places throughout the Göttingen 
Dogmatics and the Church Dogmatics.122 Van Til simply omits this fact. “In short, 
and at least on the basis of reading Barth,” Vissers concludes, “it is difficult to see 
the stark divide between Barth and Bavinck that is represented by someone such 
as Cornelius Van Til who sets Bavinck’s orthodoxy over against Barth’s 
modernism.”123
D. Appropriation in Jerusalem and Athens
“I use Herman Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek as my source of 
information,” begins Van Til in part one of his two-part rejoinder to John 
Wook Chung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 30, notes several unwitting similarities 
between Van Til’s and Barth’s formulations of key doctrinal themes, including the following: 
“both made the doctrine of the Trinity their key presupposition.”
121. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 84-
85.
122. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 86.
123. Vissers, “Karl Barthʼs Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics,” 86.
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Warwick Montgomery’s criticisms of his apologetic method.124 Specifically, Van 
Til relies upon Bavinck’s explication of the Reformed maxim, finitum non est capax 
infiniti, in order to confute Montgomery’s allegedly Lutheran interpretation of it 
following Francis Pieper’s Christian Dogmatics. Though Van Til does not provide 
any specific references to Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, it is likely that he has in mind both 
Bavinck’s epistemological125 and his Christological126 uses of this maxim; for, he 
levels both epistemological and Christological critiques against Montgomery’s 
position.127 Therefore, within this brief rejoinder Van Til explicitly appropriates 
Bavinck’s theology as the criterion of orthodoxy upon the basis of which he 
judges Montgomery’s thought to be heterodox.
E. Summary
Although in some places throughout these polemics Van Til mentions not 
only Bavinck’s thought but also Kuyper’s and Berkouwer’s theology as criterions 
of Reformed orthodoxy, his primary paragon is Bavinck’s Dogmatiek. For, as we 
have seen, the entire structure of Van Til’s lengthy polemic throughout The New 
Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands presupposes Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the 
paragon of Reformed orthodoxy. Likewise, in The Theology of James Daane Van Til 
frequently pits Daane’s allegedly heterodox views against Bavinck’s orthodox 
positions. Furthermore, throughout his voluminous polemics against Karl Barth’s 
124. Cornelius Van Til, “Reply to Once Upon an A Priori . . .,” in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical  
Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Presbyterian and 
Reformed, 1971), 397.
125. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:309-310.
126. Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, vol. 3, Sin and 
Salvation in Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006).
127. Van Til, “Reply to Once Upon an A Priori . . .,” 397-398, 402-403.
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neo-orthodox theology, Van Til explicitly employs a Bavinck-vs.-Barth motif, and 
at one point he even expressly admits to using Bavinck’s (and Berkouwer’s) 
theology as the criterion by which to judge Barth’s theology as heterodox. 
Moreover, in his response to Montgomery in Jerusalem and Athens, Van Til 
expressly states that he uses Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the source of his polemic 
against Montgomery’s position.
For all of these reasons the answer to the question with which we began this 
chapter—whether Van Til uses Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the paragon of Reformed 
orthodoxy by which he determines whether other Reformed theologians are 
orthodox or heterodox—is therefore a patent affirmative.
CHAPTER V. 
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN DEFECTU ET IN EXCESSU (PART 1):
DIALECTICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF BAVINCK’S DOGMATIEK
Thus far we have surveyed Van Til’s positive appropriations of Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek. We have examined these appropriations from three perspectives—
formally (or structurally), materially, and polemically—and from all three 
viewpoints we have seen that Van Til appropriates from Bavinck’s thought not 
occasionally but pervasively. We suggested accordingly that Van Til’s first 
presupposition be emended to clarify the fact that when Van Til asserts that he 
presupposes Reformed dogmatics for his Reformed apologetics, it specifically 
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek that he primarily presupposes. In other words, 
Van Til’s Reformed apologetics presupposes Bavinck’s Reformed dogmatics to 
such an extent that his apologetics is nearly unintelligible without Bavinck’s 
dogmatics.
For this reason the final aspect of Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s 
thought which we will examine in this essay—his totalizing critiques of the 
patent “scholasticism” in Bavinck’s theological formulations—leads us to a 
perplexing, twofold dialectical tension with respect to Van Til’s presupposition.
In the first place, since he blatantly and pervasively appropriates from 
Bavinck’s theological formulations, Van Til’s totalizing critiques against 
Bavinck’s “scholasticism” are not only odd, but also formally self-contradictory. 
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To borrow one of Van Til’s favorite metaphors,1 for him to level totalizing 
critiques against Bavinck’s Reformed dogmatics is like the little apologist-girl 
who slaps her dogmatician-daddy in the face—all the while being held firmly by her  
daddy; for, if Van Til’s allegations against Bavinck’s theology are valid, then he 
risks undercutting his own polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek 
surveyed in chapter 4 above. His theological opponents could simply use Van 
Til’s critiques against Bavinck as their rejoinder against Van Til’s employment of 
Bavinck’s thought as the paragon of Reformed orthodoxy. Additionally, by 
criticizing Bavinck’s theology so strongly Van Til risks undercutting his positive 
presentation of Reformed dogmatics as noted in chapter 3 above. Hence the first 
dialectical tension: How hard does Van Til want to slap Bavinck in the face at the 
risk of undercutting both his polemics against neo-orthodox theology and his 
positive presentation of Reformed dogmatics?
In the second place, Van Til’s critique of the “scholasticism” in Bavinck’s 
thought is unoriginal in two senses. First, in terms of its material content, Van 
Til’s critique is a direct appropriation—without citation—of Herman 
Dooyeweerd’s criticism of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought (along with the 
scholasticism in Abraham Kuyper’s and Jan Woltjer’s thought). Second, in terms 
of its form, Van Til’s critique is simply one iteration of the same bipolar polemic 
that he levels against Kuyper, Berkouwer, and Dooyeweerd, namely, that there 
are two streams running through the thought of these theologians: a Reformed 
1. Cornelius Van Til, The Case for Calvinism, International Library of Philosophy and 
Theology: Philosophical and Historical Studies Series (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1964), 147-48; 
idem, Essays on Christian Education (Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1971), 89; idem, Jerusalem 
and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Nutley, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 98, 403; Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van 
Til 1895–1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree Communications, 1995), 15, 23.
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(i.e., antithetical) stream and a scholastic (i.e., synthetical) stream. Hence the 
second dialectical tension: On the one hand Van Til presents himself as the 
American guardian of the neo-Calvinist antithesis, but on the other hand he 
criticizes the very theological wells from which he draws his neo-Calvinist 
dogmatic water as having been poisoned by scholasticism.2
Our analysis of this twofold dialectical tension regarding Van Til’s 
appropriation of Bavinck’s thought will proceed in two steps. First, in the present 
chapter we will survey Van Til’s various criticisms of Bavinck in order to locate 
the crux of the critiques and to elucidate the dialectical nature of the critiques.  
Second, in the following chapter we will demonstrate that Van Til’s 
“scholasticism” polemic is an appropriation both of Herman Dooyeweerd’s 
definition of scholasticism and of Dooyeweerd’s application of this definition 
contra neo-Calvinist theology. Then, based upon our findings regarding the 
nature and the sources of Van Til’s criticisms, we will argue that the critiques are 
invalid due to Van Til’s misguided dialectical, idealistic reconstruction of 
Bavinck’s thought.
A. Van Til’s Critiques of Bavinck’s Thought
1. Dialectical Interpretations of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck’s theology and the wider neo-Calvinist 
theological movement spearheaded by Abraham Kuyper are well known in the 
Copernican line of Van Til scholarship that was introduced in chapter 1 above. 
Specifically, self-styled “Van Tilian” scholars frequently portray their master as a 
2. Both of these points will be demonstrated in chapter 6 below.
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veritable Copernicus who revolutionized Christian apologetics specifically by 
purging the scholasticism of his Reformed predecessors and hence producing for the 
first time ever a truly Reformed approach to metaphysics, epistemology, and 
ethics. Such is the case, for example, with Greg Bahnsen’s interpretation of Van 
Til’s “inward” criticisms of “the teachings . . . of Dutch Reformed authors” such 
as Bavinck.3 Furthermore, K. Scott Oliphint appropriates Van Til’s criticisms of 
the scholasticism in Bavinck’s formulations of epistemological realism and 
argues that
. . . there is in Herman Bavinck’s otherwise most useful analysis of 
epistemology and theological prolegomena a viral infection—call it 
Bavinck’s bug—that, if it spreads, will serve to undermine the basic 
foundation of his own Reformed theology.4
William’s Dennison’s remark exemplifies such Copernican interpretations of Van 
Til’s criticisms of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought:
As most Van Tilians realize, Van Til fought diligently to purge the 
Reformed tradition from the remnants of scholasticism which remained 
in the thought of Old Princeton, Kuyper, and Bavinck.5
Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are therefore a part of the larger hero story 
purported by the Copernican interpretation of Van Til wherein he purportedly 
saves the entire Reformed tradition from the wiles of scholasticism.
3. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 
13-14. Bahnsen lists Van Til’s main criticisms of Bavinck at p. 14n42, yet he makes no attempt to 
analyze them.
4. K. Scott Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck,” in Speaking the Truth 
in Love: The Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 201; cf. the 
expanded version of this article in idem, “Bavinckʼs Realism, The Logos Principle, and Sola 
Scriptura,” Westminster Theological Journal 72, no. 2 (2010): 359-90.
5. William D. Dennison, “Analytic Philosophy and Van Tilʼs Epistemology,” Westminster  
Theological Journal 57, no. 1 (1995): 55. Compare Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic, 13-16, 542. Contrast 
the more nuanced, critical assessment of John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His 
Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 339-52, and the non-revolutionary, albeit too brief, 
assessment of John R. Muether, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman, American 
Reformed Biographies (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 56.
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Not every interpretation of Van Til’s critiques of scholasticism follows the 
Copernican approach, however. Most notably, as we saw in chapter 1 above, 
Brian Mattson has recently analyzed Van Til’s various critiques of Bavinck at 
some length and has concluded that they are largely superficial, misdirected, and 
hence invalid.6 Additionally, William Masselink argues that, far from trimming 
select scholastic twigs from from the Reformed theological tree, Van Til, insofar 
as he makes common cause with the “reconstructionists,” aims his anti-scholastic 
axe at the very roots of neo-Calvinist theology (i.e., Kuyper, Bavinck, and 
Valentine Hepp (1879–1950)):
Instead of reconstruction, we seem to face some destruction. Instead of 
relieving the “Kuyper tree of some unhealthy twigs,” to use Schilder’s 
phraseology, they [i.e., the “reconstructionists,” including Schilder, 
Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, and Van Til7] have, according to my thinking, 
severed some of the roots upon which the life of the tree depends. 
Instead of removing a few loose shingles from the roof of the calvinistic 
structure of science, they have, I am afraid, dislodged or attempted to 
dislodge some of the foundation stones upon which the whole building 
rests.8
Two nearly opposite approaches to Van Til’s criticisms are therefore evident in 
the scholarship. On the one hand, the Copernican scholars hold up these 
criticisms as the pinnacle of Van Til’s Copernican revolution, as if Van Til saved 
Reformed theology in general and of Bavinck’s theology in particular from 
scholasticism. On the other hand, at least two scholars find Van Til’s criticisms of 
Bavinck’s thought to be less than convincing. This dialectical tension in the 
6. Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck: An Assessment,” Westminster Theological Journal 70, 
no. 1 (2008): 111-127.
7. William Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace: A Defense of the Historic Reformed 
Faith Over Against the Theology and Philosophy of the So-called “Reconstructionist” Movement (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1953), 12.
8. William Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 15. Masselink views Van Til’s 
apologetics as a “departure from Machen’s and Warfield’s apologetics as well as from Kuyper, 
Bavinck, and Hepp. . .” (p. 13).
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secondary scholarship mirrors the dialectal tension evident in Van Til’s 
simultaneous pervasive appropriations and totalizing criticisms of Bavinck’s 
thought.
Since Van Til’s main criticisms of Bavinck’s thought have been treated at 
length by Mattson, there is no need for a detailed analysis of every point of the 
various criticisms. However, Mattson’s analysis needs to be expanded in several 
ways. First, Mattson does not cover all of Van Til’s criticisms. Arguably, he omits 
the two most important sources of Van Til’s criticisms: (1) Common Grace and the  
Gospel and (2) Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics; for, within these 
works Van Til provides clues to the motivation behind his criticisms. Second, 
although Mattson briefly analyzes Van Til’s review of R. H. Bremmer’s first book 
on Bavinck, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, he omits Van Til’s review of 
Bremmer’s second book, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten. As will be 
demonstrated below, due to this omission Mattson draws a false conclusion on 
an important point of Van Til’s analysis of Bavinck’s thought. Third, Mattson 
does not analyze the crux of all of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck’s 
theological and epistemological formulations. Beyond the the obvious fact that 
Van Til misreads and misrepresents Bavinck’s thought at several points, much 
more needs to be said about why he criticizes Bavinck’s thought in such a 
perfunctory manner and why he chooses the topics of principia and epistemology 
as the main heads for his critiques. Mattson helpfully and correctly elucidates 
several aspects of the that, but he sheds little light on the why. Therefore, we must 
first survey the full scope of Van Til’s criticisms before we can attempt to shed 
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light on why Van Til levels these criticisms in the first place.
2. Criticisms in An Introduction to Systematic Theology9
“Herman Bavinck has given to us,” writes Van Til at the beginning of the 
chapter that is devoted to criticizing Herman Bavinck’s and Valentine Hepp’s 
formulations of theological epistemology,
the greatest and most comprehensive statement of Reformed systematic 
theology in modern times. In this chapter we wish to note something of 
the breadth and depth of Bavinck’s presentation, and then point out 
where we believe he might have gone somewhat further than he has 
along the path that he has laid out for us.10
Van Til proceeds to praise Bavinck’s insistence upon a threefold principa for 
dogmatics: (1) God is the sole source of human knowledge, (2) Holy Scripture is 
the sole external principle of theology, and (3) believing reason is the sole internal 
principle of theology.11 Yet, this praise serves as the terminus a quo for Van Til’s 
criticisms; for, he argues that Bavinck contradicts his own principia in several 
ways.12 According to Van Til, Bavinck’s catalog of self-contradictions includes the 
following metaphysical formulations: (1) Bavinck fails to escape Thomas 
Aquinas’ influence with respect to realism, and Bavinck thus falls prey to 
appealing “to facts as though they were brute facts when it comes to the 
formulation of a theory of metaphysics.”13 (2) Bavinck’s critique of idealism fails 
to go far enough; for, since he “does not tell us that the basis of his criticism is the 
9. Cf. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 123-27.
10. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of  
Revelation, Scripture, and God, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2007), 89.
11. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 89-91.
12. Van Til repeats this self-contradiction argument against Bavinck elsewhere. E.g., see idem, 
A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 20.
13. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 92.
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presupposition of the self-existent God,”14 and since he approvingly cites a quip 
by Aquinas regarding knowledge of heavenly things, Bavinck falls prey to both 
an anti-Christian, “Aristotelian notion of gradation in the created universe” and 
an anti-Christian “Greek depreciation of the things of the sense world.”15 (3) By 
following the metaphysical realism of Aquinas and Gijsbert Voetius (1589–1676), 
Bavinck fails “to distinguish carefully a Christian epistemology from the non-
Christian epistemology.”16 (4) Likewise, with respect to scholasticism in general, 
Bavinck fails to reject “its principle of commingling Aristotelianism with 
Christian principles.”17 Thus Bavinck’s formulation of “moderate realism” is “not 
a specifically Christian position based upon the presupposition of the existence 
of the God of Scripture.”18
In addition to these four arguments against Bavinck’s metaphysical 
formulations, Van Til continues his catalog of criticisms with the following 
allegations against what he views as “the weakest point”19 in Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek, namely, the self-contradictions in Bavinck’s epistemological 
formulations: (1) On the one hand, Bavinck roots human knowledge in the Logos 
of creation. Yet, on the other hand, Bavinck follows Thomas Aquinas who 
“trimmed Aristotle’s principles down but did not reject the foundation on which 
they were built.”20 Bavinck is thus guilty of mixing pagan Greek philosophy with 
Christian theology. (2) With respect to natural reason Bavinck follows Aquinas’ 
14. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 92.
15. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 92-93; quotes at p. 93.
16. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 94.
17. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 94.
18. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 95.
19. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 95.
20. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 95-96; quote at p. 96.
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formulation of knowing per participationeum—a formulation that “has not cut 
itself free from its monistic origin in Platonic Aristotelian thought.” Hence 
Bavinck falls prey to “the half-Christian, half-Greek speculation of Thomas.”21
3. Criticisms in The Defense of the Faith22
Similar to his critiques in An Introduction to Systematic Theology, the structure 
of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck’s thought in The Defense of the Faith 
proceeds from praise to polemic. The praise part can be seen, for example, in Van 
Til’s summary of the first section of the book wherein he lauds Bavinck’s 
formulation of the Reformed worldview (along with Hodge’s and Warfield’s):
It is on the basis of the work of such men as Charles Hodge, Herman 
Bavinck, and B. B. Warfield, to mention no others, that we have 
formulated the broad outline of the Reformed life and world view. It is 
only by the help of such men that we have been enabled to attain to 
anything like a consistent Protestantism.23
The praise is further evident in a similar passage wherein Van Til appropriates 
Bavinck’s thought (along with Hodge’s, Warfield’s, and Kuyper’s) as a polemic 
against Roman Catholic and Arminian theology:
The one great defect of the Roman Catholic and the Arminian view is, as 
noted, that it ascribes ultimacy or self-sufficiency to the mind of man. 
Romanism and Arminianism do this in their views of man as stated in 
their works on systematic theology. It is consistent for them, therefore, 
not to challenge the assumption of ultimacy as this is made by the non-
believer. But Reformed theology, as worked out by Calvin and his recent 
exponents such as Hodge, Warfield, Kuyper and Bavinck, holds that 
man’s mind is derivative.24
21. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 96-98; quotes at p. 97 and p. 98, 
respectively.
22. Cf. Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 116-23. Note, however, that Mattson does not 
cover all of the critiques that Van Til levels against Bavinck throughout The Defense of the Faith.
23. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
P&R, 2008), 103.
24. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 113; Also cf. p. 276.
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Additionally, in chapter ten Van Til summarizes his apologetic methodology in 
such a way that praise precedes his criticisms:
If Christian theism is not true then nothing is true. Is the God of the Bible 
satisfied if his servants say anything less?
And have I, following such a method, departed radically from the 
tradition of Kuyper and Bavinck? On the contrary have learned all this 
primarily from them. It is Kuyper’s Encyclopedia that has, more than any 
other work in modern times, brought out the fact of the difference 
between the approach of the believer and of the unbeliever. It is 
Bavinck’s monumental work which set a natural theology frankly 
oriented to Scripture squarely over against that of Romanism which is 
based on neutral reason. It is Bavinck who taught me that the proofs for 
God as usually formulated on the traditional method prove a finite god. I 
have indeed had the temerity to maintain that these great Reformed 
theologians have in some points not been quite true to their own 
principles. But when I have done so I have usually tried to point out that 
when they did so and to the extent that they did so they had departed 
from Calvin.25
Van Til uses these statements of praise as the terminus a quo for his various 
criticisms of Bavinck’s alleged self-contradictions—contradictions which Van Til 
thinks are rooted in Bavinck’s invalid attempt to synthesize Reformed and 
Roman Catholic thought. Ironically, on the one hand Van Til praises the “main 
thrust” of Bavinck’s theology as being against the “scholastic synthesis” of 
“Aristotle and Christ.”26 Yet, on the other hand, he levels the following criticisms 
against the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought.
3.1. Chapter 8: A Brief Excursus on Sources
Due to the fact that many portions of The Defense of the Faith are 
concatenations of extended citations from Van Til’s various syllabi, a brief note 
on the sources of chapter eight is necessary. Van Til begins the chapter by noting 
25. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 264.
26. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 286.
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that most of the material herein is “taken verbatim from a syllabus on A Christian 
Theory of Knowledge.”27 This 1954 syllabus was later divided and published in two 
separate books: A Christian Theory of Knowledge28 and The Defense of the Faith. The 
latter has been published in four editions, two unabridged29 and two abridged.30 
Furthermore, within The Defense of the Faith the portion of chapter eight which 
contains Van Til’s criticism of Bavinck’s theology is comprised of an extended 
citation from Van Til’s book, Common Grace, which itself is a concatenation of 
three articles which Van Til published in the Westminster Theological Journal.31 
Additionally, Common Grace was later published within Van Til’s expanded 
treatment of the same topic—Common Grace and the Gospel.32 For simplicity’s sake 
the following survey will cite only the fourth edition of The Defense of the Faith.
3.2. Chapter 8: Common Grace and Scholasticism
Van Til alleges that Bavinck and Kuyper fail to overcome the Roman Catholic 
formulation of the concepts of innate knowledge of God (i.e., cognitationes insitae) 
and common notions (i.e., koinai ennoiai and notiones impressae). Specifically, 
Bavinck and Kuyper “sometimes employed the notions of brute fact and of 
abstract universals,” writes Van Til.33 Furthermore, “they also at times adopt in 
their process of reasoning the non-Christian principles of continuity and of 
discontinuity” insofar as “they seek for common notions between believers and 
27. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 171; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1954.K.
28. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1969.G.
29. For the first unabridged edition, cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1955.G; The 2008 4th edition of 
Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, is unabridged and includes added commentary from the editor.
30. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1963.B, 1967.A.
31. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.vv., 1945.D, 1946.F1-2, 1947.C.
32. Cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1972.E.
33. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 184-85; quote at p. 185.
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unbelievers that are not exclusively based upon the idea of the sensus dietatis.”34
They then ignore the difference between the idea of fact and logic as it 
springs from the position that is based upon the notion of the 
autonomous man, and the idea of fact and logic which springs from the 
position that is based upon the notion of the ontological Trinity.35
In sum, then, Bavinck and Kuyper fail to formulate a fully Christian 
epistemology insofar as they accept the Roman Catholic formulation of common 
notions and innate knowledge of God, formulations that Van Til views as invalid 
mixes of pagan philosophy and Christian theology.
3.3. Chapter 13: Amsterdam and Old Princeton36
Staying true to the overall structure of his criticisms against Bavinck’s 
theology, Van Til begins his section on Bavinck by praising Bavinck’s insistence 
upon Holy Scripture “as the principium unicum of the Christian.”37 Then Van Til 
levels an allegation to the effect that Bavinck contradicts his own principium:
In spite of this stress on the Scripture as self-attesting and as such the 
primary principle for the interpretation of man and the world, Bavinck 
too [i.e., in addition to Kuyper] sometimes reverts to the idea that man 
can without this principle interpret much of experience truly.38
Van Til catalogs Bavinck’s contradictions as follows: (1) Despite his insistence 
upon Scripture as the principium unicum, Bavinck sometimes argues from the 
principum of “self-consciousness as such” without any attempt to relate this 
34. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 186.
35. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 186.
36. With respect to the material content of this chapter, note Van Til’s remark in The Defense of  
the Faith, 345n1: “Most of the material in this chapter is taken from the syllabus on A Christian 
Theory of Knowledge.”
37. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 374.
38. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 374.
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principium to God or to Christ.39 (2) Within his 1908 Princeton Stone Lectures40 
Bavinck omits the doctrines of creation and providence in order to meet 
philosophers on their own terms.41 (3) Bavinck employs abstract (i.e., non-
Christian) definitions of the terms “real” and “ideal” in his use of the phrase, 
“the unity of real and ideal being.”42 (4) Bavinck contradicts his own views of 
innate and acquired knowledge and of general revelation since he seeks to “start 
with the cogito as such as the foundation of human knowledge.”43 (5) Bavinck 
fails to properly relate natural and special revelation insofar as he follows 
Thomas Aquinas’ formulation “that supernatural revelation is necessary for man 
because natural revelation is uncertain.”44 (6) Likewise, because Bavinck follows 
Aquinas, he unduly lowers the claims of the objective clarity of general 
revelation. Hence he admits that the Christian “has no compelling proofs for his 
position,” only probabilities.45 (7) Contrary to his own Reformed theology, 
Bavinck starts with the foundation of Descartes’ “cogito as such” and then builds 
up a “piecemeal” argument from the causal argument to the teleological 
argument and then to the ontological argument.46 Van Til concludes accordingly:
. . . surely we must not follow Bavinck when, starting from man as 
ultimate, he leads on to an ultimate Cause that is not clearly God, to an 
ultimate Purpose that is not clearly God’s, and to an ultimate Being who 
does not help us out of the vicious circle of our thought.47
39. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 374-75; quote at p. 375.
40. Herman Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation: The Stone Lectures for 1908-1909, Princeton  
Theological Seminary (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908).
41. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 375.
42. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 375-76; citing Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation, 61.
43. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 376.
44. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 376-77; quote at p. 377.
45. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 377-78; quote at p. 377.
46. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 378-79.
47. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 379.
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In sum, Van Til charges Bavinck for appropriating Descartes’ anti-Christian cogito 
and then building upon this autonomous epistemological foundation a schema 
of proofs for God’s existence that at best proves only the probability of God’s 
existence rather than demonstrates the necessity of God’s existence as the 
ultimate precondition for all truth.
4. Criticisms in Common Grace and the Gospel
Despite the fact that some of the material within Common Grace and the Gospel 
is recapitulated in An Introduction to Systematic Theology and The Defense of the  
Faith, Van Til’s longest and most detailed criticisms are found herein. 
Furthermore, the context of these criticisms is important background material for 
chapter 6 below. Additionally, Van Til insinuates that Common Grace and the  
Gospel contains his definitive critique of Bavinck’s errors.48 Thus for our purposes 
it is important to survey these criticisms despite a few repetitions.
4.1. The Context of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck’s thought throughout Common Grace and the  
Gospel are set within the context of his interpretation of the American debate 
regarding the Three Points on common grace issued by the 1924 Synod of the 
Christian Reformed Church in North America. He divides the parties of the 
debate as follows:
Broadly speaking there are in this latest struggle three parties. (a) There 
are those who would cling quite closely to the traditional, that is, the 
48. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, 
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974), 3:31: “For a fuller understanding of the nature of 
the scholasticism that faced Dooyeweerd as he began his work, a consideration of Herman 
Bavinck’s views would be helpful. But I must refer the reader to my Common Grace and the Gospel 
for a discussion of Bavinck’s views.”
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Kuyper-Bavinck point of view. Professor V. Hepp of the Free University 
of Amsterdam may be said to be the leading representative here. (b) 
There are those who deny common grace. Herman Hoeksema is now the 
recognized leader of this group. (c) There are those who would not deny 
common grace, nor yet affirm it in its traditional form, but reconstruct it. 
Dr. K. Schilder may be said to represent this group.49
For reasons that will become apparent in chapter 6 below, it is important to 
highlight two points regarding the context of Van Til’s criticisms. In the first 
place, Van Til explicates the third party in terms of a larger theological and 
philosophical reconstruction movement that seeks both to build upon the 
traditional Kuyper-Bavinck position and to rebuild “certain abstractions” that 
threaten the stability of that position:
The reconstruction effort [of Schilder] is closely related to a broad 
movement in theology and philosophy which attempts to build up the 
traditional Reformed position while yet to an extent rebuilding it. The 
Philosophy of Sphere Sovereignty of Professors H. Dooyeweerd and D. 
H. Th. Vollenhoven represents a part of this movement. It seeks to 
appreciate the concrete approach that Kuyper has given to the problems 
of theology and philosophy without clinging to certain abstractions that 
he retained.50
He then references an article by Dooyeweerd51 and a booklet by Cornelis 
Veenhof52 as exemplars of this theological and philosophical reconstruction 
movement. The importance of Dooyeweerd’s article with respect to Van Til’s 
criticisms of Bavinck’s theology will be analyzed below.
In the second place, Van Til aligns himself with this reconstruction 
movement by appropriating a major aspect of Schilder’s critique of Kuyper’s 
49. Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Pub. Co., 1972), 23.
50. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 23.
51. Herman Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939): 193-
232.
52. Cornelis Veenhof, In Kuyperʼs lijn (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1939).
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formulation of common grace—concrete vs. abstract thinking. Hence Van Til 
comments upon Schilder’s book, Wat is de Hemel?,53 as follows: “The whole thrust 
of his [I.e, Schilder’s] thinking,” writes Van Til, “is an effort to proceed 
concretely.”54 Similarly, Van Til remarks:
The contribution made in this book is of great value. This contribution 
consists in stressing the need of concrete procedure in all our theological 
thinking.55
Even though Van Til is critical of certain aspects of Schilder’s formulations, he 
nevertheless appropriates Schilder’s concrete-vs.-abstract thinking motif, and he 
then uses this motif as the paradigm according to which he levels critiques 
against Bavinck’s theology. Hence he introduces his criticisms as follows:
It would seem to be obvious that if we are to avoid thinking abstractly on 
the common grace problem, we must seek to avoid thinking abstractly in 
the whole of our theological and philosophical effort. Perhaps the first 
question we should ask ourselves is whether the Kuyper-Bavinck form 
of theological statement in general, in which nearly all, if not all, who 
have been engaged in the recent common grace debate have been 
nurtured, does not, to some extent at least, suffer from the disease of 
abstraction. Perhaps the physicians have not altogether escaped the 
disease against which they have inoculated others. As a grateful patient 
it is my duty now to assert that in my humble judgment such is the 
case.56
Furthermore, later on in the book where Van Til responds to William Masselink 
he insinuates that he does belong to the so-called “reconstruction theology” 
movement led by Schilder and Dooyeweerd.57
Though he does not spell out herein the significance of this reconstruction 
53. Klaas Schilder, Wat is de Hemel? (Kampen: Kok, 1935); translated and condensed as idem, 
Heaven: What Is It? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1950).
54. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 24.
55. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 25.
56. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 34.
57. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 148ff.
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movement with respect to his own criticisms of Bavinck, it is important to note 
that Van Til recognizes that he is not the only theologian leveling critiques 
against Kuyper, Bavinck, and other neo-Calvinist thinkers. Van Til’s relation to 
this reconstruction movement is highly significant, and one salient aspect of this 
relation will be examined in the following chapter—Van Til’s appropriation of 
Herman Dooyeweerd’s formulations regarding scholasticism.
4.2. The Catalog of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til summarizes the basic thrust of his criticisms against Bavinck (along 
with Kuyper and Hepp) in terms of his abstract-vs.-concrete motif. Specifically, 
he links Bavinck’s abstract thinking with an alleged Roman Catholic synthesis of 
Aristotelian and Christian thought:
Rome’s semi-Aristotelian epistemology influences, and accords with, its 
semi-Aristotelian ethics. Rome’s notion of the common area of Reason 
between believers and non-believers controls its conception of the 
common cardinal virtues. So also what Kuyper and Bavinck think of the 
reprobate’s knowledge of God will influence what they think of the 
reprobate’s deeds before God. We shall seek to intimate, be it all too 
briefly, that in the epistemology of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp there are 
remnants of an abstract way of thinking that we shall need to guard 
against in our common grace discussion.58
After stating generally that Bavinck mixes Aristotle and Christ, Van Til alleges 
several specific instances of Bavinck’s commingling.
In the first place, Bavinck at times contradicts his own affirmation of Holy 
Scripture as the sole principium externum of theology. He does this by adopting “a 
moderate realism.”59 Specifically, “by accepting what he calls the good of 
empiricism and what he calls the good of rationalism, and dropping the evil of 
58. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 34.
59. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 44-45; quote at p. 45.
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both,” argues Van Til, Bavinck makes common cause with “non-Christian 
realists” over against rationalism and with “non-Christian rationalists” over 
against empiricism.60
But, we object, the abstract principles of rationalism are not made 
concrete by bringing them into relation with the brute facts of 
empiricism, and the brute facts of empiricism are not made accessible by 
bringing them into relation with the abstract principles of rationalism.61
Van Til thus concludes that with respect to the principia of theology Bavinck falls 
prey to abstract thinking. In other words, he “does not make a thorough break 
with Scholasticism.”62
In the second place, a concomitant of his failure to make a clean break with 
scholasticism is that Bavinck fails to provide a Christian formulation of the 
incomprehensibility of God. Instead, his view is “obtained in part by Christian, 
and in part by non-Christian, principles of reasoning.”63 Thus Van Til asserts that 
on this point Bavinck’s view should be replaced with Calvin’s:
With all our admiration for Bavinck we yet found that he allowed 
himself to be influenced by the Greek ideal of the comprehension of God. 
This ideal works havoc with true Reformed theology. Perhaps we may 
here learn anew from the greatest of theologians, John Calvin.64
In the third place, a further concomitant of Bavinck’s scholasticism is that in his 
formulation of the theistic proofs (1) he “has not altogether cut himself loose 
from non-Christian forms of reasoning” and (2) he fails “to show that this 
procedure [i.e., the epistemological procedure of the autonomous man] is 
60. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 45.
61. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 45.
62. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 45.
63. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 46-47; quote at p. 47.
64. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64-65.
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basically mistaken.”65 Bavinck’s formulation of the proofs is thus
very similar to the old Princeton position, and both are very similar to 
the Scholastic position. There are differences in degree between these 
three positions, but they agree in holding that all reasoning about 
Christian theism must be done on “common” ground. . . . For all his 
effort to the contrary, Bavinck sometimes seems to offer us a natural 
theology of a kind similar to that offered by the church of Rome.66
Additionally, Van Til avers that Bavinck fails to challenge the Roman Catholic 
view of natural theology since he fails to “presuppose the ontological trinity” 
before treating the theistic proofs.67 Such a failure has catastrophic consequences 
for Bavinck’s theology; for, according to Van Til, “unless we may make this 
presupposition, all human predication is meaningless.”68 In sum, Bavinck’s 
adherence to the Roman Catholic formulation of the theistic proofs and hence to 
the Roman Catholic view of natural theology undergirding the theistic proofs 
contradicts “the real position of Bavinck,” namely, that the “Christian must stand 
with both feet upon the bed-rock of special revelation in his study of nature.”69
In the fourth place, yet another concomitant of his failure to overcome 
scholasticism is that Bavinck’s view of the innate knowledge of God is not fully 
Christian. Bavinck contradicts his own principia by allowing for “the idea of brute 
facts of Empiricism and the idea of abstract universals of Rationalism.”70 Using 
an idiosyncratic distinction between psychological and epistemological innate 
knowledge of God, Van Til poses the following question:
Psychologically there are no atheistic men; epistemologically every 
65. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 47-48; quote at p. 48.
66. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 48-49; quote at p. 49.
67. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 49.
68. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 49.
69. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 50-51; quote at p. 51.
70. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 51-52; quote at p. 52.
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sinner is atheistic. Has Bavinck kept this fact in mind?71
He answers with a resounding negative:
Bavinck speaks of Cicero as saying that that on which all men agree, 
because of their common nature, cannot be wrong. Cicero no doubt 
meant that there is some basis of agreement between all men, 
epistemologically as well as psychologically. That is to say, for Cicero 
there was an area of common interpretation, however small, in which all 
men are epistemologically in agreement. It is on such notions as those of 
Cicero that Roman Catholic natural theology is built. Bavinck has not 
always kept this point in mind.72
After further detailing Bavinck’s allegedly Roman Catholic—and hence non-
Christian— view of humanity’s innate knowledge of God,73 Van Til concludes by 
summarizing the entire catalog of his critiques:
Taken in its entirety, the section dealing with the cognitio Dei insita has 
not escaped the ambiguity that we found in Bavinck’s general treatment 
of the principia in science, in his conception of mystery, and in his 
conception of the theistic proofs. It is the same ambiguity throughout 
that meets us. And it is the same ambiguity that we have found in 
Kuyper. These men have certainly led the way in modern times in the 
direction of working out a truly Protestant theology. But they have not 
quite had the courage to go consistently along the path they have 
marked out for us. There are elements of abstract reasoning in their 
procedure that lead to a natural theology which is not consistently set 
over against the natural theology of Rome at every point. When they 
deal with the objective aspect of the matter, that is with the revelational 
question, they cater, to some extent, to the idea of a probability position. 
This probability position is the result of seeking for truth in the abstract 
way, combining impersonal principles with brute facts. When they deal 
with the subjective aspect of the matter, with the common ideas, they do 
not make a clear-cut, ringing distinction between that which is 
psychologically revelational and that which is epistemologically 
interpretative.74
In the fifth place, over against Bavinck’s allegedly abstract thinking Van Til 
proposes another idiosyncratic formulation, namely, the doctrine of the trinity as 
71. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 52-54; quote at p. 54.
72. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 54.
73. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 54-57.
74. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 57-58.
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the epistemological “concrete universal.”
What has been said by way of criticism on the remnants of abstract 
thinking found in Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp has virtually suggested 
the direction of thought we would follow in approaching the question of 
common grace. The ontological trinity will be our interpretative concept 
everywhere. God is our concrete universal; in Him thought and being are 
coterminous, in Him the problem of knowledge is solved.
If we begin thus with the ontological trinity as our concrete 
universal, we frankly differ from every school of philosophy and from 
every school of science not merely in our conclusions, but in our starting-
point and in our method as well. For us the facts are what they are, and 
the universals are what they are, because of their common dependence 
upon the ontological trinity. Thus, as earlier discussed, the facts are 
correlative to the universals. Because of this correlativity there is genuine 
progress in history; because of it the Moment has significance.75
5. A Brief Criticism in The Sovereignty of Grace
In this book Van Til briefly criticizes Bavinck’s “critical realism” as a 
devolution into Roman Catholic natural theology and hence a departure from 
Reformed theology:
In recent times Bavinck, much as he stressed the “ethical” character of 
the Reformation, none-the-less, developed a philosophical prolegomena 
in which he developed a critical realism. In this he followed Thomas 
Aquinas.76
This brief example displays the consistency of Van Til’s overall criticism of 
Bavinck’s theology, namely, that the root of Bavinck’s errors is his affinity for 
scholasticism à la Thomas Aquinas.
6. Criticisms in “Bavinck the Theologian” and “As I think of Bavinck”
In 1961 and 1966, respectively, Van Til wrote review articles for both of R. H. 
Bremmer’s books: Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus and Herman Bavinck en zijn  
75. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64.
76. Cornelius Van Til, The Sovereignty of Grace: An Appraisal of G. C. Berkouwer’s View of Dordt 
(Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1969), 28.
159
tijdgenoten.77 In these review articles Van Til does not level any new criticisms 
against Bavinck’s thought. Nevertheless, these articles are appropriate to 
consider under the heading of Van Til’s criticisms since in both he affirms 
Bremmer’s main criticism of Bavinck’s thought—scholasticism.
Mattson makes two assertions regarding Van Til’s first review article: (1) He 
claims that Van Til fails to write on the assigned topic—Bremmer’s book—and 
instead levels unrelated critiques against the theological formulations of Herman 
Dooyeweerd, Karl Barth, and Jan Lever. (2) He claims that Van Til grants 
Bremmer’s allegation of scholasticism in Bavinck’s theology largely for the sake 
of argument.78 Both assertions, however, are misguided.
In the first place, Van Til’s conclusion undermines both of Mattson’s claims. 
Referring to Bremmer’s books, Van Til writes:
The two volumes together will, no doubt, prove to be of great help not 
only for the understanding of Bavinck but also for an appreciation of the 
double-headed fact that (a) we must be true followers of Bavinck in order, 
then, to go beyond him, and (b) to avoid Bavinck’s tendency toward 
Scholasticism we must be alert to the deadly danger of modern 
activism.79
The whole point of the article is to vindicate this “double-headed fact.” 
Accordingly, Van Til clearly agrees with Bremmer’s assessment that it is time to 
go beyond Bavinck’s scholasticism, and he disagrees only with Lever’s, 
Dooyeweerd’s, and Barth’s invalid attempts to do so insofar as these 
contemporary theologians ground their formulations in “the deadly danger of 
77. Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological  
Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 48-64; a review of R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus 
(Kampen: Kok, 1961); and Cornelius Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” International Reformed 
Bulletin 9, no. 27 (1966): 19-26; a review of R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en zijn tijdgenoten 
(Kampen: Kok, 1966).
78. Brian G. Mattson, “Van Til on Bavinck,” 115.
79. Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian,” 64; emphasis added.
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modern activism.” Van Til therefore does not fail to write on the assigned topic; 
rather, he affirms Bremmer’s critique of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought 
and then analyzes Lever’s, Dooyeweerd’s, and Barth’s formulations according to 
Bremmer’s premise.
Furthermore, in Van Til’s review of Bremmer’s second book—which review 
Mattson omits—Van Til explicitly affirms Bremmer’s criticism of the 
scholasticism in Bavinck’s dogmatics: “Bremmer’s criticism of Bavinck is 
legitimate,” he writes. “We do well to go beyond Bavinck by dropping the 
remnants of Thomistic realism still present in his thought.”80 
Additionally, throughout his second review article Van Til recapitulates the 
“double-headed fact” motif from his first article, albeit without using the term. 
Thus, on the one hand, Van Til criticizes the “internal inconsistency” in Bavinck’s 
thought:
We have dwelt on this internal inconsistency in Bavinck’s theology 
because it illustrates, we believe, a measure of ambiguity that appears in 
his theology at various places.81
Then, on the other hand, he immediately adds a caveat:
But our negative attitude toward Bavinck must be based upon a positive 
attitude toward what was, after all, his basic approach, and that was his 
simple assumption of the direct revelation of God in history through 
Christ and his Word as found in Scripture.82
Van Til’s recapitulation of the “double-headed fact” motif regarding Bavinck’s 
“internal inconsistency” is therefore obvious.
Moreover, with respect to Van Til’s seemingly unrelated digressions on B. B. 
80. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 24.
81. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 22.
82. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 24.
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Warfield, Foppe M. ten Hoor, and Karl Barth,83 these discussions, like those 
found in Van Til’s first review article, are not instances of his failing to write on 
the assigned topic. Rather, he brings these thinkers under his purview in order to 
use them as foils for vindicating his “double-headed-fact” interpretation of 
Bavinck’s theology. Thus, on the one hand, he vehemently denies that Barth’s 
dialectical theology is a valid advancement beyond Bavinck’s scholasticism:
We could wish that those who want to go “beyond Bavinck” à la Barth 
would simply tell us that they are done with Bavinck. But we do not 
really want them to seek for an impossible fusion of the Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek and the Kirchliche Dogmatik. We really hope that hey will learn 
to challenge the Christ of modern subjectivism as he is set forth in the 
Dogmatik by the Christ of the Scriptures as he is in the Dogmatiek.84
Nevertheless, on the other hand, he affirms Bremmer’s evaluation regarding the 
need to overcome Bavinck’s scholasticism. “To go beyond Bavinck in this 
fashion,” he writes, “may also bear rich fruit for Christian apologetics.” 
Ironically, the “fashion” that Van Til puts forth as the valid way to advance 
beyond Bavinck is “the Christ of the Scriptures as he is in the Dogmatiek.” For Van 
Til, therefore, the way to overcome Bavinck’s scholasticism is to follow Bavinck’s 
non-scholastic theology! Hence the dialectical nature of the “double-headed fact.”
7. Criticisms in Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics
In his 1974 syllabus on Herman Dooyeweerd’s Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Van 
Til mostly reiterates his earlier criticisms against the scholasticism in Bavinck’s 
theology rather than leveling new critiques. Nevertheless, this syllabus is highly 
significant for understanding the why behind the that of Van Til’s criticisms; for, 
83. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 22-25.
84. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 25.
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herein Van Til explicitly connects his criticisms of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s 
thought with Herman Dooyeweerd’s earlier criticisms of the scholasticism in 
Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Jan Wolter’s thought. Building upon Dooyeweerd’s 
analysis, for example, Van Til writes, “Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck 
still have not altogether escaped the Thomistic-Aquinian position.”85 This 
important connection between Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s criticisms will be 
analyzed in the following chapter. For our present purpose of cataloging Van 
Til’s critiques, we will simply summarize his criticisms. 
Van Til’s dialectical analysis of Bavinck’s “double-headed fact” is clearly 
evident throughout this syllabus; for, he lauds several aspects of Bavinck’s 
theology before recapitulating his earlier criticisms. 
Regarding Bavinck’s positives, Van Til avers: (1) Bavinck provides great help 
in formulating “a truly Reformed theology along the lines of the Reformation 
principle.” (2) Bavinck provides the theological paragon for “a truly biblical view 
of the immanent or ontological trinity as the presupposition of the intelligibility 
of human experience.” (3) “[N]o one brought out more forcibly than did 
Bavinck” the doctrine of God’s incomprehensibility and its implications for both 
Christians and non-Christians. (4) Since all of man’s knowledge is covenantal, 
then Bavinck has correctly argued that “mystery is the life element of 
dogmatics.” (5) Bavinck correctly affirms that since humanity is the image of 
God, then humans have an “ineradicable” and “certain” knowledge of God.86
Despite these positives, Van Til maintains that “Bavinck, as well as Kuyper 
85. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
86. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:10.
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has not cut himself fully free from scholastic methodology.”87 Citing passages 
from his Common Grace syllabus, he alleges the following evidence for Bavinck’s 
non-Christian scholasticism: (1) Bavinck waffles between Christian and non-
Christian philosophies of fact and law. (2) Bavinck adopts a non-Christian form 
of “moderate realism.” (3) Bavinck’s formulations of God’s incomprehensibility 
sometimes devolve into invalid syntheses of Christian thought and pagan 
philosophy rather than maintaining the antithesis between Christian and non-
Christian formulations. (4) Bavinck’s formulation of the theistic proofs fails to 
show that the methodology underlying the proofs is fundamentally misguided. 
Thus Bavinck’s formulation of the proofs contradicts Calvin’s. (5) Bavinck’s 
formulation of humanity’s innate knowledge of God is Roman Catholic rather 
than Christian; for, Bavinck illegitimately employs brute facts from non-Christian 
empiricism and abstract universals from non-Christian rationalism.88
No small measure of perplexity attends Van Til’s “double-headed” praises 
and criticisms in this section; for, nearly all of the positives that he lists herein are 
also leveled as criticisms either on the very next page or in Van Til’s other 
writings that we surveyed above!
Additionally, a few pages later Van Til recapitulates and comments upon the 
criticisms he leveled against Bavinck’s theology in An Introduction to Systematic  
Theology: (1) Bavinck’s realism is “unusable for apologetic purposes” since it falls 
prey to the same defects as Scottish common sense realism. (2) Bavinck mixes 
Christian and non-Christian views of certainty. (3) Bavinck affirms the pagan, 
87. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:11.
88. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:11.
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Greek view of universals.89 “Thomas Aquinas,” summarizes Van Til, 
trimmed Aristotle’s principles down but did not reject the foundation on 
which they were built. To an extent, this is also true of Bavinck. He has 
largely followed Thomas in this aspect. Accordingly, he tells us at one 
moment that our certainty lies in the Logos of creation, but then forgets 
about the Logos in the course of his argumentation and makes certainty 
to exist merely in the fact that there are a priori principles regardless of 
the foundation of these principles.
Here the idea of a “metaphysical archetypal intellect,” the idea of 
making an “appeal to the analytic judgment” with all that is implied in 
them is clearly identified, in thought-content if not in words, and rejected 
as being a foreign element in Bavinck’s thinking.90
Van Til’s “double-headed” analysis is clearly evident herein; for, he labels his 
critiques of Bavinck’s theology as merely “a friendly Auseinandersetzung.”91 
Furthermore, Van Til insists that even though Bavinck fell under the scholastic 
spell of Aquinas, the seed of the “authentic Bavinck”—the Bavinck who insists 
that natural revelation cannot be understood apart from Scripture—can still be 
found beneath the inauthentic Bavinck’s scholastic shell.92 
For these very reasons, however, Van Til’s dialectical analysis is all the more 
perplexing. On the one hand, Van Til consistently portrays Bavinck’s 
epistemology as a corrupt mix of pagan and Christian thought. Yet, on the other 
hand, he views his own criticisms of Bavinck’s thought as a mere 
Auseinandersetzung between truly Christian brothers. Van Til’s criticisms are thus 
tacitly attended at every point by two nagging questions: Does Bavinck really 
have two heads? And if so, then can Bavinck’s non-scholastic seed be separated 
so easily from his scholastic husk?
89. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19.
90. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19-20.
91. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19.
92. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:21.
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B. Summary
1. The Crux of Van Til’s Criticisms
Van Til’s various criticisms of Bavinck’s theology can be summarized in one 
word—scholasticism. Van Til uses this term to represent the opposite of Kuyper’s 
formulation of the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought, 
namely, the synthesis of Christian and non-Christian thought. He presents 
Thomas Aquinas as the paragon of scholasticism; for, according to Van Til, 
Aquinas represents the most robust attempt of any theologian to synthesize 
Christian theology and pagan Greek philosophy. Regarding Bavinck’s adherence 
to scholasticism, Van Til argues that on many points, especially with respect to 
epistemology and theological principa, Bavinck falls prey to Aquinas’ scholastic, 
synthesizing influence. Therefore, to return to Van Til’s daddy-daughter 
metaphor, he feels duty bound to slap his dogmatic daddy in the face; hence, he 
directs several weighty, totalizing objections primarily against Bavinck’s 
scholastic epistemological formulations.
2. Van Til’s Perplexing Self-Evaluation of His Criticisms
In light of the weighty catalog of critiques that Van Til levels against 
Bavinck’s epistemological formulations, his understated self-evaluation of these 
critiques is greatly perplexing. For example, he appears appalled at William 
Masselink’s allegation that Van Til himself has departed from the epistemological 
formulations of “the great Reformed theologians, such as Kuyper, Bavinck, 
Hepp, Warfield, and Machen.”93 He thus exclaims:
93. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155.
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Well, has there been in anything I have ever said or written as much as 
an insinuation that the root of their thinking was not from the Bible?94
Furthermore, after chiding Masselink for misrepresenting his critiques, Van Til 
insists that with respect to old Princeton he has never “expressed a basic 
difference with its theology or its basic epistemology.”95 Likewise, with respect to 
old Amsterdam he insists that he has merely “criticized ‘subdivisions’ of the 
theology of Kuyper and Bavinck.”96 Additionally, as we noted above, elsewhere 
he labels his criticisms of Bavinck as a mere Auseinandersetzung.
The irony both of Van Til’s exclamation and his insistence that he has merely 
criticized subdivisions in Bavinck’s thought is obvious. For, in his catalog of 
criticisms Van Til blatantly and repeatedly levels totalizing objections against the 
scholasticism—the Thomistic synthesis of Greek and Christian thought—that 
allegedly plagues Bavinck’s theology. Does Van Til really think, then, that he has 
never even insinuated that Bavinck’s thinking is not biblically based when, for 
example, he distinguishes his own view from Bavinck’s, Kuyper’s, and Hepp’s 
theology in such totalizing terms as follows:
If we begin thus with the ontological trinity as our concrete universal, we 
frankly differ from every school of philosophy and from every school of 
science not merely in our conclusions, but in our starting-point and in 
our method as well.97
Likewise, can Van Til’s exclamation be taken seriously after he has alleged that 
Bavinck exchanges the Holy Scriptures for Descartes’ anti-Christian cogito as the 
epistemological principium of theology? Additionally, can Van Til’s exclamation 
94. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155.
95. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 155.
96. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 156; citing Simon Jan Ridderbos, Rondom het 
gemene-gratie-probleem (Kampen: Kok, 1949).
97. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64.
167
be taken seriously in light of the totalizing critiques he levels against Bavinck’s 
scholastic, synthesis, Greek-influenced and hence non-Christian thinking which 
he summarizes Bavinck’s errors in statements such as: 
With all our admiration for Bavinck we yet found that he allowed 
himself to be influenced by the Greek ideal of the comprehension of God. 
This ideal works havoc with true Reformed theology.98
Moreover, if Van Til truly criticizes only mere “subdivisions” of Bavinck’s 
thought, then why does he assert that Bavinck’s epistemological formulations are 
“unusable for apologetic purposes”?99 And why do the Copernican interpreters 
of Van Til’s thought allege (1) that Van Til’s apologetics necessarily sets him at 
odds with every modern Reformed theologian and philosopher100 and (2) that a 
“viral bug” threatens to undermine the entirety of Bavinck’s dogmatics?101
3. An Irreducible Dialectic
It is impossible to reconcile fully Van Til’s bipolar statements regarding 
Bavinck’s theology. On the one hand, he lauds Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the 
greatest modern statement of Reformed theology and extols his labors toward 
formulating a Christian view of all areas of life.102 Yet, on the other hand he levels 
totalizing critiques against Bavinck’s “scholasticism,” that is, his affirmation of 
epistemological realism with respect to the principia of theology, as if this 
affirmation is somehow a deadly concession to pagan, anti-Christian, Greek-
based philosophy. Therefore, despite Van Til’s earnest efforts to vindicate his 
98. Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 64-65.
99. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 1:19.
100. Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic, 13-20.
101. Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle.”; idem, “Bavinckʼs Realism.”
102. Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” 26.
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“double-headed fact,” Masselink’s assessment of Van Til’s criticisms is more in 
accord with Van Til’s own statements; for, Van Til clearly attempts more than a 
mere trimming of a few twigs—he attempts to decapitate one of Bavinck’s two 
heads. The dogmatic daddy thus receives far more than a hand slap from his 
apologist daughter. 
The most serious implication of this dialectical tension is that, if Van Til’s 
criticisms of Bavinck’s theology are pressed to their logical conclusion—and 
given Van Til’s proclivity for pressing his theological opponents’ views to their 
logical conclusions, it is difficult to see how else Van Til’s criticisms are to be 
taken than on his own terms of principled consistency—then he seriously 
jeopardizes the validity of his pervasive formal, material, and polemical 
appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as detailed in chapters 2–4 above.
CHAPTER VI. 
VAN TIL’S PRESUPPOSITION IN DEFECTU ET IN EXCESSU (PART 2):
DIALECTICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD’S
WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE
In the previous chapter we surveyed the catalog of critiques that Van Til 
levels against Bavinck’s theology, especially his epistemological formulations, 
and we found that, although Van Til downplays his criticisms as mere intramural 
disputes over secondary points, the critiques themselves are formulated in 
totalizing terms: antithesis vs. synthesis; pure Reformed theology vs. an impure 
scholastic synthesis of Christian theology and Greek philosophy; the authentic, 
non-scholastic Bavinck vs. the neo-Thomist, scholastic Bavinck. Additionally, we 
noted that Van Til asserts that a “double-headed fact” must govern one’s 
approach to Bavinck’s thought. Thus, on the one hand, Van Til insists that we 
must go beyond Bavinck’s scholastic formulations; yet, on the other hand, he 
maintains that the only way to go beyond Bavinck’s scholasticism is to follow 
Bavinck’s own non-scholastic principles. We further noted that in light of Van 
Til’s pervasive formal, material, and polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s 
Dogmatiek, his precarious “double-headed-fact” criticism of Bavinck’s theology 
introduces an irreducible dialectal tension with respect to Van Til’s 
appropriations: Either Bavinck does have two heads and hence Van Til’s formal, 
material, and polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek are jeopardized 
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accordingly, or Bavinck does not have two heads and hence Van Til’s criticisms 
are misdirected. His criticisms are therefore either in excessu or in defectu.
In the present chapter we refocus our attention upon Van Til’s criticisms, but 
this time we will ask not what Van Til criticizes but why: Why does Van Til 
criticize Bavinck’s thought in terms of two Bavincks—the authentic one the 
scholastic one—and in terms of a “double-headed fact”? Are these criticisms 
instances of Van Til’s Copernican originality? Or, rather, is it the case that, 
considered within his neo-Calvinist context, Van Til’s criticisms are 
appropriations and development of standard anti-scholastic sentiment evident 
among a host of neo-Calvinist theologians and philosophers?
Over against the Copernican line of Van Til scholarship, which, as we noted 
in chapter 5 above, presents Van Til as a revolutionary who saved Reformed 
theology from the wiles of scholasticism, we will argue that the reason why he 
levels these criticisms against Bavinck’s theology is that he was significantly 
influenced by Herman Dooyeweerd’s anti-scholasticism polemics. Specifically, 
we will demonstrate that Van Til appropriates both Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of 
scholasticism in general and his criticisms of scholastic elements in neo-Calvinist 
theology—including Bavinck’s theology—in particular. If our attempt to analyze 
Van Til’s criticisms within his neo-Calvinist “reconstructionist” context is valid, 
then the Copernican interpretation of Van Til as the anti-scholastic hero contra the 
entire Reformed tradition after Calvin will need to be reassessed as an 
abstraction.
In making such an argument we are following the lead of Van Til himself; for, 
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as we noted in chapter 5 above, in his book, Common Grace and the Gospel, Van Til 
implicitly indicates his affirmation of certain aspects of the so-called 
“reconstructionist movement” led by neo-Calvinist theologians and 
philosophers, such as, Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, and Schilder.1 We noted, for 
example, that Van Til appropriates Schilder’s polemic against the alleged abstract 
thinking in Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s theology and his concomitant assertion that 
truly Reformed thinking must proceed concretely. Moreover, Masselink and 
Muether both interpret Van Til’s position on common grace to be grounded in 
this “reconstructionist” movement.2 Furthermore, John Bolt suggests that Van 
Til’s criticism of the scholastic elements in Bavinck’s thought is significantly 
influenced by Dooyeweerd’s Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, especially Dooyeweerd’s 
article, “Kuyper’s wetenschapsleer,”3 wherein Dooyeweerd repudiates Bavinck’s 
“Logos-speculatie” as “neeoplatoons, thomistisch en dus scholastiek” and as 
contrary to the “bijbelse, reformatorische” ground-motive.4 Therefore, we are not 
arguing something new. Rather, in light of the affinities between Van Til and the 
Dutch neo-Calvinist “reconstructionist” philosophers which Van Til himself 
acknowledges and which have been noted by others, we are merely further 
highlighting the connection between Van Til’s “reconstructionist” context and his 
criticisms of Bavinck’s theology. 
1. See chapter 5, §A, 4, 4.1, above.
2. William Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace: A Defense of the Historic Reformed 
Faith Over Against the Theology and Philosophy of the So-called “Reconstructionist” Movement (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1953), 148ff.; John R. Muether, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and 
Churchman, American Reformed Biographies (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 152-53.
3. Herman Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939): 193-232.
4. John Bolt, “Een gemiste en een nieuwe kans: Herman Bavinck over openbaring en religie,” 
in Ontmoetingen met Herman Bavinck, ed. George Harinck and Gerrit Neven, Ad Chartas-reeks 9 
(Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 2006), 153.
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After briefly summarizing the current state of scholarship pertaining to Van 
Til’s complex interaction with Dooyeweerd’s thought, we will then survey the 
main lines of Dooyeweerd’s analysis of scholasticism in general and of the 
scholastic elements in neo-Calvinist theology in particular. Next, we will 
compare the main lines of Van Til’s formulations regarding the same. Finally, we 
will summarize the results of our comparative analysis.
A. Scholarship on Van Til and Dooyeweerd
1. The Untold Story in General
“The full story of Van Til’s relationship to the Amsterdam philosophy, and 
especially to Herman Dooyeweerd, has not yet been told,” wrote William Edgar 
in 2003.5 Indeed, eight years later the scholarly relationship between the Dutch-
American Reformed apologist, Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) and the Dutch 
Reformed philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977), remains largely 
unexplored in the secondary literature attending both thinkers. The scant extant 
scholarship on this topic consists mostly of passing remarks regarding alleged 
disagreements between the two thinkers.6 Furthermore, these remarks are based 
primarily upon (1) Van Til’s Christianity in Conflict syllabus7 and (2) 
Dooyeweerd’s and Robert Knudsen’s contributions to the Van Til festschrift 
5. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, ed. William Edgar, 2nd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 
2003), 57n4.
6. Cf. Leendert Kalsbeek, Contours of a Christian Philosophy: An Introduction to Herman  
Dooyeweerdʼs Thought, ed. Bernard Zylstra and Josina Zylstra (Toronto: Wedge Publishing 
Foundation, 1975; repr. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2002), 28, 301n55; Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs 
Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 14, 18-19, 48-52, 673-74; John M. 
Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 6, 22, 46, 146, 
147n26, 172-73, 312; Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 153, 197, 200-201, 216.
7. Cornelius Van Til, Christianity in Conflict, Syllabus, (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster 
Theological Seminary, 1962); cf. Eric D. Bristley, A Guide to the Writings of Cornelius Van Til 1895–
1987 (Chicago: Olive Tree Communications, 1995), s.v., 1962.I.
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(along with Van Til’s replies)8 rather than upon Van Til’s longest and most 
detailed criticism of Dooyeweerd’s thought—his 1974 syllabus, Herman 
Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.9
John Frame’s chapter-length analysis of Van Til’s thought vis-à-vis 
Dooyeweerd’s may be an exception in terms of length.10 However, throughout 
the chapter Frame does not engage Dooyeweerd’s corpus directly; rather, his 
criticisms are based upon Van Til’s second-hand summaries of Dooyeweerd’s 
thought in his Christianity in Conflict syllabus.11
Notwithstanding the predominant focus in the related scholarship upon 
Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s nuanced disagreements, several significant affinities 
between the two thinkers have been noted. In the first place, as Robert Knudsen 
remarks, generally speaking, both men shared the same mission—to develop the 
philosophical implications of Abraham Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist theology:
My own interpretation of Van Til's position, as I have said, places him 
squarely within the camp of those who hold to this general philosophical 
position [i.e., “the so-called Calvinistic philosophy”]. There is a broad 
unity of the major proponents of this school, namely, Herman 
Dooyeweerd, D. H, Th. Vollenhoven, C. Van Til, and Hendrik Stoker, in 
their attempt to erect a philosophy on the foundation of a Reformed 
world-and-life-view.”12 
8. Cf. the following essays in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and 
Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971): 
Herman Dooyeweerd, “Cornelius Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical 
Thought,” 74-89; Cornelius Van Til, “Response to Herman Dooyeweerd,” 89-127; Robert D. 
Knudsen, “Progressive and Regressive Tendencies in Christian Apologetics,” 275-98; Cornelius 
Van Til, “Response to Robert D. Knudsen,” 298-305.
9. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, 
PA: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1974); cf. Bristley, Guide, 1974.G. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 
372, mentions this syllabus only in passing. Likewise, Bahnsen, Van Tilʼs Apologetic, 14n44, 
673n265, references the syllabus twice but does not analyze any portion of it. Muether, Cornelius 
Van Til, 200-01, omits the syllabus altogether within his discussion of Van Til’s reluctant criticism 
of Dooyeweerd’s work.
10. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 371-86.
11. Van Til, Christianity in Conflict.
12. Robert D. Knudsen, “Crosscurrents,” Westminster Theological Journal 35, no. 3 (1973): 313. 
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Knudsen’s remark is in harmony with Van Til’s insistence that he is “in full 
agreement” with Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, and Stoker regarding their 
overarching goal of displaying “the variegated richness of the Christian life-and-
world view as a whole.”13 Thus, Van Til clearly shared the common neo-Calvinist 
concern to develop an all-encompassing Christian worldview.
In the second place, Van Til supported Dooyeweerd’s philosophical school in 
significant official and unofficial ways. For example, John Muether points out 
that in 1936 Van Til “eagerly accepted” the offer to become an editor of the 
Dooyeweerdian school’s scholarly journal, Philosophia Reformata, and that he held 
this editorial post for forty-two years.14 Thus, Van Til actively propagated the 
Orgaan van de vereeninging voor Calvinistische wijsbegeerte15 in an official capacity, 
notwithstanding his disagreements with some of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical 
formulations. Likewise, John Frame recalls that Van Til regularly encouraged 
students who wished to study philosophy to go to De Vrije Universiteit in 
Amsterdam in order to study under the cosmonomic philosophers.16 For 
Compare Henry Stob, “Observations on the Concept of the Antithesis” in Perspectives on the  
Christian Reformed Church: Studies in Its History, Theology, and Ecumenicity, ed. Peter DeKlerk and 
Richard R. DeRidder (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), 252: “Let it be said that I share with Kuyper, 
Herman Dooyeweerd, Van Til, and many other Christian thinkers the view that all knowledge is 
embraced at its edges by an all-encompassing Weltanschauung”; cited in Richard J. Mouw, “Dutch 
Calvinist Philosophical Influences in North America,” Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1 (April 1, 
1989): 106. Likewise, Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy: The Greek  
Prelude, ed. Robert D. Knudsen, Daniël Strauss, and Al Wolters, trans. Ray Togtmann, vol. 1, The 
Collected Works of Herman Dooyeweerd, Series A (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2004), 1, 
indicates that his “Philosophy of the Law-Idea” is an attempt to build upon Abraham Kuyper’s 
thought.
13. Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 56-57. 
14. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 146, 227. Meuther notes, however, that Van Til’s participation 
in the journal appears to be lackluster. E.g., in forty-two years Van Til published only one article 
in the journal (Ibid., 146).
15. This subtitle appeared on the cover of Philosophia Reformata from its inception in 1936 
(i.e., vol. 1) until 1992 (i.e., vol. 57).
16. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 371.
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example, H. Evan Runner moved to Amsterdam in order to study Dooyeweerd’s 
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee under Vollehoven after receiving encouragement to do 
so from Van Til.17
In the third place, Muether notes that, at first, “Van Til regretted the need to 
go public” with his criticisms of Dooyeweerd’s thought and that he described his 
dispute with Dooyeweerd as, personally speaking, the most difficult one of his 
career.18 Muether’s observation can be expanded as follows. In 1974—very late in 
his career—Van Til leveled a totalizing critique against Dooyeweerd’s thought.19 
Nevertheless, the very next year he continued to explicitly appropriate 
Dooyeweerd’s formulations, such as, the four religious ground motives that 
undergird theoretical thought.20 Also, Van Til continued to publicly defend 
Dooyeweerd from false misrepresentations of his thought even after having 
repudiated his entire philosophical project.21 In this regard Muether notes that 
Van Til defended Dooyeweerd against rash American critics, such as Ronald 
Nash, who attempted to criticize Dooyeweerd without reading any of 
Dooyeweerd’s Dutch corpus.22 Therefore, similar to Van Til’s perplexing 
17. Cf. Calvin Seerveld, “A Note of Personal Gratefulness,” Christian Renewal, Special 
Supplement: Runner remembered (March 10, 2003): 19. Several other articles in this special 
supplement mention Van Til’s influence upon Runner.
18. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 201.
19. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.
20. Cf. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1975), 3-7; with idem, Christianity and Barthianism 
(Philadelphia, PA: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1962), 230-239. Regarding the latter, Frame, 
Cornelius Van Til, 356-57, 369, notes in passing that Van Til appropriates Dooyeweerd’s religious 
“ground-motif” schema in his polemic against Karl Barth’s theology.
21. Cornelius Van Til, “Defends Dooyeweerd,” The Banner 109, no. 33 (August 30, 1974): 20; 
idem, “A Complaint,” The Banner 109, no. 40 (October 18, 1974): 20; cf. Bristley, Guide, s.v., 1974.J1, 
J2.
22. In addition to the perplexing fact that Van Til continued to appropriate Dooyeweerd’s 
formulations despite his own devastating criticisms against Dooyeweerd’s thought, Van Til also 
defended Dooyeweerd against allegedly rash American critics of Dooyeweerd, such as Ronald 
Nash; cf. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 201.
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dialectical stance toward Bavinck’s theology, he evinces a strong measure of 
affinity toward Dooyeweerd’s thought, his totalizing criticisms notwithstanding.
For these three reasons there is much more to the Van Til-Dooyeweerd story 
than only disagreements. “Surely, then,” to borrow Frame’s conclusion, “at least 
in a broad sense, we must describe the Dooyeweerdian school as one significant 
influence on Van Til’s thought, at least after the mid-1930s.”23 Nevertheless, the 
theological and philosophical relationship between Van Til and Dooyeweerd 
remains largely underdeveloped in the related scholarship.
2. The Untold Story in Particular
This underdevelopment is acutely evident with respect to Van Til’s 
allegations that a corrosive scholasticism wreaks deadly havoc upon certain 
aspects of Bavinck’s thought. The Copernican line of Van Til scholarship has 
simply accepted the major and minor premises of Van Til’s argument without 
any critical reflection upon the historical context within which Van Til’s 
argument was developed:
Major premise—scholasticism is inherently bad.
Minor premise—Bavinck’s theology is scholastic on certain points.
Ergo—Bavinck’s theology is corrupt on certain points and hence must be 
purged of it scholastic trappings.
Considered abstractly, this argument may at first glance appear to be an 
instance of Van Til’s Copernican originality. However, when the argument is 
interpreted concretely, that is, when it is viewed within the neo-Calvinist context 
23. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 22. Also cf. Frame’s similar comment at p. 426.
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that Van Til himself claims as his own, then Van Til’s reasoning appears as the 
antipode of revolutionary novelty; for, upon comparing his formulations with 
Dooyeweerd’s, it is clear that Van Til appropriates not only the two premises of 
his argument but also the conclusion directly from Dooyeweerd’s thought.
B. Dooyeweerd on Scholasticism
We turn first to Herman Dooyeweerd’s works for the purpose of 
summarizing the main lines of his critique against neo-Calvinist scholasticism. 
Due to the immensity of Dooyeweerd’s corpus we will have to be highly 
selective. 
1. Brief Excursus on Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy
The work most apropos of our inquiry is Dooyeweerd’s three-volume 
treatise, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy. Two important caveats about 
this work need to be stated up front, however. First, only the first volume—a 
translation of Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte—has been published.24 
Volumes two and three exist only in the form of pre-published manuscripts.25 
According to a note in the first volume, the material in volumes two and three is 
comprised primarily of articles which Dooyeweerd published in Philosophia  
Reformata between 1945 and 1950.26 However, it is evident that the new volumes 
24. Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, vol. 1 (Franeker: T. 
Wever, 1949); translated as idem, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, vol. 1.
25. Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy: An Introduction to the  
Anthropology of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, vol. 2, 3 vols., The Collected Works of 
Herman Dooyeweerd, Series A (Paideia Press, 2011); idem, Reformation and Scholasticism in 
Philosophy: Natural Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology, vol. 3, 3 vols., The Collected Works of 
Herman Dooyeweerd, Series A (Paideia Press, n.d.). NB: I am using pre-published editions of 
vols. 2 and 3 of Dooyeweerd’s Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy. Thus, the page numbers 
cited herein may be slightly different than those in the forthcoming published versions.
26. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:iii: “Parts of Volumes II and III 
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include materials published in Philosophia Reformata at least as far back as 1936. 
For instance, portions of Dooyeweerd’s 1936 article, “Kuyper’s 
wetenschapsleer,” appear in volume two.27
Second, our analysis proceeds upon an assumption, namely, that Van Til had 
access to all of these newly translated materials in their original, untranslated 
form. There is strong warrant for such an assumption; for, Reformatie en 
Scholastiek is a work that Van Til references numerous times throughout various 
writings,28 and his writings evince strong evidence that he was well acquainted 
with the content of this book. Furthermore, since the bulk of the material within 
volumes two and three was published in the journal of which he was an editor 
for over forty years, it is entirely plausible to infer that Van Til was aware of the 
contents of these articles.
In order to unpack Dooyeweerd’s critique of the scholasticism in neo-
Calvinist thought, we must first summarize Dooyeweerd’s general definition of 
scholasticism and the context within which this definition is situated, namely, the 
theory of Western philosophy’s four ground-motives that he propounds in 
Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy.
2. Scholasticism in General: Synthesis Thinking
Two correlations within Dooyeweerd’s opening paragraph are notable for 
appeared in theJournal Philosophia Reformata between 1945 and 1950. Volume III was left 
uncompleted, but it does contain the main ideas of Dooyeweerd with regard to the theory of 
enkaptic interlacements and Dooyeweerd’s anthropological theory of the complex bodily 
structure of the human being.”
27. Cf. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 211; with idem, Reformation and 
Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:46.
28. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic Ethics, Syllabus. (Philadelphia, PA: Reformed 
Episcopal Seminary, 1940), ch. 14; idem, Christianity and Barthianism, ch. 5, section 5; idem, The 
Great Debate Today (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1970), ch. 5, section D.
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our thesis. He begins by placing his life’s work in the context of three major 
events within the closing decades of the nineteenth century: (1) the failure of 
humanistic philosophy, (2) the rise of neo-Thomism, or what Dooyweerd calls, “a 
great Renaissance of Scholastic philosophy, more particularly of Thomism,” and 
(3) the rise of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, a Calvinist school of philosophy 
based directly upon the revolutionary work of Abraham Kuyper.29 In this way 
Dooyeweerd indirectly draws an important correlation between himself and 
Abraham Kuyper, namely, he presents himself as building directly upon 
Kuyper’s revolutionary neo-Calvinist thought. Additionally, though he has not 
yet defined the term, he correlates “Scholasticism” with Roman Catholicism in 
general and Thomas Aquinas in particular. Thus already in the opening 
paragraph the two main topics of our investigation are set before us in seed form
—neo-Calvinism and scholasticism.
Continuing further Dooyeweerd explains that from the polis of the ancient 
Greek city-states to the church-state hegemony of Medieval Roman Catholicism 
to the shifting church-state relation in the Protestant Reformation to the rise and 
fall of modern humanism, a “Promethean struggle” between spiritual cultural 
forces is obvious within the history of the West. He remarks that these spiritual 
cultural forces express themselves philosophically by means of four “ground-
motives.”30 Yet, before explicating the ground-motives individually, he divides 
them into two groups:
Of them, three are clearly dialectical. That is to say, they are town by an 
inner dualism, which constantly induces them to span positions in which 
29. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:1.
30. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:2-3.
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one factor is set irretrievably in diametrical opposition to the other.31
If we interpret this statement in light of the sub-title to Part I of the book—“Initial 
Survey of the Religious Ground-Motives and the Conflict They Produce between 
the Reformational and Scholastic Spirits in Philosophy”—we perhaps receive a 
foretaste of the overarching thesis of the book, namely, those who wish to follow 
Kuyper truly must make a choice for either scholasticism or Reformational 
philosophy.
2.1. The Greek Form-Matter Ground-Motive
Aristotle was the first to use the terms “form” and “matter” to describe this 
ground-motive, according to Dooyeweerd. “It originated,” he writes,
in an unresolved conflict within the Greek religious consciousness 
between the ground-motive of the older telluric, chthonic, and uranic 
nature religions, on the one hand, in which a proto-Greek nucleus was 
supplemented by many elements both of indigenous pre-Greek (Minoan) 
and of foreign origin, and, on the other hand, the ground-motive of the 
newer culture religion, the religion of the Olympic pantheon.32
Regarding the nature religions, Dooyeweerd admits the difficulty involved with 
drawing conclusions based on the scant number of extant pre-Homeric primary 
sources. Nevertheless, he asserts that enough evidence exists to show that the 
primary ground-motive of pre-Homeric nature religion is “the motive of the 
divine, eternally flowing stream of life.”33 Rooted in mother earth, this divine life 
stream governs the cycle of life and death. It gives life to every individuated 
form, and it takes life according to the law of fate/necessity (i.e., Anankē). 
Additionally, the life stream is viewed as a sort of “psychic fluid” that is not 
31. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:3.
32. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:3-4; quote at p. 4.
33. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:4-5; quote at p. 5.
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limited by bodily forms and is hence unable to die. Dooyeweerd labels this 
ground-motive as the Greek “matter motive,” and he presents the Greek god 
Dionysus as the paragon of this ground-motive.34
Dionysus’ antipode—the Delphic god, Apollo—is the paragon of the Greek 
culture religion, according to Dooyeweerd.35 “In contrast to the religion of 
nature,” he writes,
it was the religion of rational form, measure, and harmony. . . . The 
Olympian deities left “mother earth” and became immortal, radiant form-
gods, who in their supersensible form and personal shape were 
equivalent to idealized and personified cultural powers.36
Dooyeweerd labels this ground-motive the Greek “form motive” accordingly, 
and he holds up Homer’s epic poetry as “its most brilliant expression.”37
Dooyeweerd asserts that, notwithstanding the antithesis between Apollo’s 
form motive and Dionysus’ matter motive, the Greek culture religion
attempted to absorb into itself the older religion, both as to its original 
Greek and as to its imported and its pre-Greek domestic elements. It 
attempted to adapt it to its own ground-motive of form, measure, and 
harmony. In particular, it sought to restrain the ecstatic, telluric worship 
of Dionysus by means of the lawful form principle of the service of 
Apollo. At Delphi, Apollo and Dionysus became brothers, with the latter 
losing his indeterminate wildness and appearing in the more serious role 
of a “shepherd of souls.”38
In this passage Dooyeweerd introduces a hallmark trait of his view of 
scholasticism, namely, synthesis thinking. In other words, the Greek attempt to 
domesticate the antithetical relationship between Dionysus and Apollo is the first 
large-scale example of synthesis thinking in Western philosophy, and this 
34. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:5-6; quotes at p. 6.
35. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:6, 8.
36. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:8.
37. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:8.
38. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:8.
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attempted synthesis serves as a paradigmatic adumbration of Dooyeweerd’s later 
analysis of synthesis thinking within scholastic philosophy.
Returning to his analysis of the attempted Greek matter-form synthesis, we 
find that Dooyeweerd avers three reasons why this alleged synthesis was 
doomed to fail: (1) the culture religion failed to engage the deepest problem of 
life—death; the Olympian deities were powerless against Anankē; (2) the ethics 
of the Olympian gods were out of accord with ethics of the Greek people, as if 
the gods lived “beyond good and evil” (Homer); (3) due to the socio-politico 
transition from Mycenean knighthood to the Greek polis, the Homeric version of 
what takes place on Mt. Olympus became sorely out of touch with ordinary 
Greek people.39
Despite the ultimate failure of the Greek synthesis, however, Dooyeweerd 
argues that an important aspect of this attempt to unite the form and matter 
motives lived on—“the dialectical religious ground-motive.”40 That it to say, in 
subsequent Greek thought
the principles of form and matter are unbreakably interrelated, in the 
sense that they mutually presuppose each other. In their dialectical 
interrelationship they determine the Greek concept of the “nature” 
(physis) of things.41
Dooyeweerd therefore employs this dialectical religious form-matter ground-
motive as the hermeneutical key that unlocks the meaning of the sometimes 
wildly divergent and antithetical streams within Greek thought:
This dialectical ground-motive leads Greek thought into true polar 
antithesis and causes it to diverge into movements that seem to oppose 
39. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:9-10.
40. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:10.
41. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11.
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each other radically. These, however, manifest their underlying affinity 
within this ground-motive itself. The Greek intellectual community was 
rooted in this ground-motive, and for this reason it is quite impossible to 
understand the history of Greek philosophy in its uniqueness without 
having come to grips with it.42
Therefore, according to Dooyeweerd, the crux of the Greek form-matter ground-
motive is its attempt to synthesize polar opposites.
2.2. The Biblical Creation-Fall-Redemption Ground-Motive 
“The second ground-motive,” begins Dooyeweerd, “is that of creation, the fall  
into sin, and redemption through Christ Jesus in the communion of the Holy Spirit.”43 
Due to its concomitant doctrine of creation, the Christian ground-motive is 
diametrically opposed to the Greek form-matter ground-motive; for, as he 
concludes after citing Psalm 139: “Truly, the message of this psalm stands as the 
antipodes of the Greek dualism of the form and matter motives.”44 Dooyeweerd 
argues that the apex of the antithesis between the Christian and Greek ground-
motives evinces itself in their respective anthropologies. Whereas Christianity 
posits the human heart as “the integral, individual-spiritual fundamental unity 
of all the functions and structure of temporal reality,” the Greek dialectical 
synthesis posits a
religious dualism of the Greek form-matter motive, which comes to its 
clearest expression in the religious antithesis found in Greek 
anthropology between a material body and a theoretical mental 
substance having the character of pure form.45
42. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11.
43. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11.
44. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:11-12 ; quote at p. 12. Compare 
p. 25: “There is an absolute antithesis between the ground-motive of the Christian religion and 
that of the Greek religious consciousness. This antithesis holds just as well between the Christian 
and the humanistic ground-motives, even though in its process of formation the latter passed 
through the former.”
45. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:12.
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Furthermore, with respect to the fall into sin, whereas Christianity posits a 
“radical” rebellion in the human heart against “the absolute Source of life” and 
hence a “spiritual death” within man’s heart that “affected the temporal cosmos 
in its entirety,” the Greek dialectical motive cannot allow the idea of sin since 
Greek thought precludes divine revelation altogether.46 Additionally, 
Dooyeweerd argues, albeit only implicitly, that the incarnation of the divine 
Logos in Jesus Christ is a further antipode to Greek anthropology; for, Jesus took 
to himself both “the root and the temporal ramifications” of human nature, 
namely, soul and body.47 “Thus,” he avers, “as long as it is understood in its pure, 
Scriptural sense, this [Christian] religious ground-motive in no way manifests in 
itself a dialectical, dualistic character.”48
In its struggle against Hellenism, however, the Christian ground motive was 
corrupted by the Greek form-matter motive, argues Dooyeweerd in a passage 
that serves as a segue into the third ground-motive.49 He reasons that from the 
Christological and trinitarian controversies to Gnosticism to the Logos 
speculation of the early Apologists to Marcionism, the church was plagued on 
every sided with the dualistic Greek form-matter ground-motive. By God’s 
grace, however, the church fought back against all of these dualisms, and 
Augustine especially managed to preserve the Christian ground-motive in its 
basic form.
No one was yet in a position, however, to achieve a sufficiently 
independent expression of the Christian ground-motive within 
46. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:12-13; quotes at p. 13.
47. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:13.
48. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:14.
49. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:14-15.
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philosophical thought itself. In particular, there existed at this time great 
unclarity concerning the relationship of philosophy to dogmatic 
theology, because the inner connection of philosophic thought to the 
religious ground-motives had not yet been discovered.50
Accordingly, philosophy became subordinated to theology and then identified 
with it. What is more, argues Dooyeweerd, because Christian theology did not 
yet recognize the pagan ground-motive of Greek thought, there was no objection 
to taking over lock, stock, and barrel many important elements from ancient 
philosophy,” hence “theologians resorted to adapting or accommodating heathen 
thought to the doctrine of the Christian church.”51 Thus again we find the 
characteristic trait of Dooyeweerd’s view of scholasticism—synthesis thinking.
2.3. The Scholastic Nature-Grace Ground-Motive
The attempt by Christian theologians “to bridge the radical antithesis 
between the Greek and the Christian ground motives” led to a new dialectical 
theme that dominated the Medieval Roman Catholic cultural hegemony in the 
same way that the form-matter ground-motive dominated Greek culture
—“nature and grace.”52 Even Reformed theology could not escape this scholastic 
dualism; for, despite the attempts of Luther and Calvin to build upon 
Augustine’s preservation of the Christian ground-motive, Melanchthon 
introduced a revised version of the scholastic nature-grace dualism into 
Reformed theology thus giving rise to a Protestant version of Scholasticism.53 The 
50. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:14.
51. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:15.
52. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:15.
53. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:15-16. For Dooyeweerd’s 
further explication of how the nature-grace dualism invades Protestant scholastic thought, see 
pp. 33-39. Also cf. 2:12-13.
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Roman Catholic version of scholasticism, on the other hand, was dominated by 
the theology of Thomas Aquinas, “who,” argues Dooyeweerd,
posited nature as the autonomous but subordinate “preamble” of grace 
or supernature. Further, the mutual relationship between these was 
conceived as that between matter and form. Thus Thomas came to his 
solution with the aid of the same device that had already done service in 
the Greek intellectual community to bind together two antagonistic 
religious ground-motives.54
2.4. The Humanistic Nature-Freedom Ground-Motive
The fourth ground-motive arose within philosophy during the era of the 
Renaissance, explains Dooyeweerd. During this time Roman Catholicism’s 
Medieval church-state hegemony began to decline, and at the same time, he 
notes, “the idea of the absolute autonomy or self-legislation of the human 
personality, centered in its reason,” began to dominate.55
Hand in hand with this new freedom motive of the humanistic ideal of 
personality, there developed a new conception of nature. . . . Here nature 
was viewed as the macro-cosmic reflection of the human personality, as a 
cosmos that offered infinite possibilities for the deployment of man’s 
creative powers. . . . It was regarded as independent of all supernatural 
powers and influences.56
Thus a humanistic nature motive—exemplified in Giordano Bruno’s definition of 
nature as natura naturans—became wedded to its complete opposite, the 
humanistic freedom motive, and conflict between the two was inevitable; for, as 
Dooyeweerd argues, although the mathematical advances in modern science led 
to a rationalistic scientific ideal based on the nature motive, the the apex of the 
54. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:16. At pp. 16-17 Dooyeweerd 
remarks that the nature-grace ground-motive will be examined in detail in the second volume of 
this work.
55. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:17.
56. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:17.
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freedom motive (i.e., fully autonomous human persons) critiqued this 
rationalistic scientific ideal on empirical grounds, thus causing an irreconcilable 
conflict between the two ground-motives. Empiricism (in the form of historicism) 
thus replaced rationalism as the new scientific ideal, and the same irreconcilable 
conflict ensued, claims Dooyeweerd. Further, he avers that this cycle of conflicts 
has led to “a process of religious uprooting.”57 “In this entire development,” 
concludes Dooyeweerd,
the dialectical character of the humanistic ground-motive comes into 
sharp relief. Until the end of the previous century it had undergirded the 
thought of the Western community at large. Through its absolute 
supremacy in modern culture, it had also impressed its conceptual 
pattern in many ways upon Catholic and reformational thought, at least 
insofar as these intellectual currents did not want to have themselves 
banned from the scientific community.58
3. Scholasticism in Neo-Calvinist Thought in Particular
Now that we have seen that Dooyeweerd defines scholasticism in terms of 
synthesis thinking—specifically, a synthesis between one of the three non-
Christian ground-motives with the Christian ground-motive—we are in a 
position to survey his allegations against the patent scholasticism in the neo-
Calvinist theological formulations of Kuyper and Bavinck and philosophical 
formulations of Jan Woltjer (1849–1917). In order to view his critiques in their 
proper historical perspective, however, two factors should be kept in mind.
In the first place, Dooyeweerd treats Kuyper as the paragon of Neo-Calvinist 
thought. Therefore, despite the fact that throughout his article on Kuyper’s 
57. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:18-19; quote at p. 19; also cf. 
2:16.
58. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:19.
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epistemology and throughout volume two of Reformation and Scholasticism 
Dooyeweerd devotes most of his attention to Kuyper’s thought, he nevertheless 
lists Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s names along with Kuyper’s. In “Kuyper’s 
wetenschapsleer,” for example, Dooyeweerd employs Kuyper’s reformatorische 
grondconceptie as the explicit standard by which he judges not only Kuyper’s 
thought, but also Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s:
Immers in deze rede heb ik mij genoodzaakt gezien den vinger to leggen 
op bepaalde gedachtenlijnen in de geschriften van Kuyper, Woltjer en 
Bavinck, die m. i. met de inzonderheid door Kuyper ontwikkelde 
reformatorische grondconceptie der Christelijke wijsbegeerte op geenerlei 
wijze te rijmen zijn.59
Specifically, Dooyeweerd places his finger on the following crux of these alleged 
“bepaalde gedachtenlijnen”:
De waarheid is deze, dat aantoonbaar de beide gedachtenlijnen in 
Kuyper's wetenschappelijken arbeid met elkander in tegenspraak zijn en 
dat een innerlijke verzoening daarom onmogelijk moet worden geacht, 
wijl zij op elkander volstrekt uitsluitende uitgangspunten teruggaan.60
Apart from one exception, this de-beide-gedachtenlijnen premise governs 
Dooyeweerd’s entire criticism of the scholasticism in Kuyper’s theology and 
hence his entire criticism of the scholasticism in Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s thought. 
The one exception is that, according to Dooyeweerd, Kuyper’s Reformational 
conception of the heart overcomes the scholastic, dualistic errors that plague 
Bavinck’s and Woltjer’s anthropological formulations:
Slechts Kuyper deed hier den geweldigen greep, welke met één slag den 
anthropologischen kijk in schriftuurlijken zin radicaal omwendt. Noch in 
Woltjer’s genoemde geschriften, noch in Bavinck’s Beginselen der 
Psychologie zal men deze opvatting van het hart terug vinden. Beide 
blijven hier volkomen in de scholastische leer van de zielsvermogens en 
59. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 193.
60. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 196-97.
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het intellect als leidend, centraal deel van de ziel bevangen.61
Therefore, in contradistinction to Bavinck and Woltjer, Kuyper alone receives 
Dooyeweerd’s commendation for overcoming scholasticism on this foundational 
anthropological point.62
In the second place, Dooyeweerd appreciates Kuyper far more than he 
criticizes him. For example, we have already noted above that in volume one of 
Reformation and Scholasticism Dooyeweerd presents Kuyper as the direct 
philosophical predecessor to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. Additionally, he begins 
his article on Kuyper’s epistemology with (1) a lamentation over the fact that he 
has to criticize his former teachers and (2) an attempt to relativize his criticisms 
by noting the unique challenges that his predecessors faced:
Zij waren mijn leermeesters, voor wie ik groote liefde en hoogachting 
koester, en die baanbrekenden arbeid hebben verricht in een tijd, toen het  
behooren tot den kring der Vrije Universiteit nog als een abdicatie aan 
het wetenschappelijk geweten werd gebrandmerkt.63
Furthermore, the critiques of the scholastic line in Kuyper’s thought that we will 
survey below in volume two of his Reformation and Scholasticism are preceded by 
lofty commendations, such as:
Through this critical religious turn in his understanding of science, 
Kuyper indeed became the spiritual father of the new reformational 
philosophy. It is not an overstatement to call his appearance a critical 
turning point in the history of Western philosophical thought, since 
there, for the first time, the relation between religion and philosophy was 
determined solely on the basis of the reformational ground-motive of the  
Christian religion itself.64
61. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 211-12; also cf. idem, Reformation and 
Scholasticism in Philosophy, 3:121.
62. Cf. John Bolt, “Een gemiste en een nieuwe kans: Herman Bavinck over openbaring en 
religie,” 153.
63. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 193.
64. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:15.
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Dooyeweerd therefore levels his critiques against Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and 
Woltjer’s scholastic formulations only after praising their pioneering work.
3.1. Kuyper’s First Line: The Truly Reformational
Dooyeweerd argues that the Reformational line in Kuyper’s thought begins 
in God’s Word and charts its course solely according to the Christian ground-
motive. He describes this line as
. . . prescientific, or rather, supra-theoretical in character, which means 
that it is concerned solely with the presuppositions of a genuinely 
reformational philosophy and does not draw out the implications of 
these presuppositions within the realm of actual scientific inquiry.65
Dooyeweerd lists four philosophical presuppositions for this Christian ground-
motive: (1) the confession of God’s sovereignty as the Creator according to what 
is revealed in Scripture; (2) the acceptance in faith of Scripture’s teaching 
regarding the heart as the “religious root” or nexus of humanity’s temporal 
existence; (3) the confession of humanity’s radical fall into sin, Jesus Christ’s 
radical redemption from sin, and the concomitant antithesis in every sphere of 
life implied in these two facts; (4) the belief in a need for a repudiation of 
traditional scholastic anthropology.66
Additionally, Dooyeweerd avers that, beyond establishing these four 
presuppositions for a truly Reformational philosophy, Kuyper made another 
significant advancement for Reformational philosophy with respect to the 
doctrine of sphere sovereignty, namely, he “raised sphere sovereignty to the level 
of a cosmological principle that is directly connected to God’s absolute 
65. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:75.
66. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:75.
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sovereignty as Creature of the universe.”67 Thus, although Kuyper himself did 
not develop the sphere sovereignty doctrine scientifically, “he did state the 
starting point for such an elaboration with great clarity.”68
3.2. Kuyper’s Second Line: The Scholastic Synthesist
Despite his praise for the philosophical accomplishments arising out of the 
truly Reformational line in Kuyper’s thought, Dooyeweerd asserts that a 
contradictory scholastic line—a line of “accommodation” or synthesis thinking—
corrupts certain aspects of Kuyper’s thought, especially his scientific theological 
formulations. Rather than having the Christian ground-motive as its starting 
point, this scholastic line of thought is rooted in an illegitimate attempt to 
accommodate the Christian ground-motive to the form-matter, nature-grace, and 
nature-freedom ground-motives.69 Dooyeweerd adduces three examples to 
demonstrate this scholastic tendency.
In the first place, despite his high esteem for Kuyper’s formulation of the 
heart, Dooyeweerd criticizes Kuyper’s affinity for scholastic anthropology:
As far as I know Kuyper was the first to fathom, in its full depth and 
riches, the teaching of Holy Scripture concerning the heart as the 
religious center of human nature, and to lift this teaching from the 
overgrowth of Greek philosophy. Even so, in his scientific theological 
works he continued to use the scholastic constructs of body and soul.70
In the second place, Dooyeweerd asserts that Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s 
response to Kant’s epistemological revolution is beset by so-called neo-scholastic 
67. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:77.
68. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:78; also cf. idem, “Kuyperʼs 
wetenschapsleer,” 224.
69. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:78.
70. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:46.
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“critical realism.” He sets up this assertion by first noting that the neo-Thomists, 
led by Cardinal Mercer, attempted to meet Kant’s critique with synthesis 
thinking, namely, they attempted to transform Kant’s “critical idealism” into 
“critical realism.”71 
The core of the challenge was to bring to expression, in the problem areas 
internal to philosophy, the basic religious conception of Calvinism that 
Kuyper had developed so masterfully. It was precisely here, however, 
that the scholastic and humanistic traditions proved too strong, and 
Kuyper was unable to wrestle free of the established ways of posing the 
problems.72
According to Dooyeweerd, Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer attempted to answer 
Kant’s challenge by advocating the critical realist position that Kuyper 
formulated in his Encyclopaedie. However, instead of following Kuyper’s truly 
Reformational line of thought, the neo-Calvinists succumbed to the influence of 
Cardinal Mercer and the neo-Thomists.
Thus there arose in this new Reformed school of thought a “critical 
realism,” which initially was welcomed by many Reformed scholars as 
the dawn of a Calvinistic philosophy. Intrinsically, however, this critical 
realism was as alien to Reformed principles as was the old scholasticism 
of the days of Gisbert Voetius.73
Specifically, Dooyeweerd labels two aspects of Kuyper’s epistemological 
formulations as scholastic and hence problematic: (1) his supposition that the 
soul is anima rationalis with two primary faculties—knowledge and will and (2) 
his solution to the subject-object problem in terms of a distinction between 
elements and relations.74 Regarding the latter, Dooyeweerd rejoins:
71. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:54-55.
72. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:55.
73. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:55; also cf. idem, “Kuyperʼs 
wetenschapsleer,” 199.
74. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:56.
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This theory was nothing more than an adaptation of the “critical” 
viewpoint of modern humanistic epistemology to traditional scholastic 
psychology and ontology. It has not the slightest internal connection with 
Kuyper's basic religious conception of Calvinism.75
He goes on to further criticize Kuyper’s elements and relations theory as a mere 
objective “idea-realistic twist” to Kant’s subjective critical idealism.76
Therefore, it is evident that Dooyeweerd views the “critical realist” 
formulations of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer as a significant deviation from the 
pure Reformational line in Kuyper’s thought.
In the third place, as a concomitant of his repudiation of critical realism, 
Dooyeweerd argues that the logosleer77 inherent within Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and 
Woltjer’s formulations of critical realism is beset by synthesis thinking. He 
reasons that since the Logos theory has a long and honored pedigree in Christian 
theology, it is not surprising that the neo-Calvinists made use of the doctrine. 
Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd insists—“Let the theory be examined!”78 Accordingly, 
after subjecting the logosleer to a lengthy historical analysis beginning with its 
origins in the Platonic school, Dooyeweerd concludes that the theory is a 
thoroughly corrupt synthesis of Christian and non-Christian ground-motives.79 
On the basis that the Logos doctrine is patently non-Christian, he then argues 
that Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s theory of science unduly “logicized God’s 
order for the creation” and that hence the logosleer could not provide the basis for 
an adequate rejoinder to Kant’s epistemological critiques. “For,” reasons 
75. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:56.
76. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:56-57; quote at p. 57.
77. Cf. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer,” 197, 207ff.
78. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:59.
79. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:59-71.
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Dooyeweerd regarding what he sees as the crux of Kant’s critiques,
no change was made in Kant's view that all law-governed relations 
without exception are logical. Instead, the origin of these relations was 
sought not in the human, but in the divine Logos, the divine Reason with 
its unity of “logical thought” and “word” that had already been spoken 
of by Philo. The relationships in knowable things thus were not seen as 
subjectively logical, but as objectively logical; and it was thought that this 
logical nature was what allowed them to be grasped by our logical 
thought. For these thinkers [i.e., Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer] 
maintained that in the process of gaining theoretical knowledge, as 
Aristotle had taught, there is a union between the subjective logical 
function of thought and the objective logical ontic forms of knowable 
things.80
Furthermore, in addition to alleging that the neo-Calvinists’ use of the logosleer 
precluded their ability to answer Kant’s critique of knowledge with a truly 
Christian rejoinder, Dooyeweerd avers that Kuyper’s use of the Logos doctrine 
flatly contradicts his formulation of sphere sovereignty.81
Based upon these three examples of scholasticism in Kuyper’s thought, 
Dooyeweerd reaffirms his premise regarding the two divergent lines therein—a 
purely Reformational line and a scholastic line. “This, however,” he insists,
in no way proves that both viewpoints have an equal right to exist in an 
intrinsically reformed philosophy. It only shows that Kuyper lacked the 
opportunity to carry through his basic reformed conception in the 
internal course of scientific inquiry.82
4. Summary
For Dooyeweerd, scholasticism is synthesis thinking. More specifically, it is 
the attempt to synthesize the two antithetical poles of one or more of the three 
non-Christian religious ground-motives: form-matter, nature-grace, or nature-
80. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:71.
81. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:72-74.
82. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:74; also cf. idem, “Kuyperʼs 
wetenschapsleer,” 210.
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freedom. Insofar as all such attempts are deviations from the Christian ground-
motive, however, they are doomed to end up in a never-ending dialectical 
tension.
The Greek dialectical synthesis between the matter and form motives—
between Dionysus and Apollo—is paradigmatic for Dooyeweerd’s formulation 
of scholasticism. All subsequent syntheses are recapitulations of the this 
foundational synthesis. Hence volume one of Dooyeweerd’s Reformation and 
Scholasticism is devoted to ancient Greek philosophy up to and including Plato.83 
In stark contrast to the dialectical form-matter ground-motive, the Christian 
ground-motive of creation, fall, and redemption is diametrically opposed to all 
forms of synthesis thinking. Due especially to the Christian doctrine of creation, 
the Christian ground-motive precludes all dualisms and dialectic tensions by 
definition. The Roman Catholic scholastic synthesis is an attempt to synthesize 
the Greek and Christian ground-motives. Yet, insofar as these two are mutually 
exclusive, the synthesis can only be dialectical in nature. Hence scholasticism is 
doomed to fail according to its own self-contradictory presuppositions. Likewise, 
the modern humanistic nature-freedom ground-motive cannot advance beyond a 
dialectical synthesis between mutually exclusive principles and hence it is no 
more successful than any of the other attempted syntheses.
The whole point of Dooyeweerd’s theory of the four ground motives is to 
demonstrate that Christianity alone provides the basis for a non-dialectical, non-
dualistic, non-synthesis-based worldview. With respect to scholasticism, 
therefore, by arguing that it is based upon dialectical synthesis thinking, 
83. Cf. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 1:39.
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Dooyeweerd repudiates it as non-Christian. Therefore, according to Dooyeweerd, 
since Kuyper and the neo-Calvinists have fallen prey to synthesis thinking 
especially with respect to epistemology and the philosophy of science, neo-
Calvinist theology must be purged of its scholastic trappings. 
C. Van Til on Scholasticism
Van Til never wrote a book or syllabus exclusively on the topic of 
scholasticism. Nevertheless, he frequently employs both the term and the 
concept throughout many of his writings. It can even be said that scholasticism is 
a primary polemical theme that runs throughout Van Til’s thought. In the 
following survey we will focus primarily upon the syllabus that contains his 
most extensive discussion of scholasticism—his lengthy, three-part critique of 
Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought.84 Due to the length of this syllabus, our 
treatment must be selective.
1. Scholasticism in General: Synthesis Thinking
Van Til defines the term “scholasticism” explicitly only once throughout his 
entire corpus, despite the fact that he employs the term frequently.85 His 
definition is found in Part III of Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 
which part is entitled, “Synthesis Thinking”:
Scholasticism is an attempt to combine the man-centered thinking of the 
Greeks, notably of Aristotle, with the God-centered thinking of 
Christianity. Thomas Aquinas, the chief scholastic thinker, interpreted 
the “lower” half of reality by means of the notion of (a) human 
84. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics.
85. Muether, Cornelius Van Til, 56, notes that Van Til uses this term “imprecisely,” that is, 
usually in reference to what he interpreted as Aquinas’s allegedly autonomous use of human 
reason.
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autonomy with its implicates of an abstract, timeless principle of identity, 
thought of as correlative to a pure contingency notion of diversity and 
the “upper half” of reality by means of the notion of the creation-fall-
redemption by Christ through communion with the Holy Spirit. . . .
Thomas thought he could combine the scale-of-being idea of the 
Greeks, climactically expressed in the philosophy of Plotinus with the 
Augustinian notion of the struggle between the Civitas Dei and the 
Civitas Terrena.86
Not only is the title of Part III—“Synthesis Thinking”—an emulation of 
Dooyeweerd’s basic definition of scholasticism, but also Van Til’s language of 
“creation-fall-redemption” is clearly a recapitulation of Dooyeweerd’s 
formulation of the Christian ground-motive. Additionally, Van Til’s 
“combination” language bear obvious resemblance to Dooyeweerd’s language of 
“synthesis thinking” and “accommodation.” Furthermore, earlier in the same 
work Van Til defines the scholastic worldview using Dooyeweerd’s “synthesis” 
terminology explicitly:
After we have seen what the non-Christian view of life is in its 
opposition to the christian view of life it is easier to see what the 
scholastic view of life is. It is the fruit of an effort to synthesize these two.
Scholasticism thinks it is intelligible to synthesize (a) the Christian 
and the non-Christian view of man (b) the Christian and the non-
Christian view of the principle of unity (logic) and (c) the Christian and 
the non-Christian view of diversity by which man must interpret God, 
himself and the world.87
In yet another passage Van Til defines the “nature of scholasticism” in terms of 
“synthesis thinking”:
It is a world and life view, a view including philosophy as well as 
theology which makes an amalgam of the Greek form of apostate 
thought, the Greek paideia with the Christian thought, the Christian 
paideia. Thomas of Aquinas [sic] is the greatest exponent of this 
synthesis. Calvin’s thinking is in principle opposed to this synthesis. But 
86. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:1. Also cf. 1:9-14 wherein Van Til 
criticizes scholasticism within traditional apologetics.
87. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:26.
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many of his followers fell back to an extent on scholastic forms of 
thought. Even the recent revival of Reformed thinking has not been able 
to escape scholasticism wholly. Even Kuyper dared not to be altogether 
true to his deepest convictions in the field of apologetics.88
Moreover, Van Til employs Dooyeweerd’s “synthesis thinking” terminology in 
the title of his polemical book that we surveyed above, The New Synthesis 
Theology of the Netherlands.89
Additionally, Van Til defines the crux of scholasticism in terms reminiscent of 
Dooyeweerd’s formulation. First, consider Van Til’s formulation:
The root-error of Scholasticism is that it fails to place the whole man, as 
the creature made in the image of God, subject to the ordinance of God.90
Then, compare Dooyeweerd’s summary of the same crux in terms of “law” and 
“subjugation”:
In contrast to this Greek view, the scriptural doctrine of creation 
underscores the truth that thought is not the origin of the divine creation 
order, but is rather subject and subordinate to that order. . . . God's order 
for the creation is only disclosed to human thinking when humankind 
begins to bow in faith before God's majesty, submitting his thought to 
God's law instead of trying to logicize that law in accordance with Greek 
logos theory.91
Whether or not Van Til appropriates Dooyeweerd’s formulation, his point is the 
same. 
2. Scholasticism in Neo-Calvinist Thought in Particular
Van Til’s appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s definition of scholasticism becomes 
even more obvious as we look at his specific critiques against the scholasticism 
88. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:31. Also cf. p. 21: “This scholastic 
paideia constitutes a synthesis of the Greek and the Christian paideia.”
89. Van Til, The New Synthesis. Cf. chapter 4, §A, above.
90. Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological  
Journal 24, no. 1 (1961): 52.
91. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, 2:71.
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latent in Kuyper’s thought; for, Van Til simply recapitulates the main points of 
Dooyeweerd’s earlier criticisms.
In the first place, Van Til appropriates Dooyeweerd’s de-beide-gedachtenlijnen 
premise in terms of “Kuyper the Calvinist” and “Kuyper the Thomist.” 
According to Van Til, the former “taught E Voto Dordraceno,” but the latter “spoke 
with the voice of Thomas” and hence “[h]is reasoning is scholastic.”92 
Although he does not admit to appropriating Dooyeweerd’s premise 
specifically, Van Til asserts that he is in full agreement with Dooyeweerd’s 
analysis of Kuyper’s de beide gedachtenlijnen as summarized in Dooyeweerd’s 
article, “Kuyper’s wetenschapsleer.”93 Hence he admits that he “is in agreement 
with Dooyeweerd on the need for removing scholastic elements from Kuyper’s 
thinking. . . .”94 Likewise, Van Til affirms Dooyeweerd’s two-lines analysis of 
Kuyper’s thought by asking the following rhetorical question with an implied 
affirmative:
Haven’t I expressed agreement with Dooyeweerd’s assertion that, 
whether in philosophy or in theological apologetics, we must go beyond 
Kuyper’s scholasticism by building on and developing his Calvinism?95
Similarly, Van Til expressly affirms Dooyeweerd’s two-lines analysis in this 
remark:
[Kuyper’s] basic religious conviction was Calvinistic but, as Dooyeweerd 
says, when he was, somehow, unable to be fully himself, then he fell back 
on Scholasticism.96
92. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:28.
93. Dooyeweerd, “Kuyperʼs wetenschapsleer”; cf. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed 
Apologetics, 2:22-24.
94. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:24.
95. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:10.
96. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:28; emphasis added.
200
Therefore, it is clear that Van Til not only affirms Dooyeweerd’s analysis of 
Kuyper’s de beide gedachtenlijnen, but also recapitulates this criticism in terms of 
two Kuypers—the Calvinist and the Thomist.
In the second place, aspects of Van Til’s own analysis of the scholasticism in 
Kuyper’s thought are recapitulations of Dooyeweerd’s prior analysis. For 
example, just as Dooyeweerd argued that Kuyper’s, Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s 
affirmation of critical realism and its concomitant logosleer precluded these neo-
Calvinist thinkers from providing a truly Reformational answer to Kant’s 
skeptical critique of knowledge, so Van Til avers:
On the basis of Kuyper’s argument there would be no confrontation 
between believers and unbelievers because neither would or could exist  
except by way of a common participation in one pure faith having faith 
in itself, without ever having anything to believe.
Kuyper should have told his skeptic friends . . . that they are unable 
to be skeptical except they are what the Scripture says they are. . . . As it 
is the argument of part of the Encyclopedia compromises the Christ of 
Scripture, the Logos of John’s gospel with the Logos of the Greeks, the 
One of pure negation.97
In the third place, despite the fact that he has appropriated Dooyeweerd’s 
definition of scholasticism in general and his specific criticisms of the scholastic 
elements in neo-Calvinist thought in particular, Van Til attempts to turn 
Dooyeweerd’s argument on its head by asserting that Dooyeweerd himself falls 
prey to the very scholastic line of synthesis thinking that he sought to purge from 
Kuyper’s thought!98 Thus Van Til categorically rejects select aspects of 
Dooyeweerd’s thought. For example, he writes:
One may accept either the Kuyperian or the Dooyeweerdian view of 
sphere-sovereignty but one cannot consistently accept both. The are 
97. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:28.
98. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:51-62.
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exclusive of one another.99
Furthermore, he concludes his syllabus with a categorical rejection of 
Dooyeweerd’s entire philosophical project:
We had looked toward the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, and 
especially toward Dooyeweerd’s expression of it to lead us onward 
against the forces of apostate thinking in the philosophic field. We had 
hoped that Dooyeweerd would really build his philosophy upon 
Kuyper’s Calvinism and not on Kuyper’s Scholasticism.
However, Dooyeweerd’s new form of synthesis thinking, his seeking 
for religious instead of intellectual unity is regressive and compromising 
at best. The apologetics implied in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy seem to be 
no better than the apologetics of the Aquinas-Butler type while the 
theology implied in his philosophy is worse than that of the theology of 
the old-Princeton or the old-Amsterdam men. Dooyeweerd has gone 
“beyond” Kuyper but his “transcendental method” based on his 
religious-supra temporal sphere of occurrence leads toward the 
theological directionalism of Berkouwer, Kuitert, etc.100
Notwithstanding the dialectical perplexity present herein due to Van Til’s 
simultaneous appropriation of and polemic against Dooyeweerd’s formulations 
with respect to scholasticism, his categorical repudiation of Dooyeweerd’s 
thought according to Dooyeweerd’s own definition of scholasticism—“synthesis 
thinking”—is yet another example of Van Til’s appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s 
thought.
3. Summary
In light of the several lines of evidence adduced above primarily from Van 
Til’s syllabus, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, three conclusions may 
be drawn with respect to Van Til’s definition of scholasticism in general: (1) 
Based upon his recapitulation of Dooyeweerd’s “synthesis thinking” terminology 
99. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:57.
100. Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 3:54.
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and his ground-motive language, it is clear that Van Til appropriates 
Dooyeweerd’s definition. (2) Furthermore, both Van Til and Dooyeweerd present 
Thomas Aquinas as the paradigmatic scholastic synthesizer. (3) Finally, both Van 
Til and Dooyeweerd interpret the crux of scholasticism as an invalid assertion of 
human autonomy and hence a violation of God’s law.
Regarding Van Til’s critiques of the scholasticism in neo-Calvinist thought in 
particular, three conclusions may be drawn: (1) Van Til appropriates 
Dooyeweerd’s premise regarding two lines of thought in Kuyper’s theology—a 
truly Reformational line and a corrupt scholastic line. In Van Til’s parlance, 
Dooyeweerd’s two lines become “Kuyper the Calvinist” and “Kuyper the 
Thomist.” Furthermore, as with Dooyeweerd, so with Van Til—all of his 
criticisms proceed from this two-lines premise. (2) Van Til fully agrees with 
Dooyeweerd’s assessment regarding the need to go beyond Kuyper’s 
scholasticism in order to formulate a truly Reformational epistemology and 
philosophy of science. (3) Oddly, after appropriating Dooyeweerd’s formulations 
regarding scholasticism, Van Til turns Dooyeweerd’s own criticism against its 
original formulator and claims that Dooyeweerd himself has fallen prey to 
scholastic “synthesis thinking.” Hence a dialectical tension attends Van Til’s 
appropriations of Dooyeweerd’s thought.
D. Van Til on Bavinck in light of Dooyeweerd
The fact that Van Til appropriates both Dooyeweerd’s definition of 
scholasticism and his criticisms of the scholastic elements in neo-Calvinist 
thought places Van Til’s criticisms of the scholastic elements in Bavinck’s 
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theology in a whole new light. With the true source of Van Til’s criticisms in view, 
we are now in a position to consider the soundness of the criticisms themselves.
1. Van Til’s criticisms are largely second-hand.
In light of Dooyeweerd’s critiques of the scholastic elements in Kuyper’s, 
Bavinck’s, and Woltjer’s formulations, Van Til’s criticisms of the scholastic 
elements in Bavinck’s theology are manifestly unoriginal. Even though he 
expands upon certain points of Dooyeweerds criticisms with respect to the 
detailed theological formulations within Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, Van Til’s criticisms 
never advance beyond the overarching critique that he appropriates from 
Dooyeweerd—“synthesis thinking.”
Furthermore, several aspects of Van Til’s specific criticisms of Bavinck’s 
thought give the impression that he has simply emulated Dooyeweerd’s 
criticisms of Kuyper’s thought. 
In the first place, Van Til follows Dooyeweerd’s example of praising his neo-
Calvinist predecessors before polemicizing against the scholastic elements in 
their thought. 
In the second place, Van Til’s “double-headed-fact” analysis that governs his 
entire criticism of Bavinck’s thought is a recapitulation of Dooyeweerd’s 
overarching de-beide-gedachtenlijnen analysis of Kuyper’s thought. Accordingly, 
just like Dooyeweerd argues that, Kuyper, in his better moments, was truly 
Reformational, so Van Til argues that, Bavinck, in his better moments, followed 
Calvin’s pure Reformed thinking rather than Aquinas’ corrupt synthesis 
thinking. In this manner, both Dooyeweerd and Van Til oddly aver that they 
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know the true intentions of their predecessors better than their predecessors 
themselves knew them!
In the third place, just as Dooyeweerd argues—with Van Til’s explicit 
agreement—that contemporary Reformed philosophy must go beyond the 
scholasticism in Kuyper’s thought, so Van Til argues that contemporary 
Reformed theologians must go beyond the scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought.
In the fourth place, just as Dooyeweerd argues against the critical realism 
and logosleer in Kuyper’s thought, so Van Til argues against the critical realism 
and Logos doctrine in Bavinck’s thought.
Therefore, with respect to the sources of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck’s 
theology, we conclude that Van Til’s polemics are largely recapitulations of 
Dooyeweerd’s prior criticisms and that, accordingly, the “Copernican” 
interpretation of Van Til’s role in Reformed theology as the sole champion contra 
scholasticism is historically untenable.
2. Van Til’s criticisms are unsound.
Although a full analysis of Dooyeweerd’s first-hand and Van Til’s second-
hand criticisms of the scholasticism in neo-Calvinist thought is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, a few critical comments based upon the primary source evidence 
adduced in chapters 5 and 6 are in order.
2.1. The current analyses, both pro and con, are underdeveloped.
We have already noted in chapter 5 that the secondary scholarship regarding 
Van Til’s criticisms of the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought is divided 
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with respect to the validity of the criticisms.101 On the one hand, the Copernican 
scholars, such as, Bahnsen, Dennison, and Oliphint, argue to the effect that Van 
Til single-handedly saved Reformed theology from the wiles of scholasticism and 
thus revolutionized Reformed theology. Additionally, in an effort to reestablish 
the validity of Van Til’s criticisms of neo-Calvinist scholasticism in contemporary 
Reformed theology, Oliphint appropriates and expands Van Til’s criticisms 
against Bavinck’s critical realist epistemological formulations in two recent 
publications.102 However, these Copernican interpretations of Van Til remain lost 
in historical abstraction regarding Van Til’s view of scholasticism insofar as they 
fail to note (1) that Van Til appropriates both his definition of scholasticism and 
his critiques of neo-Calvinist scholasticism primarily from Dooyeweerd and (2) 
that Van Til’s view of scholasticism is significantly influenced by the debates at 
De Vrije Universiteit over the validity of classical Reformed scholasticism; for, Van 
Til clearly sides with the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee philosophers in rejecting all 
forms of scholasticism over against Valentijn Hepp’s103 and Hendrik Steen’s104 
stern criticisms of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s views.105 These highly 
101. Cf. chapter 5, §A, 1, above.
102. K. Scott Oliphint, “The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck,” in Speaking the 
Truth in Love: The Theology of John M. Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 201-
232; idem, “Bavinckʼs Realism, The Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,” Westminster Theological  
Journal 72, no. 2 (2010): 359-90.
103. Valentine Hepp, Dreigende deformatie, 4 vols. (Kampen: Kok, 1937); cf. Masselink, General  
Revelation and Common Grace.
104. Hendrik Steen, Philosophia Deformata (Kampen: Kok, 1937).
105. For an introduction to the basic issues at stake in the debate, including Hepp’s and 
Steen’s polemics and Dooyeweerd’s rejoinders, see ch. 6 in Marcel E. Verburg, Herman 
Dooyeweerd, Passage 5 (Baarn: Ten Have, 1989); also cf. Daniël F. M. Strauss, “Skolastiek en 
Gereformeerde Skolastiek kontra Reformatories-christelike denke,” Nederduits Gereformeerde 
Teologiese Tydskrif 10, no. 2 (March 1969): 97-114; Jacob Klapwijk, “Rationality in the Dutch Neo-
Calvinist Tradition,” in Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan Van der 
Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 113-131; 
Albert M. Wolters, “Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality,” in Rationality 
in the Calvinian Tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan Van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
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significant contextual factors are completely overlooked by the Copernican 
interpretations.
On the other hand, Mattson and Masselink have challenged the validity of 
Van Til’s criticisms. Mattson’s alleges that Van Til read Bavinck’s work 
uncharitably at points and hence misinterpreted several of his formulations. 
While this is undoubtedly true in the instances that Mattson cites, such an 
analysis does not penetrate to the heart of Van Til’s criticisms as a whole, namely, 
his appropriation of Dooyeweerd’s formulations regarding scholasticism in 
general and neo-Calvinist scholasticism in particular. Thus, although Mattson 
has made real progress with respect to challenging the details of Van Til’s 
criticisms, he has not reached the final destination with respect to either the 
historical context or the scopus of the criticisms.
The opposite is the case with Masselink’s analysis. Whereas Mattson is 
mostly correct on the details but insufficient on the historical context, Masselink 
is mostly correct on the context but insufficient on the details. For example, 
Masselink argues correctly with respect to the context of Van Til’s criticisms that 
“Van Til expresses general agreement with Dooyeweerd’s criticism of Kuyper’s 
Epistemology.”106 “It appears,” he likewise surmises, “that Van Til’s general 
approach to historical Reformed theology resembles that of Schilder, Vollenhoven 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 113-131. (I am indebted to Professors Danie 
Strauss and Harry Vandyke for alerting me to the Verburg and Strauss sources via 
correspondence on the Thinknet newsgroup <http://www2.redeemer.ca/dooyeweerd/thinknet-
forum.php>.) For Van Til’s alignment with the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee philosophers on this issue, 
see his remarks regarding Hepp’s and Steen’s “false criticism” in Cornelius Van Til, “Response to 
Herman Dooyeweerd,” 92; also cf. idem, Herman Dooyeweerd and Reformed Apologetics, 2:22. 
Incidentally, it should be noted that in one place Van Til uses Hepp’s term, “dreigende 
deformatie,” positively, albeit in a sense unrelated to the scholasticism debate at De VU, namely, 
with reference to developments at Princeton Seminary: idem, “De ‘Preaching Mission’,” De 
Reformatie 17, no. 21 (February 19, 1937): 167.
106. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 120.
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and Dooyeweerd.”107 Yet, despite his accurate assessment of Van Til’s neo-
Calvinist context, Masselink misconstrues aspects of Van Til’s position, such as 
his formulation of the essence and task of apologetics.108 
Therefore, insofar as a sound analysis of Van Til’s criticisms requires an 
accurate interpretation both of his historical context and of the details of his 
position, not only the Copernican interpretations but also the non-Copernican 
analyses require further refinements in order to overcome the current dialectical  
tension within the Van Til scholarship regarding his criticisms of neo-Calvinist 
scholasticism.
2.2. The “double-headed fact” premise is wholly subjective.
Emulating Dooyeweerd’s allegation that there are two irreconcilable “lines” 
in Kuyper’s thought—a Reformational line and a scholastic line—Van Til divides 
Bavinck’s thought into two halves and agues that the truly Reformed half of 
Bavinck’s thought is at odds with the scholastic half. Furthermore, just as 
Dooyeweerd argues that Kuyper’s Reformational line is stronger than his 
scholastic line and thus may serve as the foundation for a truly Reformational 
philosophy, so Van Til avers that Bavinck’s truly Reformed side is stronger than 
his scholastic side and thus may serve as the foundation for a truly Reformed 
theology and apologetic. The underlying premise of Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s 
criticisms of neo-Calvinist scholasticism is therefore the same: regarding their 
most basic presuppositions, or, to use Dooyeweerd’s terminology—regarding 
their ground-motives—there are two Kuypers and two Bavincks.
107. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 18.
108. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 176. Cf. chapter 2, §B, above.
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However, the two-Kuypers and two-Bavincks premises are wholly 
subjective. This fact becomes immediately apparent as soon as one asks: How 
does one determine that there are two Kuypers or two Bavincks instead of one 
each? By what norm is such a bipolar determination made? The answer to these 
questions reveals the subjectivity of the premise: According to the norms 
supplied by the critics themselves!109
How then do Dooyeweerd and Van Til establish their norms? Do they they 
start with an objective historical analysis of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s views of the 
nature of scholasticism? Or, do they begin by analyzing Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s 
own evaluations of whether or not the scholastic method is appropriate for 
Reformed theology? 
The answer to both questions is negative. Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s 
method begins not objectively but subjectively. They impose an idiosyncratic 
definition of scholasticism—a subjective norm—upon Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s 
theological formulations, and then they formulate both their two-Kuypers and 
two-Bavincks premises and their anti-scholastic criticisms on the basis of this 
subjective norm. 
Specifically, their subjective analysis proceeds as follows. First, they assert 
that the history of Western thought is controlled by four ground-motives. Second, 
they argue that scholasticism is defined as a synthesis of the Christian ground-
motive with one of the three non-Christian ground motives. Then, upon the basis 
of this definition, they allege that Thomas Aquinas is the paragon of scholastic 
109. Cf. Masselink, General Revelation and Common Grace, 17, who argues a similar rejoinder 
against Schilder’s attempt to separate the true Kuyper from the false Kuyper: “This is truly a 
subjective undertaking, because who is to determine what is the true Kuyper—only the critic—
only Schilder!”
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“synthesis thinking.” Third, they search Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s writings for any 
theological formulations that appear to be influenced by Aquinas’ synthesis 
thinking. Fourth, wherever they find scholastic-looking formulations in Kuyper’s 
or Bavinck’s writings they immediately allege that non-Christian synthesis 
thinking has corrupted these aspects of Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s formulations. 
Therefore, not only the two-Kuypers and two-Bavincks premises but also the 
method of Dooyeweerd’s and Van Til’s criticisms is subjective.
With respect to Van Til’s “double-headed-fact” criticism specifically, in light 
of his subjective premise and method, Van Til’s assertion is methodologically 
untenable; for, he fails to demonstrate objectively that Bavinck’s theological 
formulations have been corrupted by a dialectical synthesis between Christian 
and non-Christian thought. All that Van Til’s criticisms demonstrate is that—
formally considered—Bavinck recapitulates and develops theological formulations 
not only from Augustine and Aquinas but also from Reformed scholastics. 
Despite the fact that Van Til—according to the subjective criterion that he 
appropriates from Dooyeweerd—deems all scholastic formulations to be 
inherently non-Christian, he fails to demonstrate materially that in the places 
where Bavinck employs scholastic formulations he does so either with specific 
intent to mix Christian and non-Christian conceptions or with the specific 
consequence of actually achieving such a misguided synthesis.
2.3. The historical scope is severely limited.
In addition to the subjective premise and method of Van Til’s criticisms, the 
severely limited historical scope of his analysis of Reformed scholasticism leaves 
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his assessment of Bavinck’s scholasticism open to the charge of reductionistic 
historical abstraction; for, following Dooyeweerd, Van Til limits the scope of his 
polemics exclusively to Kuyper and Bavinck.
However, even if we leave aside the question of whether or to what extent it 
is historically accurate to classify nineteenth-century neo-Calvinist theology as an 
expression of Reformed scholasticism,110 Van Til’s use of Bavinck’s and Kuyper’s 
theology as the sole basis for his repudiation of Reformed scholasticism in 
general is methodologically unsound; for, he neither analyzes any Reformed 
orthodox theologian between Calvin and Kuyper nor compares the neo-Calvinist 
expression of scholasticism with the scholastic formulations of Reformed 
orthodox theologians, such as, Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590), Franciscus Junius 
(1545–1602), Johannes Polyander (1568–1646), William Twisse (c.1577–1646), 
Gijsbert Voetius (1589–1676), John Owen (1616–1683), Francis Turretin (1623–
1687), Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706), Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635–1711), 
Herman Witsius (1636–1708), Campegius Vitringa (1659–1722), and Bernhard De 
Moor (1710–c.1765)—to list only a few of the Reformed scholastics who Bavinck 
references copiously throughout his Dogmatiek. In other words, Van Til—
following Dooyeweerd—omits the entire period of Reformed orthodoxy from his 
negative assessment of neo-Calvinist scholasticism as if neo-Calvinist scholasticism 
can be easily analyzed and quickly repudiated without regard for the three centuries of  
Reformed orthodoxy that precedes and undergirds it. Therefore, insofar as they are 
based upon an historically abstract understanding of Reformed scholasticism 
110. E.g., Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena to  
Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 84, argues that the era of Reformed 
orthodoxy and its concomitant scholastic methodology came to an end in the mid-eighteenth 
century with the rise of pietism and rationalistic dogmatics.
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that is limited exclusively to the early neo-Calvinist era, Van Til’s polemics 
against Reformed scholasticism in general and the scholastic elements of 
Bavinck’s formulations in particular are historically untenable.
CHAPTER VII. 
CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapters we have analyzed the most basic presupposition 
undergirding Cornelius Van Til’s formulation of Reformed apologetics—his 
presupposition of Reformed dogmatics. We have examined this presupposition 
from a variety of perspectives (i.e., historically-contextually, formally, materially, 
polemically, dialectically), and we have found that looking at this presupposition 
from each of these perspectives reveals that Van Til’s thought depends upon 
Herman Bavinck’s theological formulations in salient ways, many of which have 
been significantly underdeveloped in the related scholarship. The following 
conclusions may be drawn from these analyses.
A. Van Til is neither a Copernicus nor a “Van Tilian” but a neo-
Calvinist.
Much of the scholarship pertaining to Van Til is based upon the premise that 
he is a theological Copernicus who single-handedly ushered in a new era of 
Christian thought. To a limited extent this line of scholarship appreciates Van 
Til’s reliance upon his Reformed predecessors (especially Kuyper); however, by 
focusing almost exclusively upon the ways in which Van Til allegedly goes 
beyond his predecessors and purges their naive mistakes, this Copernican line of 
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scholarship fails to elucidate Van Til’s thought within his historical context. The 
lack of scholarly attention to Van Til’s pervasive appropriation of Herman 
Bavinck’s theological formulations is a case in point.
The abstract nature of such scholarship is acutely noticeable with respect to 
the topic of scholasticism; for, in the eyes of self-styled “Van Tilians,” Van Til 
becomes a Copernican hero who not only saves the entire Reformed tradition 
from the wiles of scholasticism but also provides Reformed theology, for the first 
time ever, a truly Reformed (i.e., non-scholastic) formulation of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics. In short, Van Til becomes the first thinker in the history 
of the church to provide the world with a Christian view of everything.
The problem with these bombastic interpretations, however, is that they are 
based on an abstract reading of Van Til’s life and works, a fact that becomes 
immediately apparent when one notes from whom Van Til appropriates his 
theological and philosophical formulations. For example, it is beyond dispute 
that Van Til pervasively appropriated theological formulations from Herman 
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. Likewise, it is undeniable that Van Til 
appropriated copiously from Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophical formulations, 
most notably, his “ground-motives” formulation, his concomitant definition of 
“scholasticism” as “synthesis thinking,” and his critiques of scholasticism in neo-
Calvinist theology. These two concrete contextual facts not only directly 
undermine the Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s thought, but also they 
elucidate the primary historical context within which Van Til’s thought ought to 
be interpreted: twentieth-century Dutch neo-Calvinism.
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Moreover, if Van Til is more accurately interpreted as a neo-Calvinist than a 
Copernicus, then also he is more accurately described as “Reformed” than “Van 
Tilian.” For, Van Til not only frequently reflects upon his affinity for Kuyper’s 
and Bavinck’s theology, especially in his formative years, but also he explains his 
own life purpose in terms of upholding Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist vision. It could 
even be said that, since Van Til views himself as the North American guardian 
and champion of Kuyper’s antithesis thinking over against all forms of synthesis 
thinking, he should be labeled as a “Kuyperian” rather than a “Van Tilian.” Or, 
insofar as he presupposes Bavinck’s Reformed dogmatics for his Reformed 
apologetics, he would more accurately be labeled a “Bavinckian” than a “Van 
Tilian.” Yet, with respect to his own work, Van Til eschews all such labeling. The 
only adjective that he uses to describe his own work is simply “Reformed” 
(which he understood to mean “consistently Christian.”) Furthermore, Van Til is 
strongly averse to theological novelty in his own apologetic formulations, he 
polemicizes fiercely against the theological novelty in the writings of modern 
theologians (especially neo-orthodoxy), and he consistently interprets his own 
theological contributions as modest attempts to further the pioneering work of 
his Reformed predecessors. Additionally, Van Til never published any article, 
book, or syllabus with his own name in the title. 
For all of these reasons the adjective “Van Tilian” is a non sequitur both 
logically and historically, and it deserves to be retired from theological discourse 
accordingly. If a replacement for this neologism is desired, then let the term that 
Van Til himself preferred suffice—“Reformed.”
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In sum, Van Til’s neo-Calvinist context has been significantly 
underdeveloped in the related scholarship. One major reason for this anomaly is 
the ahistorical nature of the Copernican interpretations of Van Til’s thought. 
However, rather than abstracting Van Til from his context in order to present him 
as a Copernicus, the most appropriate and most accurate method for interpreting 
Van Til’s thought is to read his work within the neo-Calvinist context in which he 
lived, moved, and had his being. When due respect is paid to his historical 
context, Van Til appears not as a Copernican revolutionary, but as a twentieth-
century neo-Calvinist thinker. Additionally, Van Til appears not as a founder of a 
new school of so-called “Van Tilian” apologetics, but as a neo-Calvinist thinker 
carrying on and developing the tradition of Reformed apologetics.
B. Van Til’s apologetics presupposes Bavinck’s Dogmatiek.
With respect to Van Til’s most basic presupposition, insofar as he pervasively 
appropriates Bavinck’s formulations formally, materially, and polemically, his 
presupposition should be understood as follows: Van Til’s Reformed apologetics 
largely presupposes Herman Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. 
Regarding Van Til’s formal appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, although 
the evidence for a link between Van Til’s and Bavinck’s formulations of the 
nature and function of apologetics in theological encyclopedia is more implicit 
than explicit, it is nevertheless significant that Van Til’s formulation is nearly 
identical to Bavinck’s. In contrast, Van Til clearly sets his view over against 
Warfield’s reversal of the relationship between the two. Also, he clearly criticizes 
Kuyper for allegedly underestimating the necessity of apologetics. Yet, he has 
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nothing negative to say about Bavinck’s formulations, and he hints, albeit briefly, 
that he aligns his own view with Bavinck’s. Moreover, Van Til’s first 
presupposition itself is a summary of Bavinck’s view, namely, that dogmatics 
logically precedes apologetics and provides it with its material content—the 
dogmas of the Christian faith.
Regarding Van Til’s material appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, his most 
significant summary of Reformed dogmatics—An Introduction to Systematic  
Theology—is largely a condensation of Bavinck’s magnum opus. Throughout An 
Introduction Van Til both explicitly and tacitly appropriates copious amounts of 
Bavinck’s formulations, sometimes with citations yet frequently without. 
Additionally, several programmatic themes in Van Til’s apologetical formulations 
derive directly from Bavinck’s theological formulations. Furthermore, Van Til 
repeatedly lauds Bavinck’s Dogmatiek as the preeminent modern formulation of 
Reformed dogmatics. Therefore, although Bavinck is certainly not the only 
Reformed theologian whose work is included in Van Til’s presupposition of 
Reformed dogmatics, he is nevertheless Van Til’s primary dogmatic resource.
Regarding Van Til’s polemical appropriations of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, it is no 
surprise that the theologian whose work Van Til primarily relies upon for his 
positive statement of the Reformed faith is the same theologian whose 
theological formulations he employs polemically against the rise of neo-
orthodoxy both at the former headquarters of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist movement 
(De Vrije Universiteit) and at Van Til’s Alma Mater (Princeton Seminary), namely, 
Herman Bavinck. Van Til’s use of Bavinck’s thought as the paragon of Reformed 
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orthodoxy contra various forms of heterodox modern theology is most notable in 
The New Synthesis Theology of The Netherlands, in his several polemical writings 
against Karl Barth, and in The Theology of James Daane. He likewise employs 
Bavinck’s dogmatics polemically, albeit only briefly, in Jerusalem and Athens.
For all of these reasons there is sufficient warrant not only to conclude that 
Van Til’s presupposition of Reformed dogmatics is essentially a presupposition 
of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, but also to suggest that Van Til’s thought 
cannot be accurately interpreted apart from Bavinck’s. For, if, according to Van 
Til himself, it is true that the apologist receives from dogmatics the very dogmas 
that apologetics seeks to defend, then insofar as Van Til’s apologetic formulations 
presuppose Bavinck’s dogmatic formulations, the former cannot be accurately 
interpreted apart from the latter. In this regard appreciation for Van Til’s 
pervasive appropriation of Herman Bavinck’s dogmatics is significantly 
underdeveloped in Van Til scholarship.
To highlight the fact that Van Til’s apologetics largely presuppose Bavinck’s 
dogmatics is not to say that Van Til merely parrots Bavinck’s theological 
formulations at every point of his apologetic formulations. Nor is it to deny that 
Van Til is a brilliant, powerful, creative, and trenchant thinker in his own right. 
Rather, the implication is that, since he follows Bavinck closely on so many 
points, the very points at which “Van Tilian” scholars claim that Van Til advances 
beyond his predecessors and corrects their views—especially with respect to the 
doctrine of God, theological metaphysics, and theological epistemology—are the 
very points that need to be elucidated more clearly in relation to (1) Bavinck’s 
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formulations in particular and (2) the Dutch and North American neo-Calvinist 
contexts in general within which Bavinck and Van Til operated, respectively. 
Specifically, Van Til scholarship needs to pay more attention to the neo-Calvinist 
theology and philosophy arising out of De Vrije Universiteit during Van Til’s 
lifetime; for, much of his scholarly work is directly rooted in that context.
In sum, although multiple streams of influence flow into his thought, and 
although Van Til’s thought cannot be reduced exclusively to one theological, 
academic, ecclesiastical, or geographical context, nevertheless, regarding his 
specific presupposition of Reformed dogmatics, Van Til largely presupposes 
Bavinck’s Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. This important fact has been significantly 
underdeveloped in the extant scholarship.
C. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are unoriginal.
With respect to both their form and content, Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck 
are direct appropriations of Herman Dooyeweerd’s earlier criticisms of the 
alleged scholasticism in the neo-Calvinist thought of Kuyper, Bavinck, and 
Woltjer. Van Til advances beyond Dooyeweerd only with respect to quantity 
insofar as he applies Dooyeweerd’s overarching criticism against Bavinck’s so-
called “critical realism” with more specificity and to more points of Bavinck’s 
formulations. Nevertheless, Van Til’s criticisms are manifestly unoriginal.
This fact has been entirely overlooked both by the Copernican line of Van Til 
scholarship which has recently attempted to recapitulate Van Til’s criticisms 
against Bavinck’s theology and by the scholars who have offered either 
rejoinders to Van Til’s criticisms or ameliorating analyses of Van Til’s criticisms. 
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Hence the scholarship on both sides of this issue has failed to penetrate to the 
heart of the matter, namely, the tumultuous debate at De Vrije Universiteit over 
gereformeerde scholastiek. Insofar as Van Til clearly sides with Dooyeweerd’s 
position in this debate and appropriates Dooyeweerd’s view of scholasticism 
accordingly, Van Til’s criticisms of the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought 
must be interpreted in light of that historical context. For this reason the 
Copernican interpretation of Van Til’s role as the anti-scholastic hero of Reformed 
theology in America is misdirected; for, if there is such an anti-scholastic 
champion (which itself is a highly debatable assertion), it would have to be 
Dooyeweerd, not Van Til, insofar as the latter appropriates his formulations from 
the former.
D. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are methodologically unsound.
Van Til’s arguments against the alleged scholasticism in Bavinck’s thought 
are subjective. Rather than engaging Bavinck’s own understanding of 
scholasticism, he imposes a subjective norm (i.e., Dooyeweerd’s definition of 
“scholasticism”) upon Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, and then he further posits a 
bipolarity based upon this norm—the scholastic Bavinck versus the truly 
Reformed Bavinck. The problem with this method is that anyone can be polarized 
and dismissed as “scholastic” according to the mere whims of the one wielding 
the critique. However, by merely imposing a subjective norm upon Bavinck’s 
thought, Van Til does not prove that Bavinck succumbs to the alleged evil 
inherent in Dooyeweerd’s definition, namely, anti-Christian synthesis thinking. 
Nor does Van Til prove that Bavinck is in fact bipolar. Rather, both the two 
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Bavincks supposition and the norm upon which it is based are abstractions that 
are imposed upon Bavinck’s thought from without.
Furthermore, the subjectivity of Van Til’s criticisms against Bavinck is 
illustrated most strikingly (and most perplexingly) in his attempt to dismiss 
Dooyeweerd’s thought as “scholastic” using a similar argument; for, if the very 
source from which Van Til appropriates his definition of scholasticism (i.e., 
Dooyeweerd’s criticisms of scholasticism) is itself beset by scholasticism, then, by 
implication, the very definition of scholasticism that Van Til appropriates from 
Dooyeweerd is itself scholastic, and Van Til would then be guilty of the same 
charge of scholasticism that he levels against Dooyeweerd! Hence Van Til’s 
subjective argument leads straight into a reductio ad absurdum.
Additionally, even if his subjective critiques were granted methodological 
validity for the sake of argument, then Van Til’s conclusion would be wholly 
subjective nonetheless; for, the conclusion would be that since Van Til knows 
Bavinck’s thought better than Bavinck himself knows it, then Van Til may 
properly grant himself the right to assert that the way to move “beyond” Bavinck 
is to build upon the alleged non-scholastic Bavinck. However, what if another 
scholar were to come along and argue the opposite, namely, that the way to move 
beyond the non-scholastic Bavinck is to follow the scholastic Bavinck? By what 
standard would the case be decided?
For all of these reasons Van Til’s criticisms proceed from a subjective terminus 
a quo and lead to a subjective terminus ad quem, and thus they are 
methodologically unsound. 
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E. Van Til’s criticisms of Bavinck are historically untenable.
Concomitant with the subjective form of Van Til’s criticisms is the fact that 
these criticism lack objective historical material for their basis. Van Til does not 
analyze in any meaningful way Bavinck’s own thoughts on the history of 
scholasticism. Nor does he analyze any Reformed scholastic theologian from 
Calvin to Kuyper. Rather, the historical scope of his entire analysis of 
scholasticism is limited exclusively to Thomas Aquinas’ theology and to neo-
Calvinist theology (i.e., Kuyper and Bavinck). Hence Van Til’s use of the term 
“scholasticism” is more of an ahistorical philosophical construct that he employs 
merely for polemical purposes rather than an historically accurate description of 
the nature and purpose of school-based theology in its medieval, Reformation, or 
post-Reformation expressions. Furthermore, insofar as Van Til’s philosophical 
construct imposes an anachronistic understanding of scholasticism upon 
Bavinck’s thought and hence precludes an historically accurate analysis of 
Bavinck’s theological formulations either in their own context or in relation to the 
three centuries of Reformed scholastic theology that precedes Bavinck’s day, his 
criticisms are misguided, inaccurate, and historically untenable. In this regard we 
affirm Mattson’s conclusion that Van Til’s criticisms are based largely upon 
cursory and uncharitable readings of Bavinck’s Dogmatiek, a point which is 
somewhat surprising given the copious amount of detailed theological 
formulations that Van Til appropriates from Bavinck’s theology for formal, 
material, and polemical purposes.
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F. Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought is dialectical.
This latter point regarding the historical untenability of Van Til’s criticisms is 
closely related to the dialectical tension inherent in Van Til’s simultaneous 
pervasive appropriations and stringent criticisms of Bavinck’s thought. On the 
one hand, Van Til’s Reformed apologetics largely presupposes Bavinck’s 
Reformed dogmatics as the source of the dogmas that Van Til seeks to defend 
and vindicate vis-à-vis all forms of modern heterodoxy. Yet, on the other hand, to 
speak in terms of Van Til’s own metaphors, the apologist-daughter slaps her 
dogmatician-daddy in the face by leveling totalizing critiques against several 
fundamental features of Bavinck’s theology. Therefore, a pressing dialectical 
tension arises from Van Til’s bipolar assessment of Bavinck’s theology: If Van Til 
presses his arguments against Bavinck’s scholasticism to their logical conclusion 
(i.e., that Bavinck’s theology is beset by non-Christian synthesis thinking), then 
he undercuts his own pervasive formal, material, and polemical appropriations 
of Bavinck’s thought. 
However, he clearly does not want to go all the way with such criticisms. 
Hence he settles for a half-way house—the bipolar Bavinck. Such a conclusion, 
however, is not only open to the charge of subjectivity, but also is inconsistent 
with Van Til’s penchant for pressing the principles of his polemical interlocutors 
to their logical conclusions.
This dialectical tension is the most likely root cause of the Copernican 
interpretations of Van Til’s thought. For, when Van Til’s criticisms of neo-
Calvinist scholasticism are pressed to their logical conclusion, then the net result 
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is that the only truly Reformed, non-scholastic thinker left standing in the entire 
history of the church is Cornelius Van Til. Neither Kuyper, nor Bavinck, nor 
Dooyeweerd, nor any of the Princeton theologians pass Van Til’s scholasticism 
test; for, according to him they all fell prey to various degrees of synthesis 
thinking. Hence the self-styled “Van Tilians” can claim accurately, to a limited 
extent, to be following the lead of their teacher when they laud him as the 
greatest theologian since Calvin or the most profound apologist since Aquinas. 
For, when Van Til’s criticisms are pressed to their logical conclusion, then such 
hyperbolic inferences would be warranted. Nevertheless, such claims only 
represent one side of the dialectical tension.
G. Van Til’s appropriation of Bavinck’s thought is more positive 
than polemical.
All things considered, the Copernican interpretations remain misguided, 
despite the negative side of the dialectical tension to which they can appeal; for, 
Van Til’s positive appropriations of Bavinck’s thought in particular and neo-
Calvinist thought in general far outweigh his perplexing and, at points, self-
contradictory criticisms. For example, based solely upon his pervasive 
appropriations of Bavinck’s thought and his high esteem for Bavinck’s life and 
work, it is self-evident that Van Til appreciates and emulates Bavinck’s theology 
more than he criticizes it. Furthermore, it is clear that Van Til knows that his own 
work cannot stand without Bavinck’s. For these reasons Van Til’s writings simply 
do not provide warrant for the conclusion that Van Til is a Copernicus; for, 
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scholars need look no further than his most basic presupposition to see that Van 
Til is wholly dependent upon his neo-Calvinist context. However, his writings do 
provide sufficient warrant for inferring not only that Van Til’s criticisms of 
Bavinck’s thought, despite their totalistic form, are in fact intended to be 
understood as subsidiary in nature, but also that Van Til’s overall attitude toward 
Bavinck is overwhelmingly positive. This attitude is well summarized by Van 
Til’s conclusion to his review of R. H. Bremmer’s Herman Bavinck en zijn  
tijdgenoten:
What lover of the gospel can help but be thankful to God for the life and 
labor of Herman Bavinck? He, perhaps more than others has inspired 
them to enter fully, and sympathetically into the problematics of modern 
thinking in every sphere of human interest. Nihil humani mihi alienum est. 
This motto was his. He knew he was saved by grace alone. He knew this 
all his life. He knew this especially on his death-bed. It is the Christ for 
whom Bavinck labored so prodigiously and in whom he died so 
peaceably, in whose name alone we may and must say: ”Where are the 
wise, where are the scribes, where are the disputers of this age? Hath not 
God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that the world by 
its wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching 
to save those that believed” (I Cor. 1:19–20).1
1. Cornelius Van Til, “As I Think of Bavinck,” International Reformed Bulletin 9, no. 27 (1966): 
26.
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